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Summary
Accounting for indigenous forms of sovereignty poses difficult problems for the 
discipline of International Relations, which is framed by the story of the modern, 
territorial European state. Most attempts to conceptualize Aboriginal nations in the 
international system confirm the modern state as the benchmark for sovereignty. In this 
dissertation I address the problem of how to incorporate Aboriginal peoples into IR 
without granting the modern European state as the only legitimate form of sovereignty. 
I proceed through an examination of key moments in the European colonization of the 
Americas, from first contact through the geographic isolation of indigenous peoples onto 
reservations. In each case it is demonstrated that the assumption of “formal”  sovereignty 
– based on recognition, and with insufficient regard for historical context – underpinning 
conventional IR accounts of colonialism is inadequate to theorize colonialism. I argue 
that colonialism is not a story of political-legal recognition (sovereignty), but of political-
economic social relations – specifically the appropriation of land (property). 
My contribution to the discipline is two-fold. First, I contribute to a richer understanding 
of sovereignty. Establishing sovereignty  over territory in the New World allowed the 
English (and then American) state to set the legal, political and cultural framework for the 
private acquisition of land. Second, rather than using indigenous nations only as a foil for 
modern sovereignty, or as victims in a narrative of colonial domination, I make the case 
for incorporating the political agency of Indigenous communities into IR’s account of 
colonialism. Far from the passive victims implied by conventional IR, they were central 
to a dynamic history of resistance and compromise, and their interactions with Europeans 
shaped modern sovereignty in lasting ways.
Contents
 1! Introduction
 1! ! Research Question
 7! ! Beyond Formal Sovereignty: My Core Theoretical Methodology
11! ! David Harvey and Space as Social Relations
19! ! Summary and Structure of the Argument
25! 2. Review of the Literature
34! ! The “Iroquois Diplomacy” Debate
39! ! Sovereignty as Discourse: Shaw, Beier, and Stewart-Makarere
43! ! State-centrism Reconsidered in Spatial Terms
47! ! Conclusion
49! 3. The Modern State Emerges out of England
53! ! Imperial Absolutist Spain
59! ! The Vitorian Tradition of International Law
63! ! English Property Rights in the New World
67! ! Enclosures
70! ! English Colonial Charters
74! ! Improvement and Waste Land
76! ! Land Occupation and the Idea of Waste Land
79! ! Locke and Land in the New World
84! 4. “The Dissolving Effects of Space”: Private Initiative and Aboriginal Land 
! ! Tenure on the Frontier
87! ! English Settler Colonialism on the Frontier
95! ! Why Would Indigenous People Sell Their Land? Indigenous Concepts of 
! ! ! Land and Property
106! ! Surveying, Maps, Archives, and other State Technologies
110! ! Investment Follows Improvement
112! ! The Royal Proclamation of 1763
122! 5. Post-Revolutionary Land Policies in the US
123! ! British Dominance After the French and Indian War: Continuities and 
! ! ! Changes in Land Policy
131! ! The State Regains Control of Purchasing Land
135! ! Treaties
138! ! The Marshall Doctrine: Johnson v. McIntosh
143! ! Culture and Civilization: The “Myth of America”
149! ! The Transition from “Greek” to “Roman” Colonialism
152! 6. Removals, Reservations, and Allotments
152! ! Removals
157! ! Cherokee Resistance and the Trust Relationship
163! ! Governance: The Case of the Muskogee
168! ! Reservations
172! ! Race and Manifest Destiny
173! ! Treaties and Allotment
183! 7. Conclusion
186! ! The Relationship Between Sovereignty and Property
193! Bibliography
Introduction 
 
Research Question 
The modern system of international relations is dominated by sovereign, territorial nation-
states, but it also subsumes “pre-modern,” non-state forms of sovereignty. Accounting for 
such forms poses difficult problems for a discipline framed by the story of European state 
sovereignty. Indigenous peoples historically have not adopted the territorial nation-state 
that the discipline of International Relations (IR) conventionally views as the form of 
sovereignty required to enter the international sphere.1 The IR community — long guided 
by a commitment to the state as the main unit of analysis — has tended to ignore 
Aboriginal experiences or dismiss them as a matter for domestic politics or anthropology 
                                                 
1 The terminological considerations here are complex and politically charged. How to refer to the people who 
lived in North America before European contact? In the social sciences, the convention has long been to use 
the term Amerindian, although it appears much less frequently in the recent scholarship, and rarely if ever in 
humanities scholarship. With the obvious exception of direct quotations, I have chosen not to use that term, 
nor related forms such as Native American, largely because of their colonial resonances; as well, they seem to 
normalize the very conflation of racial identity and state citizenship that this project challenges. When an 
adjective is called for, I have typically used indigenous, as in this sentence. The noun form is trickier. I like 
the term First Nations — which has recently acquired a high level of currency in Canada – because it is 
consistent with one of the main themes of this dissertation, namely the need to distinguish between nations 
and states, and so I do use it occasionally, usually when referring specifically to indigenous political entities. 
In the US, the term Indian has long been – and remains – likely the most widely used, by Indians and non-
Indians alike, even though its popularity is decreasing due to its colonial associations. In an act of rhetorical 
reappropriation, political radicals such as the American Indian Movement began using the term. I also use the 
noun forms Indigenous peoples or Aboriginal peoples, because these are among the most widely used terms 
of self-identification at this time, and also the most-used in international venues. I never use Aboriginals for 
the admittedly subjective reason that (to my ear at least) it sounds less respectful, perhaps because it echoes 
Aborigines, which was long used to describe the original peoples of Australia and is now considered 
insensitive or even offensive. My decision not to choose one term exclusively was made in large part 
precisely because the issue of terminology is so politically sensitive and I feel more comfortable aspiring to a 
restless meta-critical stance regarding terminology than I do with choosing one imperfect option among many.  
 Who  exactly  “Indigenous  peoples”  refers  to  is  itself  the  subject  of  a  complex  literature. The United 
Nations Working Definition of Indigenous Peoples is widely cited, and it is consistent with how I intend the 
term:  “Indigenous  populations  are  composed  of  the  existing  descendants  of  peoples  who  inhabited  the  present  
territory of a country wholly or partially at the time when persons of a different culture or ethnic origin 
arrived there from other parts of the world, overcame them, and by conquest, settlement, or other means, 
reduced then to a non-dominant or colonial situation; who today live more in conformity with their particular 
social, economic and cultural customs and traditions than with the institutions of the country of which they 
now form a part, under a State structure which incorporates mainly the national, social and cultural 
characteristics of other segments of the population which are predominant”  (quoted in Wilmer 1993:216) . 
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on the grounds that indigenous communities are not sovereign international actors. While 
this is a superficially elegant solution to the problem of accounting for Aboriginal peoples, 
it really just begs the question — “proving”   indigenous   nations   are   not   sovereign 
international actors by assuming they are not — and is profoundly Eurocentric. It is less an 
analysis of Aboriginal forms of sovereignty than it is a disciplinary self-definition that 
excludes them.  
 A number of attempts to address Aboriginal experiences in IR have followed a 
distinctive logic, according to which it is argued that traditional indigenous communities 
have a status equivalent to states. This approach, commonly associated with a liberal 
discourse of recognition, rights, and national self-determination, actually reproduces the 
Eurocentric norm of sovereignty by confirming the nation-state form as the benchmark for 
legitimacy. To put it another way, both traditional IR, which excludes indigenous forms of 
sovereignty from IR, as well as liberal attempts to include them through an appeal to 
equivalency, are united in invoking the modern territorial state as the standard for 
sovereignty. How is it possible to bring Aboriginal peoples into IR without granting the 
modern European state as the only legitimate form of sovereignty? That is this 
dissertation’s main research question. I address this question through a theoretically 
controlled historical reconstruction of key moments2 in the European colonization of the 
Americas, from first European contact until most remaining Aboriginal peoples had been 
isolated on reservations in the early twentieth century. The dissertation is organized to 
highlight the evolution of land appropriation through a series of consecutive different 
modes. 
                                                 
2 Here  and  throughout,  I  use  the  term  “moment”  as  per  Jindrich  Zeleny  (1980),  who  defines  it  as  “one  of  the  
elements of a complex conceptual entity” (xi). 
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I employ a synthesis of two related strands of historical-materialist theory to 
challenge the standard IR portrayal of colonialism as sovereignty (political-legal relations). 
Instead I show colonialism as the alienation and expropriation of land (political-economic 
relations). I consider the economic and political dimensions of sovereignty together. I 
situate these political-economic relations in   a   “frontier” colonial context, where the 
establishment of state sovereignty could not happen as organically as it did in Europe. The 
process involved attempts to project certain practices onto a space that was not already 
ordered for them. The resulting contradictions and slippages highlight aspects of state 
sovereignty that are commonly overlooked in the IR literature. As a result, this project is 
able to address the historical imposition of the state on Indigenous peoples from, so to 
speak, both sides: it restores the agency of Indigenous peoples to our account and at the 
same time offers new insights into sovereignty.   
 To date, the best attempts to address my research question followed the indigenous 
turn in IR, in works by Marshall Beier, Neta Crawford, Paul Keal, Kerena Shaw, Makere 
Stewart-Harawiwa, and Franke Wilmer, among others. Far from granting the nation-state as 
the only legitimate form of sovereignty, these writers set out to challenge the positivist 
certainties of mainstream IR by mounting a full-on attack on the authority of state 
sovereignty. They draw upon constructivist and post-structuralist IR theories, sometimes 
blended with traditional indigenous forms of knowledge, to challenge the very notion of 
sovereignty, typically by portraying it as fundamentally a story of recognition. Because 
sovereignty is achieved through international recognition, and recognition is effectively 
controlled by the most powerful states in the system, sovereignty enforces the normative 
international consensus.  Or  (to  modify  Alexander  Wendt’s  famous  argument  that  “anarchy  
is  what  states  make  of   it”),  sovereignty   is  what   the  most  powerful  states   say   it   is (Wendt 
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1992).  The works associated with the indigenous turn in IR enrich the field by rectifying 
empirical omissions, and illuminating the inter-subjective social construction and 
reproduction  of  norms  that  determine  what  is  “legitimate”  sovereignty.  But  they  also  open  
up new problems. They demonstrate that to address our research question adequately is 
more than just a matter of rebalancing our emphasis to include “less   state.” The 
constructivist emphasis on denying the authority of the modern sovereign state has a 
depoliticizing effect, and prevents substantial new insights into how Aboriginal interactions 
with  Europeans  shaped  the  modern  state’s  evolution  as  a  real  world-historical entity — one 
whose power, influence and authority cannot be wished away.3  
  I argue there is an assumption of formal sovereignty built into the traditional IR 
account  of  colonialism,  and  shared  by  liberal  and  constructivist  critics  alike.  By  “formal”  I  
mean the conventional understanding of sovereignty based on political-legal recognition, 
and with insufficient regard for historical context.4 The assumption of formal sovereignty 
                                                 
3 An incisive critique of social constructivism in international legal theory can be found in Bowring (2010). 
Surveying the recent constructivist literature in IR theory, with an emphasis on law (and in particular 
Christian Reus-Smit’s  The Politics of International Law), he shows that constructivist theory is fundamentally 
idealist  and  inherently  apolitical,  springing  as  it  does  from  the  same  root  as  Habermas’  “linguistic  turn.”  
Bowring  contrasts  constructivists’  commitment  to  normative  and  ideational structures with the work of the 
scientific realists, which is based upon the much stronger foundational assumption that social structures such 
as nations have a real and objective existence. Bowring cites approvingly China Miéville, who has 
synthesized historical-materialist approaches to IR and international law, and who criticizes constructivism, in 
which  “the  structures  of  everyday  life  that  surround  us  — such as international law — are deemed the 
accretions of ideas....This is a radically idealist philosophy, privileging abstract concepts over the specific 
historical context in which certain ideas take hold, and how”  (quoted  in  Bowring  2010:111). 
 Teschke  and  Heine’s  chapter  in  Mark  Rupert  and  Hazel  Smith’s  collection  Historical Materialism 
and Globalization defends Marxist IR against the attacks, levelled by social constructivism and neo-Weberian 
historical sociology, that it is unable to account for the role of the state and for change in the system of inter-
state relations because of its reductive economic structuralism. The authors show how constructivist and 
NWHS  approaches  distort  the  work  of  both  Marx  and  Weber,  and  how  Marxist  dialectics  provide  “a  coherent  
approach for conceptualizing the nexus between conscious agency and institutions on the one hand, and the 
nexus between political authority and economic forces on the other....[as well as for] theorizing international 
change”  (2002:  156-166).  
4 An illustrative example of this view is found in James (1986), for whom sovereignty is a straightforward 
matter of fact; it either exists or it does not, with constitutional independence being its main attribute. 
“Sovereignty,”  he  writes,  “while  it  does  not  usually  end  in  formalities,  always  starts  there” (143). Although he 
does not specifically address indigenous appeals for formal recognition, James does posit that membership in 
the United Nations is evidence of, rather than a criterion for, sovereignty. In other words, if a state has 
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conceals political-economic relations, and it excludes non-state forms of sovereignty. 
Discussions in the IR literature of the expansion and universalization of the state form, and 
its confrontation with non-state indigenous nations, cannot be placed outside this 
assumption of sovereignty-as-recognition. On it rests the view that the establishment of 
modern state sovereignty in the New World was essentially a binary phenomenon: it did not 
exist, and then it did. In contrast, I argue that the establishment of state sovereignty in 
North America was a complex, uneven, and politically contested phenomenon. It was 
relational and dynamic, rather than formal and static.5 To substantiate this thesis mandates 
the adoption of a theoretical approach that allows us to move beyond formal sovereignty by 
neither taking the state form for granted, nor dispensing with it altogether. It cannot simply 
point   to   “external”   or   formal   qualities,   such   as   the   authority   to   govern  or   recognition   by  
other   states   in   the   international   system.   It   must   instead   open   up   the   “internal”   social  
relations and contradictions that drove and shaped the expansion of the state form. An 
analysis framed by formal sovereignty has little to say about such forces, which include 
political conflict between Europeans and First Nations, tensions between individual 
colonists and their states, and class antagonisms. From European contact at the end of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
achieved legal sovereignty, recognition and rights in international law follow from there. In this way, 
indigenous nations — by definition non-state entities — can never be sovereign international actors. 
5 My emphasis on a relational narrative is particularly important because I am drawing on historical 
materialism to theorize indigenous history, a potentially fruitful but traditionally fraught combination. As 
Ward  Churchill  (1996)  argues,  “the  dialectical  theoretical  methodology  adopted  by  Marx  stands  — at least in 
principle — in as stark an oppositional contrast, and for all the same reasons, to the predominant and 
predominating tradition of linear and nonrelational European logic (exemplified by John Locke, David Hume, 
and Sir Isaac Newton) as do indigenous systems of knowledge. It follows from this that there should be a 
solid conceptual intersection between Marx, Marxism, and indigenous peoples”   (462-463).  However, 
Churchill continues, Marxism abandons a truly dialectical, or relational, perspective to the extent it assumes 
the primacy of humanity over nature. This can be contrasted with traditional Aboriginal philosophies, which 
rest upon a view of the universe as an interrelational  whole;;  “the  whole  can  never  be  understood  without  a  
knowledge of the function and meaning of each of the parts, while the parts cannot be understood other than 
in   the   context   of   the   whole….Far   from   engendering   some   sense   of   ‘natural’   human   dominion   over   other  
relations, the indigenous view virtually requires a human behavior geared to keeping humanity within nature, 
maintaining relational balance”  (461-464).  
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fifteenth century until the turn of the twentieth century, the peoples indigenous to the 
territory that is now Canada and the United States lost almost all their land. It was a period 
of violent dispossession and tenacious resistance, coloured by intense inter-imperial 
rivalries, ultimately entailing the loss of millions of Aboriginal lives and the extinction of 
cultures.6 Examining this history through the lens of formal sovereignty makes this 
politically contested, culturally complex and geographically uneven process appear to have 
been both timeless and bloodless. 
 My theoretical approach is a synthesis of two complementary historical-materialist 
theories. First is the notion of the separation of the political and the economic in capitalism, 
which I extend to the international level, positing the separation between sovereignty and 
property as the equivalent in IR. Second, because contrasting indigenous forms of political 
organization with European state sovereignty highlights a set of interesting questions about 
the role of property — specifically land — in constituting sovereignty, I turn to spatial 
analysis. This synthetic methodology allows me to develop and sustain two positions. First, 
sovereignty and property are deeply linked.  The modern state was literally grounded in 
property; establishing sovereignty over territory in the New World allowed the English (and 
then American) state to set the legal, political, and cultural framework for the private 
acquisition of land.7 This took the form of the privatization and commodification of land. 
Aboriginal systems of landed property rights, in which land could be subject to multiple 
                                                 
6 While exact population figures remain elusive, it is commonly calculated that at least 90 percent of the 
indigenous  population  was  killed.  James  Tully  writes,  “the  Aboriginal  population  of  what  is  now  commonly  
called the United States and Canada was reduced from 8 to 12 million in 1600 to half a million by 1900, when 
the genocide subsided”   (1995:19). Ward Churchill cites the work of historical anthropologist Henry F. 
Dobyns and US Census Bureau reports to argue that total hemispheric Aboriginal population was reduced by 
an estimated 90 percent, from a peak of 125 million (1997:1). Also cf. Stannard, 1992 on the case of Mexico. 
7 On  this  point  I  am  inspired  by  James  C.  Scott’s  Seeing Like a State (1998), which argues that various major 
schemes   led  by  “modernist”  centralizing  states  and   intended   to   improve   the  human  condition  have  actually  
been oppressive because they undermine local knowledge and autonomy. Scott specifically mentions 
rationalized land measurement and land tenure. 
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and overlapping ownerships, were replaced with one in which land was subject to exclusive 
ownership and could be privately transferred at law.  Second, there was a specifically 
spatial character to the new form of land tenure, which was based on territorial exclusivity. 
Simply put, a functionally organized system of land rights was replaced by a spatially 
organized one.  
 
Beyond Formal Sovereignty: My Core Theoretical Methodology 
 To make an argument involving Indigenous peoples using the tools of IR poses 
complex and interesting theoretical problems. It necessarily involves taking a double 
stance,  in  that  it  also  requires  a  critical  interrogation  of  some  of  IR’s  core  approaches  and  
assumptions. For our purpose, the most important of these is the focus on state sovereignty. 
The  assumption  of  “formal”  sovereignty,  which  I  critique  here,  is  a  product  of  mainstream  
IR’s   more   general   focus   on   sovereignty, or inter-state relations, to the exclusion of 
property, or social relations.   
 According to Wood (1981), historical materialism rests on the key insight that each 
mode of production has its own specific logic, or laws of motion. (An idea reflected in my 
thesis that we must view the imposition of the modern state form on indigenous peoples of 
North America in social and geographical context.) An insistence on historical specificity 
also underpins groundbreaking work by Brenner (2003). Brenner argues that capitalism is 
best understood as a social system based upon social property relations between producers 
and non-producers. Under capitalism, producers have lost direct access to their means of 
subsistence — unlike producers in a feudal system, they are no longer required to hand over 
a portion of what they produce to a lord — and thus they must trade their labour and the 
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products of their labour through the market system. This means producers have both 
economic freedom and political freedom. Surplus production is no longer extracted from 
them using direct force or political coercion; instead this process is mediated through the 
market system. Wood and Brenner portray capitalism as fundamentally a system of social-
property relations. Thus, capitalism is not only an economic system but a political one as 
well, and the core of the interrelation between the economic and the political is social-
property relations.8 The specific form of political authority associated with capitalism is the 
modern state.  
 This insight regarding the connection between capitalism and the modern state is the 
nexus that connects the Wood-Brenner thesis with the argument I develop in this 
dissertation. If, following Wood and Brenner, the origin of capitalism entails fundamentally 
a shift from direct extraction (as in the relationship between lord and serf) to economic 
exploitation, this gets at what is for our purposes the distinguishing characteristic of the 
modern state as it emerged out of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England: the 
separation between the political and the economic. This is what distinguishes it from the 
feudal state, in which property was not owned privately, but rather held by the Crown — 
thus the feudal monarch enjoyed both ownership and political control over   the   nation’s 
                                                 
8 See also Rosenberg 1994 and Teschke 2003. Wood identifies the object of her theoretical stance as 
“practical,  to  illuminate  the  terrain  of  struggle  by  viewing  modes  of  production  not  as  abstract  structures but 
as they actually confront people who must act in relation to them”  (1995:25).  On the question of agency, 
Wood highlights  E.P.  Thompson’s  work  as  a  touchstone  within  the  historical-materialist literature because, 
she argues, Thompson is almost uniquely able to overcome the gap between the economistic determinism of 
structural  Marxists  and  a  vaguely  theorized  humanism.  His  work  shows  that  “the  economic”  is  always  
inherently social and political, because accumulation and exploitation are based on human relations. 
According  to  Wood,  Thompson  effectively  addresses  the  core  problem  of  how  to  reconcile  the  “laws  of  
motion”  of  a  mode  of  production  with  human  agency.  She  accuses  Thompson’s  structuralist  critics,  most  
prominently Althusser, of being essentially  ahistorical,  while  Thompson  sees  “historical  determinations,  
structured processes with human agencies”  (1995:78). The emphasis on historical specificity and human 
agency (in this case of Aboriginal peoples), finds parallels in this dissertation. 
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territory.9 If  we  concretize  that  concept  by  making  “the  political”  and  “the  economic”  refer  
to more specific historical forms, we can say that they refer to the separation between 
(state) sovereignty and (private) property. This is how I translate and apply the Wood-
Brenner   thesis   to   IR.   It   follows   from   this   that  mainstream   IR’s  state-centrism results in a 
near-total focus on sovereignty, to the exclusion of property. It includes power relations 
between states, but excludes power relations across and within states.  
 In the context of a modernizing Europe, state sovereignty and private property not 
only rose coincidentally, they both took the form of territorial exclusivity. When the nation-
state emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the idea of a distinctly public 
realm emerged with it. This produced a double movement, in which private-property 
owners attempted to establish a private sphere free from the power of the state (the Crown 
and later Parliament). The modern state, as Roepke writes in a classic article, entailed two 
meanings  of  sovereignty:  “on  one  hand  it  means  the  independence  and  freedom  of  one  State  
from all others, that is, a relationship as it exists between states. On the other hand, it 
denotes the supreme and absolute power of the State within its borders and vis-a-vis other 
centres of power”   (1954:249-50; also see Aoki 1995). This phenomenon — the 
coincidental rise of the sovereign state and the sovereign, rights-bearing individual — was a 
fundamental characteristic of the modernizing state. In the immediate post-feudal context, 
the most important form of property was land. Therefore, to assert private-property rights 
was essentially a matter of keeping the Crown off of private land (Anderson 1986; also see 
Horwitz 1982). Thus the separation between sovereignty and property was underpinned 
                                                 
9 The conceptual distinction between property and sovereignty is complicated by the vernacular use of the 
terms,  in  which  “property”  often  refers  to  an  area  of  land,  or  when  we  say,  for  example,  that  Alaska  “belongs”  
to the United States. At the risk of repetition, in this dissertation I conceptualize the separation between 
property (private ownership) and sovereignty (authority  to  govern)  as  IR’s  particular  version  of  the  separation  
between   the   private   sphere   of   individual   contractual   freedom   (“the   economic”)   and the public sphere of 
government  authority  and  regulation  (“the  political”).   
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fundamentally by spatial assumptions.10  
 This insight takes on even greater significance when we examine Aboriginal forms of 
sovereignty. Some of the most significant differences between European and Aboriginal 
forms of sovereignty had to do with landed property. In medieval Europe — as in 
Aboriginal societies — land was considered fundamentally inalienable; it was not for sale, 
and not seen as a source of potential profit. But as markets emerged in modernizing 
England, land was re-imagined as marketable property. It became, in the legal terminology, 
alienable, meaning it could be privately transferred at law. In this historical context, landed 
property  developed  as  exclusionary  space  in  land  (with  the  property  owner’s  rights  legally  
protected from state encroachment and the state also providing police protection against 
intrusion by others). These two linked characteristics — that it was exclusionary space and 
that it was subject to private legal transfer — combined to make land function as a 
commodity. The commodification of land coincided with the emergence of the modern 
state: from the origins of the state, land, like any other commodity, could be a source of 
profit. In contrast, in traditional indigenous societies, land was often subject to multiple, 
non-exclusive forms of ownership, and not subject to purchase; that is, it was never 
commodified. In order to build this into our  account,  I  start  with  Wood’s  understanding  of  
the separation between the political and the economic. I then add a spatial dimension by 
drawing on complementary work by David Harvey.  
 
                                                 
10 An interesting parallel can be found with the work of the legal realists, who argued that the separation 
between public and private realms in orthodox legal thought advantaged private property owners. See, for 
example, Cohen (1954), Hale (1943), Singer (1992). The territorially bounded sovereign state has been 
privileged within IR in roughly the same way. (As Elkins (1995) notes, state sovereignty and private 
ownership both rest on a view of property that assigns rights to an owner.) And, just as the modern state and 
modern notions of property were both articulated as exclusive space, so the Anglo-American legal tradition is 
“strongly  based  on  geographically  defined  sovereigns”  (Aoki  1996:fn  1300). 
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David Harvey and Space as Social Relations  
In the simplest terms, a geographically informed approach to my topic is 
appropriate  because  colonialism   is  about   space;;  as  Cole  Harris  describes   it,   colonialism’s  
“geographical  core”  is  “the  displacement of people from their land and its repossession by 
others”   (2002:xxiv).11 We benefit from highlighting fundamental spatial features of 
colonialism, such as frontiers and reservations, in addition to historicizing the state by 
examining how the relationship between state, culture, and economy have been 
conceptualized over time, and also over the surface of the globe. But a spatial lens is not on 
its own sufficient to move beyond an assumption of the formal state. In fact, the reality that 
sovereignty and property are forms of social relations is masked by an assumption of empty 
space. Spatial theory may allow us to avoid a naturalized statism, but also carries with it the 
danger of reducing space itself to the purely formal level, in this way merely reproducing 
the assumption of empty space. To avoid these problems — to move beyond the formal 
state — we must begin with the assumption that space is relational, not static. In other 
words, we must not see space as essentially empty, without people occupying it; the 
concept of space as  a  category  allows   for  a  “focus  on  actually   lived  experiences  entailed  
attention to the spaces where these experiences take place”   (Davies   and   Niemann  
2002:559).  
The version of spatial social relations I employ here conceptualizes space in two 
senses: both the physical space of geography, and ideas about space (see Poovey 1995:27). 
It   does   not   refer   to   space   in   the   narrow   geometric   sense,   nor   in   the   sense   of   a   “fixed  
                                                 
11 Also   see   Edward   Said:   “Underlying   social   space   are   territories,   lands,   geographical   domains,   the   actual  
geographical underpinnings of the imperial, and also the cultural contest. To think about distant places, to 
colonize them, to populate or depopulate them: all of this occurs on, about or because of land. The actual 
geographical  possession  of  land  is  what  empire  in  the  final  analysis  is  all  about….Imperialism  and  the  culture  
associated with it affirm both the primacy of geography and an ideology about control of territory”  (1994:78). 
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container”  of  politics  and  economics;;  rather  it  refers  to a dynamic and ever-mutating site of 
social relations. When applied to the concept of the state, it allows us to consider each state 
in historical and geographic context. The spatial theory I use in this study is based on work 
by Harvey (1999; 2001; 2009) and Lefebvre (1991, 2009). 12  
The first major idea I take from Harvey (2009) is the distinction between absolute 
space and relative space. Absolute space is fixed, unchangeable, and continuous. In the 
logic of absolute space, a person or a place occupies a unique and exclusive place — space 
is how the individuality of people and places are identified. No two people can ever share 
the   exact   location   in   absolute   space   and   time.  At   the   social   level,   “absolute   space   is   the  
exclusionary space of private property  in  land  and  other  bounded  entities,”  including  states 
(134; also see Harvey 1999:338-339). What Harvey describes as the logic of absolute space 
underpins   the   “container”   approach   within   conventional   IR:   a   state,   for   example,   is  
identified by its unique position on a map. Absolute space is thus the space of private 
property.  There  is  one  additional  implication  of  absolute  space:  it  is  “clearly  distinguishable  
from time. Spatial ordering is one thing. Absolute time unfolding on a linear line stretching 
to an infinite future is another. History, from this perspective, has to be construed as distinct 
from Geography”  (2009:134).  
                                                 
12 Interest   in   Lefebvre’s   work   on   everyday   life,   the   city   and   urban   life,   and   sociospatial   theory   has   been  
growing for several decades. David Harvey in particular deserves credit for introducing Lefebvre to a wide 
audience through the discipline of geography. His work can be seen to build on themes developed within neo-
Gramscian IR. Indeed, Soja  claimed  that  “the  step  from  Gramsci  to  Lefebvre  is  primarily  one  of  explicitness  
and emphasis regarding   the   spatialization”   of   modern   capitalist   society (Soja 1989:90).  Yet   Lefebvre’s  
writings on state formation and state theory — in particular the four-volume De  L’Etat published in the late 
1970s — remain largely unknown in Anglo-American IR, largely because there is no English translation of 
key  works.  Neil  Brenner  and  Stuart  Elden  have  made  huge  recent  advances  in  making  Lefebvre’s  state  theory  
available   in  English.  Their  edited  volume  of  English   translations  of  Lefebvre’s  writings  on   the   state,   State, 
Space, World: Lefebvre and the Survival of Capitalism, (2009) is particularly important. I wish to express my 
gratitude for their generous collegiality in making advance portions this book available to me in manuscript 
form. 
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This is a fundamental difference between absolute space and relative space: relative 
space is the space of change, process, and motion. In this way, relative space — which we 
might call the Einsteinian counterpart to Euclidean absolute space — cannot be understood 
separately from time. For Harvey this is the key theoretical linkage between geography and 
historical materialism:  “all  geography  is  historical  geography  and  all  history  is  geographical  
history.”  (2009:135).13 This  demands  a  terminological  shift  from  the  “absolute  space”  and  
“absolute   time”   to   “relative   space-time.”  Whereas   no   one   can   occupy   exactly   the   same  
space at exactly the same time as anyone else, many people can be in the same place 
relative to someone else at the same time. Moreover, the concept of relative space-time 
allows the analyst to consider each state in historical and spatial context.14 By adding 
historical and geographical specificity, we can avoid the trap of seeing the state as an ideal 
type or pure essence and keep the concepts of absolute space and relative space-time in 
dialectical tension.  
While the terminology of absolute space and relative space-time are specific to 
Harvey,   Henri   Lefebvre   developed   similar   insights,   writing,   for   example,   “the   space   of  
property cannot be established without its corollary: state space”   (Lefebvre   2009:249). 
Lefebvre’s   notion   of   abstract   space   is   particularly useful to understanding how the 
conceptual abstraction of the nation state acquired sufficient authority to influence social 
                                                 
13 Harvey  also  includes  “relational  space,”  by  which  he  means  the  space  of  dreams  and  memories. 
14 The concept of relative space-time   should   not   seen   as   “better   than”   that   of   absolute   space.   There   is   a  
danger, as Harvey notes, of viewing spatial concepts in purely relational terms: if the state is seen as nothing 
more than a political idea, a social relation with no basis in material reality, the logical conclusion is to 
assume that we can make it disappear simply by not thinking about it. (2009:272) This approach of dismissing 
the state as irrelevant — if the state is merely a construct, it can be banished by discursive fiat — has been 
famously employed recently by Hardt and Negri in Empire. Nonetheless, we can still recognize that the 
dominance of the absolute theory of space and time exerts a powerful disciplinary force by providing a simple 
way to identify, define and distinguish — and thus control — its   population.   “The  modern   state,”  Harvey  
asserts,   “could   not   be   what   it   is   without”   the   hegemony   of   the absolute theory of space and time; that 
dominance  is  a  “’condition  of  possibility’  for  the  perpetuation  of  capitalist  and  state  powers”  (2009:270). 
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relations. According   to   Lefebvre’s   complementary   work,   the   territorial   nation-state is 
neither eternally fixed (as per neo-realist IR), nor only-recently eroding (as per most 
contemporary non-realists), but constantly being reconfigured16 (cf. Lefebvre 1991; 
Brenner 1997; Elden 2004:211-245). Capitalism’s   distinctive   spatiality   entails   the  
production of geographically uneven development by producing abstract space, which is 
driven by three simultaneous  characteristics: it is homogenizing; it is fragmented; and it is 
hierarchical. The expansion of the inter-state system as I am describing it was superficially 
paradoxical. On the one hand it was homogenizing, taking a Western European model of 
political organization, the nation-state, and implementing it globally (if unevenly). At the 
same time, the very process of homogenization was based upon fragmentation, in that it 
involved systematically marking divisions, lines of inclusion and exclusion in the form of 
national borders. In De  L’Etat, Lefebvre writes: 
“capitalistic   space   is   simultaneously   homogenous   and   fractured.   Isn’t   this  
absurd, impossible? No. On the one hand, this space is homogenous because 
within it, all is equivalent, exchangeable, interchangeable; because it is a 
space that is bought and sold, and exchange can only occur between units 
that are equivalent, interchangeable. On the other hand, this space is 
fractured because it is processed in the form of lots and parcels, and sold on 
this basis; it is thus fragmented. These aspects of capitalistic space are 
shaped both within the realm of the commodity, in which everything is 
equivalent, and within the realm of the State, in which everything is 
controlled.”  (2009:233) 
 
                                                 
16 Echoing  Marx’s  account  of  the  contradictions  between  the  city  and  the  countryside, Lefebvre developed his 
concept  of  social  space  in  part  through  the  explorations  of  urbanization.  At  first  this  engagement  with  Marx’s  
work  on  the  city  was  quite  direct,  as  the  title  to  Lefebvre’s  1972  book  La Pensée marxiste et la ville makes 
clear. Key concepts within the urban problematique, which Lefebvre developed in subsequent books, 
included   the  struggle  for  control  over  “the  right   to   the  city,”  and   the  need  for  an  “urban   revolution.”  These  
concepts remind us that for Lefebvre spatiality is highly political and closely related to class struggle. But 
equally   importantly,   we  must   keep   in  mind   that   “urban”   did   not   refer   narrowly   to   cities,   but   as   a   kind   of  
metaphor for the spatialization of modern capitalism and in particular the way its core social relations of 
production  are   reproduced   through   state  planning.  The  notion  of  a   “planned”  economy,  which   is  central   to  
Lefebvre’s  concept  of  state  space,  should  not  be  confused  with  a  centrally  planned  economy,  although  that  is  
one example of the phenomenon to which Lefebvre refers. The survival of modern capitalism, according to 
Lefebvre, rests on a socially mystified spatiality, a set of spatial arrangements obscured by ideology. 
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The state produces homogeneity, equivalence, while the market tends to fracture. Space is 
fractured through exchange. In other words, the state and the market perform contradictory 
functions, but ultimately work together to produce capitalistic space.  
The apparent paradox between homogenization and fragmentation can further be 
explained  with  reference  to  the  principle  of  “functional  equivalence,”  which  was  imported  
from Euclidean geometry into political theory by Thomas Hobbes. As used by Hobbes, 
“functional  equivalence”  holds   that  every  subject  of   the  state   is  a   theoretically  equivalent  
unit. This way of thinking repudiated the early-modern ideas of divinely assigned social 
roles  or  “stations.”  It  was  adopted by Adam Smith, for whom it formed the basis of homo 
economicus, and thus geometric formalism became foundational to classical political 
economy (Poovey 1995:29). Lefebvre   holds   that   the   “principle   of   equivalence”   is   a  
foundational strategy of the production of modern state spatiality. Equivalence in this case 
does not imply equality — in fact, quite the contrary — but rather a formal designation that 
incorporates space into the realm of the commodity. Space that is both homogenous and 
fragmented is exchangeable, meaning it can be bought and sold in a market system. 
Functional equivalence extends the realm of the commodity, and allows commodities to be 
measured in terms of exchange value: 
Marx argues in the first chapter of Capital vol. 1 that proponents of free 
trade  and  mercantilism  alike  “operate  under  the  assumption  that  ‘value  and  
its magnitude arise from their mode of expression as exchange-value,’  
whereas  Marx  argues   that   ‘the   form  of  value,   that   is   the   expression  of   the  
value of a commodity, arises from the nature of commodity-value.’  In  other  
words, by representing the exchangibility of commodities as a natural 
attribute of the object, and thus as the source or ground of value, both 
mercantilists and free traders fail to consider the multiform, potentially 
antagonistic social relations that produce heterogeneous commodities — 
chief among them the commodity labour-power — that can be exchanged as 
if  they  were  equal.”  (Kazanjian  2003:213) 
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The   reason   equivalence   does   not  mean   “equality”   arises from the fact that, in the global 
context, the relations between states are governed by the principle of uneven development: 
the more industrialized and urbanized countries make best use of new technologies, exert 
relatively greater influence over global finance, and dominate political discourse. 
 As the modern territorial state form spread, it carried with it a range of key spatial 
assumptions regarding property. A classical liberal notion of property rights allowed land to 
be abstracted onto documents, subject to exclusive individual ownership, and easily 
exchangeable. Land claims were made contingent on improving the land. Membership in a 
political community was assumed to take the form of exclusive citizenship and arise from 
residency within a territorial state. Such basic assumptions were incompatible with 
indigenous understandings of landed property and political authority. These modern 
concepts acted as technologies of appropriation. They allowed for the transformation of 
land tenure in North America from a functionally organized system to a spatially organized 
one. This was the framework through which land was commodified; it could then be 
acquired by whites. 
This process, while ultimately overwhelming, was not inexorable. It was politically 
and militarily contested, and complicated by the implications of projecting state practices 
onto a space that was not already ordered for them. For example, in the metropolis, owning 
land was a relatively straightforward sign of social and political status. In the colonial 
context, however, a number of complications — regarding the relative status of different 
forms of land tenure, of indigenous vs. settler property rights, of different types of settler 
interests, among others — could not be avoided. As a result, judges were required to make 
rulings over land rights in societies for which the common law had not been designed 
(Buck, McLaren, and Wright 2001:21). The resulting social, political, and cultural 
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contradictions and tensions produced an overall process that was highly dynamic. The 
colonial expansion of the state form was not unidirectional; while English assumptions 
about space, property, and sovereignty were the leading edge of colonial expansion, 
interactions with Indigenous peoples and with European colonial rivals shaped these 
assumptions in lasting ways. The modern state form — following Lefebvre, we can call this 
“state   space”  — spread geographically across North America behind a dynamic frontier. 
This was not a state border, but rather a zone in which the state had not yet established its 
own property-rights regime. The movement was driven by the actions of private settlers, 
who pushed beyond the limits of government regulation but then had their land claims 
retroactively protected by technologies supplied by the state, such as laws, surveys, maps, 
and official records. On these issues, two books from outside of the IR cannon are 
important resources for me: Stuart  Banner’s  How the Indians Lost Their Land and John 
Weaver’s  The Great Land Rush.  
Banner, a legal scholar, provides a revisionist account of the transfer of land from 
Indigenous peoples into white hands. He begins with the claim that previous scholars have 
overemphasized the direct taking of land by force, and failed to account for the many ways 
in which land acquisition occurred through purchase or treaty. He outlines shifts in legal 
and economic regimes in the United States from first contact until the early twentieth 
century as colonists advanced steadily westward, claiming indigenous land as they went.17 
                                                 
17 Banner’s  subsequent  (2007) monograph, Possessing the Pacific: Land, Settlers, and Indigenous People 
from Australia to Alaska, expands his geographical scope, using a specifically spatial approach. It is a 
comparative  survey  of  colonial  land  appropriation  across  the  Pacific.  Of  particular  note  is  Banner’s  case  study  
of the Mahele of 1845-1855, a land-reform process in the then-independent kingdom of Hawaii. The 
fundamental consequence of this process was to reorganize the indigenous system of property rights to make 
it the same as European property regimes. The native Hawaiians did this to themselves as a preemptive move 
made in the knowledge that they were about to be colonized. Banner suggests that the Mahele was designed to 
convert land into a legal form that would be recognized by a colonial government, and in this way ensure that 
local elites would be able to protect their personal land after annexation by the United States.  
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Banner argues that it was often easier to buy land than to take it, especially early in the 
colonial period, when the first colonists were outnumbered and vulnerable. This attention to 
the real material conditions of claiming land — and the historical and archival evidence he 
mounts in defense of his thesis — help me develop and support to my argument that 
property and sovereignty were deeply connected. The legal artifacts, including deeds, 
letters, and court records cited by Banner give depth to the argument that taking control of 
Aboriginal land was not simply a matter of declaring formal sovereignty, nor was it pure 
force, but a dynamic combination of the two. Banner’s  thick  description of shifting historic 
regimes and regional variation helps disrupt the view that colonialism was primarily a 
matter of legal-political recognition. Aboriginal dispossession was the common result, but 
the process through which this occurred was not universal across time and space. At the 
same time, he attributes much of these differences to discrete (often idiosyncratic) decisions 
made by local colonial officials. These individual decisions accrued over time, meaning 
that the system of land tenure we know now can be seen as the accumulation of many small 
decisions, instead of any broad strategy. As a result, Banner’s   narrative plays up the 
importance of contingency, or chance, in determining the evolution of colonial policies, 
often downplaying the agency of First Nations in shaping events. Along the same lines, 
Banner does not offer nearly as much historical detail about Indian forms of political and 
social organization as he does about European laws and mores. My approach differs from 
his in numerous ways, including my greater emphasis on: the international context; the 
need to theorize the state; and the agency of Aboriginal peoples.  
Weaver’s   path-breaking book, which sits at the intersection of post-colonial and 
geographic history, shows how the global spread of the market economy dovetailed with 
imperial expansion to lead to the appropriation of enormous areas of land during the early 
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modern and modern periods. Weaver uses a regional-comparative approach, focusing on 
the experiences in the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, all of which 
were originally British settler colonies. The Great Land Rush contains impressive historical 
detail, but perhaps the most powerful claim is also the most sweeping. As signaled by the 
book’s  subtitle,  Weaver  argues  that  a  fundamental  element  of  “the  making  of  the  modern  
world”  was  the  conversion  of  common  lands  into  private  property.   
 
Summary and Structure of the Argument 
 If sovereignty really were fundamentally a matter of recognizing universal criteria, 
indigenous nations might enjoy a much different status in international politics than they do 
now. Before contact, and into the early colonial period, indigenous communities organized 
themselves in well-established and sophisticated political structures.18 These entities 
controlled territories, practised self-government, and conducted foreign relations with each 
other using various forms of trade and diplomacy (Deloria and Lytle 1984; Richter 2001; 
Warren 2005). It is true that Aboriginal societies did not share with European modernity the 
concept of state citizenship defined by residency within an exclusive territory; nationhood 
generally was constituted by a complex of ideas centred on a particular concept of the 
people, which was a spiritual as well as a political conception, and entailed fundamentally 
different understandings of political authority and the land (Deloria and Lytle 1984; 
Overstall 2005). Still, they shared enough of the same basic formal characteristics of 
European nations that some contemporaneous European political thinkers actually argued 
                                                 
18 There was great diversity — cultural, spiritual, linguistic, technological, political, economic, agricultural, 
architectural — across the indigenous societies of North America. It would be a major mistake to imagine a 
homogenous   “Aboriginal”   society.   Still,   they   did   have   in   common   some   variety   of   holistic   spiritual  
philosophy,   and   certain   assumptions   about   a   people’s   relationship   to   land   followed   from   this (Churchill 
1996). 
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they met European criteria for nationhood (Keal 2003). Therefore the defining differences 
between traditional Aboriginal forms of sovereignty and modern state sovereignty must be 
based on something other than recognition. This argument is illustrated through an account 
of the historical establishment of sovereignty in a context where it could not happen as 
organically as it did in modernizing Europe. In North America, First Nations resisted 
intrusions onto their land with force and tenacity. Moreover, European colonization of 
North America constituted an attempt to project certain practices onto a space that was not 
already ordered for them.  
Incorporating property into an IR analysis unsettles the traditional story of 
sovereignty   as   a   “formal”   matter   based   on   recognition.   The   pursuit   of   property — 
specifically, land — was the reason English colonists crossed the ocean in the first place. 
Establishing sovereignty in the form of the modern state created the conditions of 
possibility, and provided a range of supports, for the private appropriation of land. At the 
same time, property functioned as a relational support for the more abstract notion of 
sovereignty. Viewed in purely formal terms — as they are in mainstream IR theory — 
sovereignty and property appear separate and unconnected. A social-relations approach 
reveals them to be profoundly connected.  
The idea of empty, geometric space actually masks the reality that sovereignty and 
property are social relations. Adding space to our analytical framework may allow us to 
move beyond the formal state — but only if we understand space itself to be relational, not 
static nor empty. Our concern is with people occupying space and relating to others. From a 
critical geographical perspective, the state is neither natural and eternal nor a false 
construct. It is dialectically constituted by diverse moments of technologies, ideas, social 
relations, production, relations to nature, and the politics of daily life. The state appears as a 
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coherent entity, independent from other states and from the economy and civil society. It is 
reified — both as a tangible object and our understanding of it as a container of power — 
through  material   objects   and   real   social   relations,   from  maps,  borders,   armies,   “national”  
economies and so on. This understanding of the relationship between absolute space and 
relative space-time, taken from Harvey, helps explain the imposition of the modern state 
form, with its logic of exclusive sovereignty and exclusive private property. Indigenous 
nations did not have fixed, exclusive territorial boundaries, and thus no clear definition in 
absolute space and time, while the modern state that emerged in England in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries was entirely consistent with the logic of absolute space. The ideas 
and culture associated with absolute space exerted powerful disciplining force in support of 
the state. 
I develop these points over four historical chapters. The first of these, chapter 3, 
contrasts the English and Iberian views of indigenous land rights: the English were much 
more concerned with owning land, while Spanish colonists were relatively more interested 
in extracting minerals and metals from under the land — and so relatively more interested 
in indigenous labour than land per se. My critical target in this chapter is the commonly 
accepted notion that colonial interactions with Indigenous peoples occurred between them 
and  a  generic  “Europe.”  This  is  what  I  call  the  “European  state”  thesis  of  conventional  IR. 
It   underpins   the   assumption   of   formal   sovereignty   because   it   posits   a   “state”   that   is  
completely removed from cultural or historical context. Contrary to this argument, different 
European powers interacted with the peoples they encountered in the New World in 
different ways. There were different forms of modern state in Europe, and the specific 
moments of state formation were unevenly timed, with economic ambitions, culture, and 
domestic social relations accounting for most of the variations between different imperial 
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systems.  
Chapter 4 extends my critique of the assumption of formal sovereignty. It shows 
how indigenous-settler relations on the ground were not determined by formal sovereignty 
or nationality, but were shaped fundamentally by the real material conditions of defining 
and   claiming   property   in   the  New  World.   Colonists’   attitudes   and   practices   toward   land  
claiming and ownership were in tension both with those of indigenous peoples, as well as 
with the official positions of their home state. Unlike the Spanish or the French, most 
British   colonial   settlers  were   “free   agents,”   representing   neither   the   state   nor   the   church.  
This freedom meant that, while the ideas that English settlers carried with them — notably 
those reflecting an early-modern English obsession with land — remained influential, they 
often underwent severe mutations upon contact with Indigenous peoples in the colonial 
context.  
As settlers were forced to reconcile their ideas with the challenges of the frontier, 
they increasingly contradicted official policy, sometimes taking by force land that their 
government had acknowledged as belonging to first peoples; sometimes buying indigenous 
land that the Crown believed they already owned as a spoil of discovery. Shortly after 
contact, when colonists were most vulnerable, they tended to combine dramatic 
declarations of imperial dominance with de facto recognitions of Aboriginal land 
ownership. As time went on, and Europeans became more powerful, they transformed 
power into right: their methods for taking Aboriginal land actually become both subtler and 
more brazen, but in all cases the methods of appropriation were protected by a shield of 
legality. This chapter also introduces the Aboriginal perspective, contrasting indigenous 
forms of land tenure with European ones and exploring why First Nations would choose to 
sell some of their land. 
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Chapter 5, which deals with the period after American secession brought the British 
colonial   period   to   a   close   and   Aboriginal   nations   were   becoming   “internal”   rather   than  
“external”   nations,   takes   up   the   issue   of   the   separation   between   the   political   and   the  
economic. Revolutionary American governments attempted to assert control over the 
allocation of land on the frontier by putting land allocation in government hands. Just as 
before, land transfer was structured through a series of contracts; now, however, control 
over land transfers was centralized in the state. Land was transferred out of Aboriginal 
hands through contracts, but these no longer took the form of sales between individuals, 
and instead took the form of sales between sovereigns; that is, as treaties. 
Over the course of several decades in the early nineteenth century, the US state 
forcibly removed most remaining Indigenous people to land west of the Mississippi, a 
process that was formally legitimized through the use of treaties. US government 
acquisition of Aboriginal land was always structured as a series of voluntary transactions. 
But Aboriginal consent, as expressed through treaties, became purely formal, not 
meaningful. The process for appropriating land always included both consent and coercion. 
Chapter 6 addresses these issues, and also contains a detailed case-study of the Muskogee 
nation, which I use as an example of the effects of European contact on indigenous 
governance structures and practices: First Nations experienced intense pressure to abandon 
traditional indigenous governance structures by the requirements of dealing with nation-
state governments (Warren 2005). 
 My main contribution the literature is twofold. First, I help restore to International 
Relations the experiences of many people who have long been ignored by the discipline in 
large part because it would be theoretically inconvenient to include them. In addition to this 
moral imperative to add indigenous experiences to our account of history, I also make an 
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empirical case: we cannot achieve a full understanding of sovereignty if Aboriginal people 
are excluded, or if they appear only as victims in a narrative of colonial domination. Far 
from the passive victims implied by conventional IR — and no less by some sympathetic 
critical scholars — they were central to a dynamic history of resistance and compromise, 
and their interactions with Europeans shaped modern sovereignty. 
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2. Review of the Literature 
This chapter helps establish the problem I am trying to solve, and, crucially, how others 
have tried to solve this problem and come up short. Because indigenous nations historically 
have not adopted the state form the IR orthodoxy takes for granted, the discipline has a 
meagre theoretical vocabulary to explain their experiences, and they have typically been 
ignored altogether or else dismissed as a matter for domestic political analysis or 
anthropology (Brown 2000; Dunne 1997, 1998; Keal 2003; Shaw 2008; Wilmer 1993).19 
As I show in this chapter, addressing this long-standing omission requires doing more than 
just adding indigenous people to our story. Certain deep-rooted assumptions in IR form 
structural impediments to the inclusion of Aboriginal forms of sovereignty. The chapter 
begins by establishing the problem in the literature. Whereas mainstream IR excludes 
Aboriginal forms of sovereignty entirely by failing to historicize the modern state, the 
historical approach of the English School is itself inadequate in that it confirms the state as 
the natural constitutive unit of the international system. I then show how others have 
attempted to address this problem, focusing on the authors associated with the indigenous 
                                                 
19 A number of works by scholars outside the field of IR have placed indigenous case studies in the 
international   context.   These   include   two   recent   books   by   Latin   Americanists,   Alison  Brysk’s   From Tribal 
Village to Global Village (2000) and   Nicholas   P.   Higgins’   Understanding the Chiapas Rebellion (2004). 
Higgins’  book  is  valuable  because  of  its  historical  argument  tracing  the  assimilation  of  the  Maya  Indians  into  
the   modern   Mexican   state.   Ronald   Niezen’s   The Origins of Indigenism also emphasizes the role of 
international cooperation among indigenous peoples — Niezen  uses  the  phrase  “international  indigenism”  to  
describe the global phenomenon in question — in pursuing human rights (Niezen 2003). As with books by 
Keal (2003) and Wilmer (1993), which are discussed in more detail elsewhere in this chapter, Niezen largely 
accepts the liberal notion that indigenous activists should pursue rights and recognition by international 
institutions. The anthropologist Edward H. Spicer had embarked on one of the few major studies that 
theorized  indigenous  nations  as  stateless  nations  in  an  international  context.  Spicer’s  book  project,  Enduring 
Peoples; or, Ten Against the State, a study of how ten nations — including three nations indigenous to North 
America and the Lowland Mayas — survived within modern states, remained unfinished after his death, 
although his chapter on the Yaquis was published posthumously (Spicer 1994). There is also a rising literature 
on indigenous issues in international law,  notably  Robert  Williams’  towering  The American Indian in Western 
Legal Thought (1990), a book that is referenced and discussed in several chapters below (See also Green and 
Dickason 1989; Venne 1998; Anaya 2004). 
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turn in IR. They attempted to overcome the absence of indigeneity in IR with approaches 
that emphasize the social construction and reproduction of norms that determine what is 
“legitimate”  sovereignty.  I work through the key works in this approach, highlighting their 
success but critiquing these approaches for the fact that, while they do incorporate more 
indigenous experiences into the literature, their emphasis on denying the authority of the 
modern sovereign state has a depoliticizing effect. They are unable to offer substantial new 
insights   into   how   Aboriginal   interactions   with   Europeans   shaped   the   modern   state’s  
evolution as a real world-historical entity. Finally, I review how some authors have 
borrowed from critical geography to challenge the state-centrism in international theory. 
This last section provides important context for my use of David  Harvey’s  work. 
Many IR scholars would presumably defend the absence of indigenous nations and 
issues from the field on the grounds that they are not an important part of world 
politics.  This  is  true,  but  only  if  by  world  politics  we  mean  IR’s  traditional  concerns  
such as war, trade regimes, and state diplomacy — concerns that share a particular 
theoretical foundation, namely the assumption that the international system is 
naturally and essentially a system of inter-state   relations.   IR’s   self-definition 
naturalizes and legitimizes the state form by making the sovereign state the pre-
condition for analyzing international relations. Thus the exclusion of indigenous 
nations from IR is self-imposed and self-perpetuating (Shaw 2008:60). Yet on the 
face   of   it,   IR’s   embedded   statism  may   seem  perfectly   reasonable:   does   the   nation-
state’s  status  as  the  main  currency  in  International  Relations (the scholarly discipline) 
not merely reflect its equivalent place in international relations (the subject of 
inquiry)? The state is the key constituent part of the international system, and 
therefore is it not only logical for the same to be true of the field that examines that 
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system? Assumptions such as these characterize efforts to use a natural-sciences 
approach to theorizing within the social sciences — an approach in which the goal is 
a disinterested explanation of eternal forces. Historically   IR’s   scientific   aspirations  
experienced   a   sharp   rise   after   the   discipline’s   mid-century behavioral turn, which 
triggered a decades-long drift towards pseudo-scientific positivism, during which 
time structure superceded historical context as a central concern and organizing 
principle in analyses of international politics (Smith, Booth, and Zalewski 1996). This 
positivist momentum reached its logical conclusion with the advent of neo-realism.  
A-historical, state-centric neo-realism has provided for at least a generation the 
dominant methodological paradigm in IR, and so a critical engagement with that 
approach has been at the centre of many recent debates in IR theory; indeed, critical 
approaches  to  IR  theory  have  “defined their identity through a series of challenges to 
neo-realism”   (Linklater   1998:15). The immediacy and awareness of large-scale 
change seen in the years after the Cold War did generate a renewed interest in 
historical approaches to IR, part of a larger post-positivist reorientation (Halperin 
2004). A growing number of critical IR theorists have demonstrated neo-realism’s  
ahistorical state-centrism   to   be   a   closed   loop   of   “self-referential logic”   (Teschke  
2003:13). That the states system is not natural and eternal — and therefore the 
centrality of the state in IR no simple reflection of reality — has been demonstrated 
by historical materialists, historical sociologists, and constructivists in IR. Introducing 
a historical dimension into IR is necessary if we are to develop an account of the 
historical problem at issue in this project. The English School does add such an 
element, and this body of work stands as the most sustained attempt to come to terms 
with the historical expansion of the European states system as a historical 
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phenomenon.  The  English  School’s  account  of  the  colonization  of  North  America  is  
the canonical one in IR. 
The English School defines itself against realism’s   core claim that the conflict 
between states is endemic to the international system, positing instead the existence 
of an international society of states. International society is not the same as 
international system. According to Bull, an international system is merely one in 
which states interact, such that they “behave — at least in some measure — as parts 
of a whole” (1996:13). As  Chris  Brown  writes,  to  “refer  to  an  international  society is 
simply a way of drawing attention to the (posited) norm-governed relations between 
states”  (Brown  2001:89). The emphasis in that sentence is in the original: Brown is 
distinguishing between an international society and international system. However, 
his   use   of   the   word   “states”   is   equally   instructive   — the English School is as 
committed to the state form as realist IR is, and assumes the legitimacy of the state as 
the main form of political organization in international relations.21 The resulting 
absence of indigenous nations from international society is deeply  ironic.  Realism’s  
skepticism regarding the possibility of inter-state cooperation emphasizes the 
fundamentally Hobbesian character of nation-states, which are by their nature 
engaged in an endless conflict of all against all. For this reason the English School 
refers to realism as the Hobbesian tradition in IR, attacking it in part because this 
tradition   excludes   certain   questions   from   its   analysis.   Hedley   Bull’s   canonical   The 
Anarchical Society, for   example,   attempts   to   “demonstrate   that   there   is   more   to 
                                                 
21 For discussions of the English School that question  the  “utility  in  thinking  about  world  politics  in  terms  of  a  
society  of   states  alone”  see   the  contributions   from  Paul  Williams,  Jacqui  True,  Matthew  Paterson  and  Alex  
Belllamy in Bellamy, ed, (2005:286). Scholars such as Martin Wight, for example, consider the European 
states system as one among numerous historical examples of international societies (Wight 1977).  
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international relations than the realist admits”   (Linklater   1998:105). Yet The 
Anarchical Society begins   by   establishing   “the   existence   of   states”   as   “the   starting  
point   of   international   relations”   and   fundamental   condition   for   his   analysis.   To   the  
extent  the  English  School’s  critique  of  realism’s  exclusionary stance is framed in this 
way, it is guilty of an equally exclusionary logic: it marginalizes non-state units such 
as Aboriginal nations as being unworthy of study in international relations, and 
further,  “asserts  the  primacy  of  the  society  that  these  states  form  as  the  universal  form  
of the international. In doing so, it also reinscribes a particular modern, European 
form of social-political organization as the universal norm”  (Shaw  2008:61).  
According to the English School, international society appeared in early modern 
Europe, when a society of sovereign but equal states was first established, and then spread 
outward, eventually encompassing the entire world. The classic text articulating this 
argument is The Expansion of International Society (Bull and Watson 1984). Bull and 
Watson are clear that international society was a society of European states. As Bull (in 
Bull and Watson 1984) writes, international society was not realized until  all  of  the  world’s  
“numerous  and  extremely  diverse  political  entities….had  come  to  resemble  one  another,  at  
least to the extent that they were all, in some comparable sense, states”   (121). In other 
words, the realization of international society was impossible before the presence of states. 
An   important   phase   in   this   development   was   “the   entry   of   non-European states into 
international society”  (115). But this was not a matter of the European state appearing and 
then  being  exported,   rather,  “the  evolution of the European system of inter-state relations 
and the expansion of Europe across the globe were simultaneous processes, which 
influenced   and   affected   each   other.”   When   the   European   powers’   colonial   adventures  
across the Atlantic began, the European states system was still a residue of the Christian 
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empire; they were not yet secular; and the doctrines of internal and external sovereignty of 
states, the balance of power, and the equal rights of states had yet to be formulated (1984: 
6-7).  
These authors provide well-needed historical perspective; unlike (neo)realists, they 
do not take the system of inter-state relations to be timeless. Yet their narrative remains 
resolutely Eurocentric. For Bull and Watson, the simultaneous evolution and expansion of 
the European system of inter-state relations began in the late fifteenth century. This 
happens to be the moment of European contact with the Aboriginal people of North 
America (Columbus first crossed the Atlantic in 1492), yet even despite this historical 
coincidence Bull and Watson do not address the reality that the expansion of the European 
states system entailed conflict with Aboriginal societies. This omission is attributable to 
indigenous   societies’  not  having   adopted   the   state   form.  Bull   and  Watson  write that   “the  
expanding  Europeans,   on   their  part,   as   they  encountered  Amerindian   [peoples]  …did  not  
always seek to subjugate or colonize them, which in any case they were not capable of 
doing on a general scale before the nineteenth century, but rather sought to trade with them, 
to convert them to Christianity, and in some case to join in military alliances. There was 
thus a disposition on the part of European states to enter into relations of a peaceful and 
permanent nature with particular non-European powers”   (1984:117). While there is some 
truth   to   these   claims,   neither   side   in   this   relationship   was   “moved   by   common  
interests…they  were  not  able  to  invoke  a  common  and  agreed  set  of  rules  to  this  end,  such  
as came later to be assumed as the basis of international intercourse over the world as a 
whole. They were not able to appeal to established international universal international 
institutions — diplomatic conventions, forms of international law, principles of hierarchy, 
or customs of war — such as did facilitate exchanges within the various regional 
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international systems”  (118). There  could  not  be  any  conception  of  a  “coexistence  of  equal  
sovereign states…between  Christian  and  Amerindian”  nations  because  that  idea  was  not  yet  
a reality in inter-imperial relations, let alone those between Europe and the rest of the 
world. Secular internationalist institutions had not yet emerged; instead there was natural 
law.   As   Bull   concedes,   natural   law   was   merely   a   “conceptual   or   theoretical”   basis   for  
international cooperation, and an inherently European one at that (120). An   “actual  
international   society”   did   not   emerge   until   “European   states   and   the   various   independent  
political communities with which they were involved in a common international system 
came to perceive common interests in a structure of coexistence and cooperation, and 
tacitly   or   explicitly   to   consent   to   common   rules   and   institutions.”   This   phenomenon   — 
manifest in such developments as the exchange of diplomats, the adoption of treaties based 
in international law, and multilateral conferences — was true to the extent that the political 
entities coming together were states (120).  
Paul  Keal’s  European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is a rigorous 
but sympathetic book-length critique of the omission of the role of indigenous people from 
the  English  School’s  account  of  the  expansion  of  international  society.  He  bases  his  critique  
of  the  English  School’s  unjustifiably  sanguine  view  of  the  expansion  of  the  sovereign  state  
largely in moral terms, arguing that modern-day states that have unresolved indigenous 
land claims are morally illegitimate, every bit as much as states that abuse human rights. 
Since the exclusion and dispossession of indigenous peoples was inherent to the historical 
expansion of international society, its moral legitimacy is questionable, and normative 
arguments about improving international society should be based on expanding its benefits 
and protections to include non-state groups (Keal 2003). Keal echoes the argument made by 
several English School authors that before international society emerged, and international 
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law along with it, the guiding philosophical framework for international relations was 
natural law, which provided at least a potential foundation for universal equality of 
individuals. Keal writes: 
The development of the states system and consequently of international society 
meant a progressive denial by Europeans to non-Europeans of the rights they 
accorded themselves. Whereas natural law theories were once a basis for 
drawing disparate cultures and political entities together, the development of a 
state-centric international society divided them. (2003:34) 
 
In  this  passage  Keal  usefully  modifies  (if  only  in  passing)  the  English  School’s  claims   for 
the earliest conceptions of international society, by making it explicit that the advent of the 
modern state had the effect of excluding non-state actors. In contrast, English School 
authors such as Bull and Watson remain constrained by a commitment to the sovereign 
territorial nation state in both theoretical and normative terms, portraying it as the basis for 
international cooperation.  
Keal argues that self-determination must be de-linked from statehood. In this way, 
indigenous peoples would achieve formal  recognition  as  “peoples”  under  international  law;;  
combined with land rights, he argues this move would safeguard Indigenous peoples’ status 
as culturally distinct, non-state groups. But such an approach — more broadly associated 
with a liberal discourse of recognition, rights, and self-determination — actually reproduces 
a Eurocentric norm of sovereignty by confirming the nation-state form as the benchmark 
for legitimacy.  
Franke Wilmer, whose The Indigenous Voice in World Politics was one of the first 
book-length arguments in favour of including indigenous issues in IR, makes a similar case 
for extending recognition to indigenous nations (1993). Wilmer   attacks   (neo)realism’s  
myopic emphasis on power politics at the expense of normative concerns. Since indigenous 
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communities lack the military or economic capacities that define realism’s   frame of 
reference — or  even  “the  international  attribute  of  sovereign  equality  that  enables  even  the  
poorest Third World states to participate in global  discourse  affecting  their  future”  — they 
are excluded from consideration (20).  
The   value   of   this   argument   is   obscured   by  Wilmer’s   problematic   analysis   of   the  
international system, and of IR as a discipline. She describes realism as a theoretical 
anachronism,  “an  historical  paradigm,  accurately  describing  the  basis  and  configuration  of  
world politics from the sixteenth to the early twentieth centuries”   (196). In the twentieth 
century, Wilmer argues, international relations have moved away from a narrow focus on 
power and conquest, and become more open to normative issues in general, and to the goal 
of self-determination in particular. It is important to clarify that Wilmer does not see a 
decline in political conflict, only that the grounds for political struggle were no longer 
“power   and   its   tangible   manifestations”   to   “normative   issues   and   the   values   allocated  
through international institutions”  (40). Wilmer  echoes  the  English  School’s  narrative  when  
she posits a 500-year process of evolving   “normative   consensus   among   international  
elites,”  which  results  in  “system  stability”  being  valued  more  highly  that  it  would  otherwise  
be,   which   “in   turn,   makes   it   more   likely   that   the   core   will   accommodate   and   adapt   to  
noncore views and assertions”  (27). The basis for the evolving normative consensus is the 
shared  experience  of  Europeans,  which  gives  rise  to  a  worldview  often  called  “modernity”  
(6). Putting  aside  its  apparent  logical  circularity,  Wilmer’s  argument  is  problematic  because  
it credits the relative decline of power (and rise of norms) with creating openings for 
indigenous activism. These real-world changes, Wilmer argues, then revealed realist IR’s  
limitations and effected a corresponding rise in norm-based theories. Her claim that the 
realist tradition in IR (defined as an emphasis on capabilities over norms) has experienced 
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steadily declining influence over the twentieth century is highly dubious, as is the notion 
that it provides a useful and accurate way to understand global politics between the 
sixteenth and nineteenth centuries (Rosenberg 1994). The  idea  that  the  world’s  elite  powers  
have been moving steadily toward normative agreement — along with the corresponding 
claim that this normative consolidation has led them to accord more weight to the claims of 
indigenous peoples — is also a problem because it portrays rights as essentially a gift 
accorded to Indigenous peoples by European benevolence. Thus Wilmer, despite making a 
strong argument that indigenous politics should no longer be marginalized, actually 
reproduces the liberal internationalist / English School schema in which modern 
civilization, embodied by the European states system, is evolving away from violent 
conflict and toward peaceful cooperation.  
In sum, the English School perspective, articulated by such writers as Bull and 
Watson,   corrects   realism’s   ahistoricism, opening the door to a sophisticated analysis of 
colonialism. As Keal and Wilmer argue, as a consequence of its statist liberalism, the 
English School approach never realizes its potential to meaningfully incorporate Aboriginal 
experience into IR. But these authors reproduce statist assumptions. This is the problem this 
dissertation addresses: how is it possible to bring Aboriginal peoples into IR without 
granting the modern European state as the only legitimate form of sovereignty? The next 
section reviews how this question has been addressed in IR. The prevailing answer to this 
question in IR has involved approaching it, so to speak, from the other side: if arguing that 
indigenous   nations   are   “as   good   as”   states   merely   reinforces   the   state’s   status   as   the  
benchmark for legitimate sovereignty, then why not challenge the very notion of 
sovereignty  itself?  This  took  the  form  of  an  “indigenous  turn”  in   IR, which was based on 
constructivism. 
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The  “Iroquois  Diplomacy”  Debate23 
For constructivists, the most valuable insight developed by writers from the English 
School was less the historical contextualization than the notion of an international society 
held together by culture.25 The constructivist emphasis on discourse offers some useful 
insights into the colonial encounter. Of the many differences that distinguished Aboriginal 
from European political traditions, two of the most important were the propensity to hold 
land in common rather than privately, and the simple fact that indigenous political 
structures were not formalized by being written  down:  “customs,  rituals,  and  traditions  are  
a natural part of life, and individuals grow into an acceptance of them, eliminating the need 
for formal articulation of the rules of Indian tribal society”   (Deloria  and  Lytle,  1984:18). 
While many Aboriginal nations had oral instead of written cultures, and thus recorded and 
communicated their political structures through stories and legends, this was not always 
this case. For example, the first written constitution in North America was the Great 
Binding Law of the Five Nations (Gayaneshagowa), which was created by the Iroquois 
Confederacy and articulated such democratic values and goals as equal suffrage, 
                                                 
23 The names by which Aboriginal nations are generally known are rarely those they used for themselves. In 
fact, often they derive from insulting names their neighbours used to describe them to early traders and 
explorers (Wilson 1998). Here and throughout I have somewhat reluctantly chosen to maintain the scholarly 
convention of using the common terminology, such as Iroquois instead of Haudenosaunee or Hotinonshonni, 
and Cherokee instead of Ani-Yunwiya.   
25 On the specific issue of cultural homogeneity, see for example, Martin Wight (1977), who argued that 
historically societies of states have only ever appeared in regions with shared culture. Hedley Bull, while 
rejecting the suggestion that cultural homogeneity was a strict theoretical necessary for the emergence of a 
society   of   states,   nonetheless   noted   that   historically   societies   of   states   “were   all   founded   upon   a   common  
culture or civilization”  (1996:15;;  see  also  Bull and Watson 1984). Different iterations of this argument can be 
found across the IR literature. Constructivists also posit an international society held together by common 
culture. And essentially the same assumptions underpinned the normative case made by Carl Schmitt 
(currently experiencing a renaissance in IR) for a Europe united politically through its imperial authority and 
culturally through a deeply held conviction that Europeans were civilized while non-Europeans were not — 
with these forms of unity allowing Europe to avoid or at least mitigate the perils of inter-imperial rivalries. 
Indeed, the tendency to homogenize the multiple colonial powers, reducing them to the simple entity 
“Europe,”  is  widespread  in  the  historical  literature,  not  just  in IR (Seed 1995). 
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referendum and recall. The availability of written text26 may explain why the Great Law of 
Peace, a document from the Iroquoian confederation, is the subject of perhaps the only 
debate about indigenous diplomacy I am aware of in the IR literature — although other 
confederacies of indigenous nations, such as the Illinois and Delaware confederacies, did 
exist.  Neta  Crawford’s   article   in   International Organization,   “A  Security  Regime  Among  
Democracies:   cooperation   among   Iroquois   nations,”   attempted   to   incorporate   indigenous  
experience into IR by portraying the document in question as an articulation of a non-
European version of a security regime.  
The Iroquois (Haudenosaunee27) League was a powerful indigenous government 
made up of an alliance formed in about 1450 of five nations: the Mohawk, Oneida, 
Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca. It was joined in about 1720 by a sixth nation, the 
Tuscarora. For Crawford, there are two salient features of the Iroquois League. First, it was 
very successful at reducing conflict. Its member nations did not go to war with each other 
from   the  League’s   founding  until   its  dissolution   in the context of American secession — 
and even this was an essentially nonviolent process. Second, the member nations, as well as 
                                                 
26 This is not nearly as straightforward as it may sound. The League did use wampum (beads) as a form of 
communication   roughly   equivalent   to  writing,   but   to   consider  wampum   simply   as   a   form  of   “writing  with  
beads”  entails  committing  a  strong act of cultural mistranslation. Wampum was used to memorialize events 
such as the creation of the League, along with other cultural forms such as songs (Foster 1985; Jennings 
1984). Yet the history of the Great Law is still primarily an oral one, passed down through generations of 
Aboriginal elders, whose social role included keeping oral traditions alive; these traditions have their own 
characteristics and complexities, which traditionally have been poorly understood by non-native scholars. The 
massive  loss  of  Aboriginal  life  and  culture  since  colonization  means  that  a  good  deal  of  historical  “evidence”  
was almost certainly lost, and this, in combination with the complications associated with translating from one 
culture’s  worldview  to  another’s,  caution against examining the history of the Great Law in exactly the same 
way we might examine written documents such as the Magna Carta or the American Declaration of 
Independence. At the same time, this is not at all to diminish the legitimacy of oral traditions as historical 
documentation. As many scholars have noted, written histories typically have one author, whose perspective, 
however biased or incomplete, takes on great stature simply because it was written down. In contrast, oral 
histories are relatively democratic (Crawford 1994). Recently oral histories have been accorded greater 
authority in legal proceedings in many countries. For example, courts in Canada and the US have admitted 
oral history in numerous important cases (such as the Delgamuukw case in Canada, and The Assiniboine 
Indian Tribe v. The United States), even though they are prima facie examples of hearsay. (Gover and 
Macaulay 1996) 
27 This is in the Seneca language, meaning People of the Long House. 
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the League political structure itself, were democratic. A governing council of fifty seats met 
at least once per year, but debates and discussions were ongoing throughout the year; these 
followed a complex process that emphasized checks and balances, public debate, and 
consensus. At the same time, the internal sovereignty of each nation was respected. Among 
other advantages, this decision-making structure fostered unity and by extension security. 
Benjamin Franklin suggested to the colonies that the Iroquois constitution be used as a 
template for federal government (Cohen 1942:128ff; Wilkins 2006:129-134).  
For Crawford, the evidence that democratic nations formally cooperated to achieve 
peace   provides   an   opportunity   to   test   out   two   IR   hypotheses.   She   claims   “the   Iroquois  
nations stopped fighting each other and kept the peace among themselves through the 
operation of a well-functioning   security   regime,”   as   per   the   regime   theory   of   Stephen  
Krasner and in particular the security-regime model as conceptualized by Robert Jervis 
(346). Crawford’s   assertion   that   IR   stands   to   benefit   from   the   inclusion   of   indigenous  
experiences is deserving of praise, and her historical reconstruction of the Iroquois 
confederacy is meticulous, based as it is upon almost all available secondary sources (349-
353). Yet her approach uses this non-Western historical example less as a way to test or 
problematize   regimes   theory   than   as   a  way   to   “expand   the   universe   of   cases   of   security  
regimes”   by   adding   a   stronger   example   than   the  Concert   of  Europe,  which   stands   as   the  
canonical case-study in the literature. Crawford also argues that the Iroquois League 
“exemplifies  Immanuel  Kant’s  idea  of  a  system  for  perpetual  peace,”  and  thus  would  seem  
to confirm the democratic peace thesis that was generating so much interest in the IR 
literature  at  the  time  Crawford’s  article  was  written (346).28   
                                                 
28 Democratic Peace (also known as Liberal Peace) theories hypothesize that the absence of war between 
states in the capitalist core can be explained by the fact that (liberal) democracies do not go to war with one 
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In addition to conceptualizing the Iroquois League as an example of a security 
regime or a manifestation of Kantian democratic peace, Crawford claims a third reason for 
her   study:   it   offers   the   potential   to   “begin   to   correct   any   biases   that  may   result   from   the  
condition that most theories of international relations are primarily based on a reading of 
European history”   (347). Yet   despite   the   stated   laudable   goal   of   tempering   IR’s  
Eurocentrism   and   “realist   claims   to   cross-cultural   and   timeless   validity,”  Crawford   treats  
the historical example at hand as confirmation of the logic of conventional IR. This is the 
basis   for  Bedford  and  Workman’s  critique  of  Crawford.  They  claim  “the   interest   that   the  
author finds in The Great Law of Peace does not lie in the uniqueness of the Iroquoian 
confederacy but rather in its supposedly (Western) democratic character”   (Bedford   and  
Workman 1997:91). In   contrast,   they   declare   their   interest   precisely   in   “the   nonmodern  
character  of   the   text,”  which   they  consider   to   embody  “understandings   and  practices that 
are incommensurate with Realist orthodoxy”  (91). This interest is part of a larger challenge 
to realism’s  ahistoricism, which the authors develop by demonstrating historical exceptions 
in which Realist laws of motion did not apply.    
Bedford  and  Workman  thus  correctly  identify  Crawford’s  untenable  application  of  
ahistorical and Eurocentric IR to questions of indigenous history. However, the alternative 
they propose is a little more than a thin normative celebration of the ostensible differences 
between European and indigenous ways of life. The loss of traditional indigenous 
governance   structures   meant   the   destruction   of   “practices   permeated   with   balance   and  
moderation — practices diametrically opposed to the extremely aggressive conduct of 
                                                                                                                                                    
another. This approach dates back at least as far as pioneering work by Doyle (1983, 1983a), but received a 
surge of attention in the 1990s, with a large literature appearing to support or challenge the central notion of 
Democratic Peace, as well as to offer more detailed explanations of the processes by which such a peace is 
achieved. See, for example, Weart (1998), Mousseau (2000). 
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capitalist states in the late twentieth century”   (Bedford   and  Workman  1997:108). This is 
little   more   than   a   “noble   savage”   argument,   in   which   an   idealized   version   of   pure   pre-
modern (almost prelapsarian) societies is contrasted favourably with the violence and 
corruption of modernity. While it is difficult to disagree with the claim that modern 
societies could benefit from exposure to human history beyond modern Europe, as a piece 
of  analysis  Bedford  and  Workman’s  article  is  unconvincing  because   it severs the Iroquois 
experience from real historical political context. The authors emphasize the contrast 
between the norms of a pre-modern society and those of contemporary international 
relations, rather than the real social contradictions and conflicts between the Iroquois 
League and colonizing European states. This is an imaginative vehicle for a broad critique 
of the limitations of realist-dominated conventional IR, but it would have been more 
powerful if it had treated indigenous-colonial relations as international relations, and it does 
very little to answer real historical questions about colonization. The Aboriginal people 
who appear in the Bedford and Workman account are detached from their historical agency, 
having apparently done little actively to resist colonial intrusion.  
 
Sovereignty as Discourse: Shaw, Beier, and Stewart-Makarere 
Karena   Shaw’s   book   Indigeneity and Political Theory, which includes a similar 
critique of Bedford and Workman, represents an additional step beyond the narrow 
conceptual limits of conventional IR (2008). Shaw’s  book  is  structured  around  a  critique  of  
the  conceptual  dominance  of  “sovereignty”  in  IR,  and  the  resulting  exclusion  of  indigenous  
experiences. She uses a close reading of the second chapter of Hobbes’  Leviathan, arguing 
that the notion of sovereignty produced in this work became paradigmatic in IR. Hobbesian 
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sovereignty, as defined by Shaw, fundamentally entails the construction of a shared 
identity,  a  process  that  is  “pre-political”  — in other words, natural and inevitable — rather 
than the result of real historical forces and social relations. This notion of sovereignty then 
effectively  naturalizes  “the  political,”  defined  as  the  narrowly  limited  relationship  between  
the sovereign and the citizens. This means that indigenous forms of political organization 
are   inherently   “outside”   the   political   realm,   and   the  Western   state   structure   is   “rendered  
apolitical and uncontestable, necessary and inevitable”  (9).  
After introducing her argument regarding the Hobbesian construction of 
sovereignty, Shaw moves on to explore how sovereignty is reified through academic 
scholarship, and in particular through the disciplinary separation of IR and anthropology, a 
separation that limits the potential for critical self-awareness within each of those 
disciplines.  According   to   Shaw,  Bedford   and  Workman’s   article   “reproduces   the   agency  
and centrality of international relations and freezes Indigenous peoples as at best marginal 
contributors to its questions and endeavors”  (68). Shaw  intends  “international  relations”  to  
refer to the system of inter-state relations, as well as the discipline of IR. This is an 
important  point   for  understanding   the  book,  which   is,   as   the   author  notes,  “an  attempt   to  
come to terms with how discourses and practices of sovereignty still set the conditions 
under which indigenous — and  other  forms  of  “marginal”  — politics occur at all”  (8).  
Having established that the dominance of the concept of sovereignty limits political 
thought, and in particular limits the options for thinking about indigenous politics. Shaw 
then applies this framework to constitutional and legal indigenous issues in Canada, 
portraying the pursuit of formal legal recognition as a complex dynamic. On the one hand, 
focusing on the pursuit of rights is perhaps the most direct way for First Nations to realize 
compensation for broken treaties and past mistreatment on the part of the state. On the other 
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hand, this strategy has the side effect of legitimizing and perpetuating the same liberal state 
institutions that render Indigenous peoples, by definition, marginal. Whereas Keal and 
Wilmer advocate admitting Indigenous peoples to the system of inter-state relations, 
Shaw’s   critical   stance   toward   sovereignty   is   more sophisticated and attenuated to its 
inherent contradictions.      
Yet   Shaw’s   book   ascribes   far   too  much   power   to   the   “discourse   of   sovereignty”  
relative to the real historical structure of the state. Shaw is primarily interested in political 
thought, specifically  in  “reconceptualizing  the  relationship  between  political  theory  and  the  
challenges   posed   by   contemporary   indigenous   politics,”   and   she   uses   such   historical  
examples   as  Alexis   de  Tocqueville’s   description   of   emerging   forms  of   democracy   in   the  
US, in addition to the legal and policy frameworks for Aboriginal issues in Canada, to 
reveal   “the   resonances   across   discourses   and   practices   of   sovereignty”   (8). No doubt an 
emphasis on political theory is perfectly legitimate, but the result in this case is an analysis 
overly detached from political context, with the rise of sovereignty analytically isolated 
from the wider context of the production of social relations. However successfully Shaw 
theorizes the construction of sovereignty as a concept and its role in naturalizing the 
sovereign state — the reproduction of social relations — she does not have an account of 
the social forces that drove the expansion of the state form. This weakness is reinforced in 
the  final  section  of  Shaw’s  book,  in  which  she turns to the critique of sovereignty found in 
Deleuze  and  Guattari’s  A Thousand Plateaus, further emphasizing knowledge production 
and authorization over social relations and politics.  
The emphasis on discourse over social relations is nearly total in Marshall  Beier’s  
International Relations in Uncommon Places (2005). Adopting a post-modern theoretical 
synthesis, in particular postcolonial theory and Derridean deconstruction, Beier argues that 
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IR’s   neglect   of   indigenous   peoples   is   the   product   of   the   discipline   having   “internalized  
many   of   the   enabling   narratives   of   colonialism   in   the   Americas.”   IR   articulates   the  
“‘hegemonologue’   of   the   dominating   society:   a   knowing   hegemonic  Western   voice   that,  
owing to its universalist pretensions, speaks its knowledges to the exclusion of all others”  
(2). Western academic disciplinarity more broadly, and IR theory in particular, are guilty of 
reproducing the dominant Western worldview to the exclusion indigenous perspectives. As 
such, IR itself is a contemporary colonial practice. Having made this case, Beier 
unsurprisingly goes on to argue that conventional ethnographic practices such as participant 
observation   through   fieldwork   are   inadequate   to   capture   Aboriginal   reality.   Beier’s  
concerns about the exclusion of Aboriginal voices from the discourse of IR are passionately 
articulated, but his argument ultimately boils down to this unremarkable insight: the 
dominant society dominates discourse and culture. The final analysis fails to move us 
beyond the initial problem: Indigenous  peoples  are  excluded  from  IR.  Beier’s  insistence  on  
exposing   IR’s   complicity   in   colonialism   and   rejecting   totally   the   authority   of   the   scholar  
leaves him no ground on which to take a clear theoretical or analytical stand. The ironic 
result is   that,   in  Beier’s   account,  Aboriginal  people   are   rarely  more   than   the  passive   and  
largely forgotten victims of colonial tyranny. 
Makere Stewart-Harawiwa’s   The New Imperial Order: Indigenous Responses to 
Globalization situates Indigenous people within the contemporary global political economy 
(2005). Its  first  chapter  sets  out  the  author’s  understanding  of  an  indigenous  ontology;;  this  
is  part  of  a  larger  narrative  strategy  designed  to  avoid  replicating  IR’s  state-centrism. After 
that chapter, the author describes  the  establishment  of  “world  order”  in  two  stages:  the  first  
builds  on  Keal’s   (2003)  argument   that   international   law  changed  from  natural   law,  which  
was   concerned  with   individuals’  moral   rights   as  members   of   a   universal   humanity,   to   a  
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legal framework  concerned  with  states’  rights.  The  second  stage  explores  the  establishment  
of a multilateral economic order in the twentieth century, manifest in international 
institutions. Stewart-Harawiwa then locates indigenous resistance within this historical 
emergence of international order, although she offers little that is genuinely new in this 
regard, choosing to focus mostly on indigenous struggles for legal recognition. The book 
then  sprawls  out  to  cover  the  postwar  period  up  to  the  advent  of  “globalization,”  which  she  
characterizes   as   the   “return   of   empire”   and   analyzes   through   an   eclectic   combination   of  
critical  perspectives  culled  from  the  “globalization”  literature,  most  prominently  the  work  
of Hardt and Negri (2000). This book covers an exceptionally long historical period and 
draws upon a very wide mix of critical theories, such that its argument fails to cohere (in 
this  way  it  testifies  to  many  of  the  problems  with  the  “anti-globalization”  literature  of  the  
late 1990s). Despite those criticisms, Stewart-Harawiwa’s   book   does   make   valuable  
contributions to the general theoretical problem I am addressing in this dissertation. (The 
sections on the particular historical period I am working on do not contain significantly new 
analysis.) First, she considers indigenous issues in a global political-economic context, 
which allows (at least potentially) for a much more political analysis. Second, she insists on 
the need to recognize, critique, and then move beyond the Eurocentric and state-centric 
assumptions of mainstream IR if we are to develop genuinely new insights into the role of 
Indigenous peoples in international relations. To this end, she employs an innovative 
indigenous theoretical approach known as Kaupapa Maori, which was developed by Maori 
scholars on the basis of the Maori history and experience with colonization and de-
colonization. While she unfortunately fails to follow any one of her theoretical paths 
through   to  a  useful  conclusion,  ending  up   instead  with  a  vague  critique  of  “world  order”  
and  “empire,”  these  two  elements  alone  make  the book an advance.  
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State-centrism Reconsidered in Spatial Terms 
The centrality of the state in IR has been critiqued by many scholars, ranging from 
pioneering works by critical constructivists (Walker 1993), to Atlantic  studies’  critique  of  
the artificiality of state-based organization through an exploration of cultural hybridity 
(Gilroy 1993). Various critical and historical-materialist approaches in the IR tradition, 
from the early anti-imperialism of Hobson and Lenin through World Systems Theory, have 
attempted to explain the dominance of the west in terms of transnational capital, with little 
regard for the role of the imposition of the nation-state form. Recently, some social 
scientists have become so fed up with the concept of the state they propose dropping it 
altogether. These schools of thought in international studies challenge state-centrism, but 
they have done so largely at the cost of missing the real role of the state — in effect 
throwing out the empirical/historical baby with the conceptual/methodological bathwater. 
Examining the colonization of North America allows me to avoid such an all-or-nothing 
approach to the state. This is because in the New World, sovereignty was not established as 
organically as it did in modernizing Europe. European colonization of North America was 
an attempt to project certain practices onto a space that was not already ordered for them. A 
whole set of interrelated European assumptions regarding the relative status of different 
forms of land tenure, property rights, and private versus state interests crash-landed into 
Aboriginal North America. Focusing my analysis on this particular historical moment — in 
which the relationship between sovereignty and property was much more arbitrary than it 
was in early-modern Europe — offers an opportunity to develop new insights into 
sovereignty as a concept and an historical reality. 
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Let us consider the particular value such insights offer IR. Consider how the IR 
literature has been characterized   by   pendulum   swings   between   challenges   to   the   state’s  
theoretical   centrality   and   assertions   of   its   empirical   durability,   producing   the   “seemingly  
unsatisfactory conclusion that the state is both a fetish illusion (a mask for class power) and 
an organized political force in its own right”   (Harvey  2009:261). While it is beyond the 
remit of this study to survey comprehensively the literature on the social theory of the state, 
two linked summary points deserve emphasis. First, the concept of the nation-state has 
cemented  the  fundamental  associations  between  the  state  and  the  nation.  The  terms  “state,”  
“nation,”  and  “nation-state”  are  often  used  interchangeably  in  the  literature.  Theories  of  the  
state typically imply some degree of nationalism, while theories of nationalism often see 
that phenomenon as a state-led project (Sharma and Gupta 2006:7). This makes such 
theories largely useless to explain indigenous nations. Second, the vast majority of social 
theory — and this is especially true in IR — accepts the state as a straightforward subject 
for empirical observation. This concept of the state rests on an unexamined territorial basis 
(Harvey 2009:267). Conceptually, space functions as an assumption rather than a subject 
meriting examination in its own right (Biggs 1999).  
Despite this unexamined status — or perhaps because of it — spatial assumptions 
are powerful in IR. As Sack (1980) shows, space, especially through the use of metaphor 
and other forms of representation, is embedded in the social sciences in deep and complex 
ways. Certain spatial assumptions structure, organize, and limit the research carried out by 
IR scholars.29 The theoretical problem of state-centrism  has  been  addressed  in  some  of  IR’s  
                                                 
29 A spatial lens is not on its own sufficient to move beyond an assumption of the formal state. For an 
example  drawn   from  IR  to  prove   the  point,  we  can   turn   to  Carl  Schmitt’s  Der Nomos der Erde — the first 
appearances of which in English translation produced  a  Schmittian  “revival”  in  IR  (Chandler  2008).  Schmitt’s  
account of two linked historical phenomena — the sixteenth-century conquest of the New World and the 
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adjacent disciplines, notably geography. We can benefit by borrowing from critical 
geography the  concept  of  the  “territorial  trap,”  which  describes  an  ahistorical state-centrism 
“in   which   the   only   possibility   for   mapping   global   processes   is   in   terms   of   the   fixed  
territorial boundaries of states”  (Brenner  1997:138). This argument has been developed in 
detail by John Agnew (1994). In these terms, the territorial state is seen as a pre-existing 
“container”  of  society.30   
The main alternative to the state-as-container theory in IR and international 
sociology has been the core/semiperiphery/periphery model of World Systems Theory 
                                                                                                                                                    
development and expansion of the European state — is a highly innovative combination of the juridicial and 
the geographical (Jameson 2005). However,   the   value   of   Schmitt’s   spatial   analysis   is   profoundly   limited  
because it confirms, rather than challenges, the definition of the modern state as strictly a matter of sovereign 
territoriality.  
 To summarize his argument in outline: Schmitt considers expansion overseas to have constituted the 
beginning of a Eurocentric world order, an order whose passing he mourned in the Nomos.  Even though this 
“world   order”   saw   the   rise   of   a   series   of   genocidal   European   empires,   Schmitt   portrays   it   in   consistently  
elegiac tones (Rasch 2008). The  core  of  Schmitt’s  analysis  in  Nomos rests on a paradigm of insider/outsider, 
or friend and enemy. Since the beginning of the Holy Roman Empire, Christian Europe saw itself as unified, 
despite its many internal cultural, ethnic and political fissures. Whatever these differences, Christian 
Europeans were inherently superior to the rest of the world. As a result, wars between European states were 
“bracketed,”   or   contained   within   reasonable   limits   (not   unlike   aristocratic   duels)   while   relations   between  
Europeans   and   the   “uncivilized”  world   were   subject   to   no   such   constraints.   Schmitt   emphasizes   that   “this  
great accomplishment,”  which  constituted  a  break  from  both  medieval  concepts  of  just  war  and  Roman  legal  
tradition,   “arose   solely   from   the   emergence   of   a   new   spatial   order”   (140). In   Schmitt’s   schema   it  was   the  
imperial conquest of non-European territory — “the  appearance of vast free spaces and the land-appropriation 
of  a   new  world”  — that gave European states the central, privileged position within international law, and 
thus created the European order of limited inter-state war (140-141; also cf. 126-129). In this way,  Schmitt’s  
nomos is literally grounded in the land as he sees land as the most fundamental object of appropriation. This is 
what makes it a deeply territorial order: Europeans were successful at conquering territory outside Europe, 
and this success provided its own justification (cf. Schmitt 2003:80-84). The  taking  of  land  is  “constitutive”  
of   international   law,   both   in   the   sense   that   making   territorial   changes   peaceful   is   international   law’s   core  
function,  and  also  that  “it  is  essential  for  Schmitt’s argument that there be no deeper criterion of legality than 
that of the successful act of appropriation”   (Hallward   2005:238). Every nomos is based upon land 
appropriation; the age of international inter-state law was inherently territorial, just as the medieval order 
before it arose fundamentally out of land conquests (Schmitt 2003:57). The logical conclusion of the 
Schmittian  analysis  is  that  conflicts  between  great  powers  are  more  important  than  “the  fundamental  relations  
of exploitation and domination that distinguish the rules of these powers from those they exploit both at home 
and abroad”  (Hallward  2005:242). In short, the potential insights of the nomos model’s  spatial  approach  are  
limited because it sees the state as formal and space as static, not relational.  
30 This assumption — which is shared across most mainstream IR theory — is the first of three geographical 
assumptions   that   underpin   Agnew’s   concept   of   the   territorial   trap.   The   second   of   these   is   that   the   strict  
distinction between the national/international, or domestic/foreign obscures how social relations work at 
different scales. The third assumption that forms the foundation of the territorial trap is the reification of 
national spaces as historically fixed — the consequence of which is that processes of state formation and 
change are overlooked or at best seen out of historical context. 
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(WST).  Immanuel  Wallerstein’s  historical-materialist approach was motivated by the need 
to place national cultures and societies more clearly in the context of international social 
relations.  Wallerstein  (1974,  1980)  posits  a  modern  world  system,  a  “world  economy”  that  
is, essentially, capitalism on a global scale.31 Wallerstein’s  largely  static  world  system  pre-
empts political agency within the theory; political struggles and contradictions are relegated 
to   the   secondary   structures   of   the   state.   In   this   way,   WST   “collapses   potentially  
contradictory state-society relations into an ahistorical, abstract unity no less than do the 
neorealists”   (Rupert   1995:10). By establishing its subject matter as a world-scale social 
phenomenon, WST and related approaches assume the space of social relations, rather than 
viewing it as the product of political dynamics and social contradictions (Drainville 1995). 
Conceiving  of  space  in  relational,  as  opposed  to  static,  terms  is  not  possible  within  WST’s  
structuralist framework. However, WST does not exhaust the possibilities for a historical-
materialist theory of spatiality. Indeed, as Soja (1989) shows, spatiality historically had a 
central place within Marxist and other radical approaches.32 
                                                 
31 This economy is capitalist simply in the sense that within it market exchange is carried out in pursuit of 
profit. 
32 The work of utopian socialist Fourier is one example of the geographically sensitive strand of socialist 
thought. The half-century-period, with 1848 as its mid-point, was the classical era of competitive industrial 
capitalism. During this period,   “historicity and spatiality were in approximate balance as sources of 
emancipatory consciousness”   (Soja,   1989:4). The discipline of modern geography emerged in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to serve as a reservoir for spatial considerations. Consequently social 
theory became dominated by two strands: a relatively narrow, naturalistic historical materialism evincing 
historicism at the expense of any sensitivity to human geographies; and a series of compartmentalized social 
sciences, each becoming steadily more positivist, less critical, and less interested in the spatiality of social 
relations. Geographically aware strands of socialist thought after this point included the works of the 
anarchists Proudhon and Kropotkin (the latter of whom was a professional geographer). Within Marxist 
thought, the great figures in the fruitful period of the early twentieth century — Lenin, Luxembourg, 
Bukharin, and Trotsky — all displayed an acute interest in spatial and geographical issues. Marxist theories of 
imperialism   and   Trotsky’s   theory   of   combined   and   uneven   development   — surely among the Marxist 
tradition’s  signal  achievements  — contained an important spatial element, and they remain a primary source 
of spatial analysis in Marxist thought. Over time, however, the geographical dimensions of Marxist thought 
would come to be seen as merely a product of historical development — we might say space became a 
superstructural  phenomenon  in  relation  to  the  “base”  of  historicism.  Despite   the relative decline of spatiality 
in Marxist theory, Marxist historicism remained radical. The same was not the case for non-Marxist 
sociology, where historical analysis largely underpinned Eurocentric modernization theories. Thus, in the long 
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Conclusion 
To  sum  up  my  argument  so  far,  IR’s  traditional  concerns  such  as  war,  trade  regimes,  
and state diplomacy share a particular theoretical foundation, namely the assumption that 
the international system is naturally and timelessly  a system of inter-state relations. 
English School approaches are historical, and indeed have been applied to the colonization 
of the New World. But these accounts are state-centric and apolitical. Keal and Wilmer 
frame   the   problem   I   address   in   this   dissertation   more   or   less   “by   accident”   with   their  
inability to move beyond the European state as the benchmark for legitimate sovereignty. 
Crawford, Shaw, and Stewart-Harawiwa address this problem, but they all fall victim, in 
various ways and to various degrees, to two of the failings of the English School: a lack of 
politics and a reproduction of state-centrism.  They  don’t  get  beyond  a   formal  analysis  of  
the state. Moreover, attempts to challenge the legitimacy of statist sovereignty by 
portraying   it  as  mere  “discourse”  do  not  shed  any   light  on  how  indigenous  communities’  
interactions with English colonizers shaped modern sovereignty in profound and lasting 
ways. I the next chapter I turn to my historical reconstruction of the colonization of North 
America, which I will theorize in light of the ideas outlined in this literature review. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
fin de siècle, spatiality became steadily marginalized within social theory — at precisely the moment when 
space took on a new social and political instrumentality (Soja, 1989: 31-35).   
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3. The Modern State Emerges out of England 
 
Different European powers interacted with the peoples they encountered in the New World 
in different ways. There were different forms of modern state in Europe, and the specific 
moments of state formation were unevenly timed, with economic ambitions, culture, and 
domestic social relations accounting for most of the variations between different imperial 
systems. The different forms of state were also shaped by inter-imperial antagonisms and 
rivalries. An assumption of formal sovereignty, such as characterizes most IR accounts of 
colonialism, obscures these dynamics. The work of the English School in IR is the signal 
example  of   this  point  of  view,  which  we  might  call   the  “European  state”   thesis.  Roughly  
stated, it assumes that colonial interactions with Indigenous peoples occurred between them 
and  a  generic  “Europe.”  It  was  this  European  state  form  that  colonized  the  world.33  
 In this chapter I reject the European state thesis, contrasting the English and 
Spanish colonial presences. Viewed through our spatial social-relations lens, inter-imperial 
rivalries mandated the adoption of a conceptual framework of acquisition based on the 
theory of absolute space, because the different powers needed to establish mutually 
exclusive claims to sovereignty in the New World. I emphasize the importance of the 
modern   English   state;;   it   was   not   the   “European”   state   that   provided   the   framework   that  
effected the transfer of indigenous land, but rather the modern state that emerged out of 
                                                 
33 According  to  Watson,  for  example,  international  society’s  spread  to  the  Americas begins at the moment of 
secession,   which   “effectively   subtracted   the   new   American   states   from   the   European   balance   of   power”  
(Watson  in  Bull  and  Watson  1984:127).  Watson’s  claim  that  US  state  formation  fundamentally  signified  a  net  
loss in the European balance of power is only convincing within a narrow, state-centric frame of reference. It 
is  also  at  best  historically  incomplete:  consider  Napoleon’s  attempts  to  take  over  Louisiana  and  sell  it  again,  
or of the ongoing complex actions of the British, Spanish and French governments in North America. 
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sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England. The distinguishing characteristic of the 
modern state as it emerged out of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England was the 
separation between sovereignty and property. The separation between (state) sovereignty 
and (private) property is one of the fundamental characteristics of the modern state form — 
for the purposes of this dissertation it is the fundamental characteristic. This is what 
distinguishes it from the feudal state, in which property was not owned privately, but rather 
held by the Crown — thus the feudal monarch enjoyed both ownership and political 
control over   the  nation’s   territory.   It   also  distinguishes   the  modern  state   from   indigenous  
nations, which, as we see in the following chapters, claimed sovereignty without 
necessarily governing an exclusive territory, and in which land was not held as private 
territory. As we will see below, the separation between the political and the economic 
allowed the modern state to function in effect as a powerful and efficient machine for 
transferring land from communal ownership into private hands.  
I establish English specificity by contrasting the Iberian view of indigenous land 
rights with that of the English: the English were much more concerned with owning land, 
while Spanish colonists were relatively more interested in extracting minerals and metals 
from under the land — and so relatively more interested in indigenous labour than land per 
se. Spain was also culturally committed to legal formalities, and came to equate rights with 
religious conversion. In contrast, the English culture of legality shared roots with classical 
liberal (in particular Lockean) notions of property rights being derived from labour. For the 
English,  the  emphasis  on  estates  and  the  productive  use  of  land  achieved  by  “improving”  it  
was more important than cultural or religious conversion. But it also required the English 
(after an initial period of controversy) to acknowledge indigenous land rights on land 
occupied by Indigenous peoples. The rights to Indian land were then appropriated through 
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two  parallel  processes:  “unused”  or  “unimproved”  land  was  deemed  unoccupied,  and  there  
for  the  taking;;  and  English  governments  asserted,  by  virtue  of  their  “superior  sovereignty,”  
the exclusive right to buy native land. The imposition of the state also entailed the 
imposition of legal doctrines that constituted a framework for the acquisition of land. 
For Europeans, contact with the Indigenous peoples of North America was truly a 
“discovery,”  in  the  sense  of  finding  something  that  was  both  newly  exposed  to  the  viewer  
and also pre-existing. However little they knew about or understood Aboriginal people, 
Europeans in general understood Aboriginal society to have been revealed to, not invented 
by, them (Pagden 1993:5-6). This discovery had to be incorporated into European political 
and legal understanding, and Europeans often found their conceptual frameworks entirely 
inadequate to explain the colonial encounter. European theories of property and land rights 
evolved through a series of modes, with changes at the level of theory reflecting the needs 
of expanding colonial empires (Green and Dickason 1989; Pagden 1993, 1995; Keal 2003). 
While it is the central contention of this chapter that we must understand the differences 
between English and other colonial projects, that is not to say were no commonalities. In 
what way might it be accurate to say that there was a European perspective on the New 
World?  
The pursuit of natural resources was a central motivation for all colonial empires, 
and all used their experience with war and superior military technologies to apply brutal 
violence in the service of appropriating resources. But arms were not the only technology 
of dispossession: the law and culture were also potent. Legally and culturally, most 
important  was  the  imperial  powers’  presumed  inherent  right  to  assert  lordship  over  the  
entire world (cf. Pagden1995:8). For the imperial states of Europe, the issue of sovereignty 
was uncontroversial — they all took for granted their right to claim sovereignty. All 
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assumed  a  “superior  sovereignty”  to  that  of  the  Indigenous peoples they encountered. This 
idea was a legacy of Christian universalism. The rise of sovereign territorial states marked 
the end of the great medieval church, which had lasted a millennium and promised to unite 
every person together under the kingdom of God. Christian universalism had a stabilizing 
effect by papering over intense social contradictions — its promise of eternal happiness in 
heaven for those who lived a hard life on earth absorbed political dissent and helped protect 
the feudal system from rebellion (Ishay 1995:xxv). The idea of the Church as a universal 
commonwealth had been the determining influence on medieval political, legal and ethical 
thought regarding colonization (Pagden 1993).  
Philosophically, the early-modern colonial projects in the Americas were explained 
and justified by drawing upon ancient (specifically, Roman) notions of universalism.34 
When Renaissance Europe first made contact with Indigenous peoples in the New World, 
the  Europeans  already  “enjoyed  the  singular  advantage  of  possessing  a  systematically  
elaborated legal discourse on colonization. This discourse, first successfully deployed 
during the medieval Crusades to the Holy Land, unquestioningly asserted that normatively 
divergent non-Christian peoples could rightfully be conquered and their lands could 
lawfully be confiscated by Christian Europeans enforcing their peculiar vision of a 
universally binding natural law”  (Williams  1990:13). Yet the Church had had very little 
interest in attempting to regulate trade or commerce, either directly or through moral 
suasion. There were never any universal European conventions of finance or trade, but 
rather  a  patchwork  of  regional  cultures  and  practices.  As  a  result  of  these  legacies,  Europe’s  
                                                 
34 The Holy Roman Empire, as its name suggests, was one of several early-modern European empires that 
found in ancient cosmopolitanism an ideological model that could be combined with Christian universalism to 
support its own imperial projects. In particular, the ancient Roman Empire provided a trove of imperial 
pretensions that were adopted by European colonizing powers, especially those that had themselves once been 
Roman colonies — thus it was no accident, for example, that Charles V referred to himself as Augustus 
(Pagden 2000:6). 
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colonial discourse was universal in form — in the sense that it was fundamentally about 
extending a particular set of social relations out to the rest of the world — but not in 
content. Aside from the commonly shared assumption that they were entitled to impose 
their own traditions on other peoples as a matter of imperial prerogative, there was wide 
variation among different European cultures. So, while the European discourse of colonial 
conquest  typically  was  expressed  in  “universal”  or  “international”  economic  dictums,  pace 
the  English  School  literature  this  did  not  demonstrate  a  “European”  culture.  Frequently  
European  colonial  justifications  that  were  “characterized  as  ‘international’  or  ‘universal’  
were  simply  their  own  distinct  European  cultural  traditions  applied  overseas.”  This  is  true  
even in the case of international law (Seed 2001:4).  
 
Imperial Absolutist Spain 
The colonial policy and culture of absolutist Spain manifested understandings of 
land rights and Indigenous people that were very different from those of the English culture 
that would become dominant. Spanish colonists were much less interested in owning land 
than were the English. Instead, the Spanish were most interested in gold and other precious 
metals and stones found under the land, as well as the labour force required to extract them. 
My rationale for choosing absolutist Spain as the foil for England in this example is that the 
country was not merely one among many to experience the transformation to absolutism in 
late-Renaissance  Europe,  it  was  quantitatively  and  hence  qualitatively  distinct:  “The  reach  
and impact of Spanish Absolutism….acted  as  a  special  over-determination of the national 
patterns elsewhere in the continent, because of the disproportionate wealth and power at its 
command: the historical concentration of these assets in the Spanish State could not but 
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affect the overall shape and direction of the emergent State-system of the West”  (Anderson  
1979:60).  
The context of an absolutist Spanish state shaped notions of property and 
sovereignty in particular ways that were different from those of modernizing England 
(recall that by our definition modernizing signifies an emerging separation between 
sovereignty and property). In the most basic terms, the Spanish did not really care about 
owning  land,  they  wanted  to  control  Aboriginal  people’s  labour.  They  valued  land  in  terms  
of its use value — often the metals found under the soil, and they saw Aboriginal people as 
a source of labour to extract those natural resources. They justified colonialism using a 
series of arguments based in the logic of pre-modern states. In contrast, a new form of land 
tenure was emerging in England along with the modern state. This was a shift from a 
functionally organized system to a spatially organized one.  
Spain emerged as a unified monarchy in 1492, the same year Columbus led the first 
Spanish voyage across the Atlantic. As Spain first extended its imperial presence across the 
Atlantic at the end of the fifteenth century, it was an absolutist state. There are extensive 
debates in the literature about the nature and extent of absolutism among European royalty 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (see, inter alia, Anderson 1979; Giddens 1985; 
Teschke 2003). For my purposes, the fundamental qualities of absolutism are relatively 
uncontested and easily summarized: absolutism replaced the partitioned sovereignty of 
feudalism — manifest in a system of estates held by politically powerful nobility — with a 
structure in which political and economic power was centralized with the Crown. This also 
entailed the establishment of many of the elements of state power, including unified state 
laws, standing armies, and professional bureaucracies. The characteristics of absolutism 
that are particularly germane to this discussion are its combination of exclusive territorial 
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(state) sovereignty, and non-exclusive (landed) property. A territory was controlled 
exclusively by the sovereign; within that territory, however, the monarch maintained 
ultimate authority for the land. Thus property and sovereignty were essentially overlapping 
and conjoined. This combination distinguished absolutism from the modern state, in which 
the state exerts sovereignty over an exclusive territory, but the land within is held 
exclusively by one (usually private) owner. (There are exceptions such as Crown reserve 
land in the form of public parks, for example, but these are still consistent with the logic of 
exclusive property — they just happen to be owned by the state.) None of this should be 
taken   to   suggest   Spain’s   absolutist structure impeded the efficiency of its colonial 
adventure.  As  Perry  Anderson  describes   it,   “conducted  and  organized  within   still  notably  
seigneurial structures, the plunder of the Americas was nevertheless at the same time the 
most spectacular single act in the primitive accumulation of European capital during the 
Renaissance”  (Anderson  1979:61). 
Owning land was not the main concern for the Spanish settlers who arrived in the 
New World; instead they were looking for the resources found underground. The Crusades 
had left another important legacy, in the addition to the powerful notion of a universally 
binding Christian natural law described above: the rise in the use of gold bullion as 
payment for imported foreign luxuries. By the fifteenth century, the use of metallic money 
(gold and silver) had become established as fundamental to European social and economic 
life (Braudel and Reynolds 1972). Western Europe had few gold mines, and relied on mines 
in the Middle East and western Africa for most of its gold. But Portugal had already 
established control over the African supply, giving it a great competitive advantage and 
making the discovery of new, cheaper sources a high priority for Spain (Walton 1994). The 
earliest Spanish colonists to arrive in the New World found gold almost immediately upon 
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landing. In his first reports back to Spain, which had a huge and immediate effect on the 
European   imagination,  Columbus   emphasized   the  numerous  mines   and   “the   rivers,  many  
and great, and good streams, the most of which bear gold”  (Quoted  in  Stannard  1992:63). 
Spanish colonists believed that, by establishing control of territory in the New World, they 
were collectively entitled to its mineral reserves, including gold, silver, and emeralds. This 
assumption reflected a long-established tradition, which held that mineral reserves were 
collectively owned by the members of the dominant religious faith, in this case members of 
the  Catholic  church.  The  tradition  originated  in  the  Iberian  Peninsula’s  Islamic  past. Unlike 
in most of Europe, where precious metals were considered the property of whoever found 
them, in the Islamic legal tradition buried precious metals and stones were considered to 
have been left underground as a gift from God, to be shared amongst the faithful. No one 
person, not even the monarch, could claim them as personal property. By the fifteenth 
century, Christian Iberians had adopted the idea that mineral resources had been buried by 
God for his Christian followers, and in the colonial period some colonists argued that God 
had placed such underground wealth in the New World in order to attract Europeans, who 
would then convert the locals (Seed 2001:57-61).  
In order to extract the gold they found in the New World, the Spanish colonists 
needed labour.  This  perspective  is  reflected  in  Columbus’s written reports back to Spain, in 
which he typically referred to indigenous people as part of the natural landscape, usually 
including   them   in   his   discussions   of   nature,   as   in   “in   the   interior   of   the   lands, there are 
many mines of metal and countless inhabitants”  (Quoted  in  Todorov  1996:34). By the time 
of his second voyage, in 1494, Columbus had developed a tribute system to systematize the 
enslavement  of   the  natives:  “Gold  was  all   that   they  were  seeking, so every Indian on the 
island [of Hispaniola] who was not a child was ordered to deliver to the Spanish a certain 
57  
 
 
amount of the precious ore every three months. When the gold was delivered the individual 
was presented with a token to wear around his or her neck as proof that the tribute had been 
paid. Anyone found without the appropriate number of tokens had his hands cut off”  
(Stannard 1992:71). This tribute approach — essentially a per capita tax on indigenous 
people — was  “the  central  unique  economic feature of Spanish dominion over New World 
peoples,”  and  was  in  keeping  with  a  medieval   Iberian  convention  under  Christian  rule,   in  
which wealthy conquered communities paid tributes in cash, while poorer ones paid in 
labour (Seed 1995:83).  
In effect, then, the most valuable resource for the first Spanish colonists was not 
land, and not even gold — which was so plentiful — but the slave labour to extract it. This 
is why individual colonists were apportioned a share, not of land, but of the native 
population, which they put to work looking for gold. What was originally an ad hoc system 
of  allocating   this  “human   resource”  personally   run  by  Columbus  was,  by  1501,  officially  
sanctioned   by   Queen   Isabel,   who   also   asserted   the   Crown’s   right   to   assign   labour. The 
power dynamics under an absolutist state were such that, after finding herself unable to 
prevent private Spanish settlers on the other side of the ocean from assigning native labour 
themselves, the Queen changed tack, ordering that indigenous people be forced to gather 
precious metals and putting the control of native labour under direct royal control. This 
practice came to be known as a trusteeship, or encomienda. It is worth emphasizing that it 
was native people who were held in trust, not their land (Seed 2001:62-65). In fact, all 
indigenous people who surrendered to the Spanish crown were formally guaranteed the 
right to own their property, including land, a right that no other European power extended 
to Indigenous peoples it encountered. They were also formally guaranteed the right to 
continue using indigenous laws and systems of trade. Weaver (2003) summarizes three 
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main ways in which Spanish colonial land practices differed from those in English 
colonies: 
First, colonial bureaucrats, notaries, advocates, and judges arranged the 
benefactions of land grants; there was an elaborate bureaucratic structure 
engaged in distributing land to elites. Second, when these elites established 
landed estates in the Americas during the colonial period, they also sought 
official  sanction  for  their  master  over  labour  and  local  markets….Third,  the  
church emerged as a major proprietor of estates. As a consequence of these 
three factors, landholding and political power overlapped, and both were 
greatly concentrated. (32) 
 
The concentration and overlap of land ownership and political power is the core distinction 
between absolutist colonialism and the colonial approach of the modern state.  
The Spanish process for formally establishing Aboriginal people’s surrender to the 
Crown involved the reading of a statement that informed them of the truth of Christianity 
and the necessity of immediately pledging allegiance to the Pope and the Spanish Crown.  
If they did not do so (and as David Stannard points out, since it is likely that almost none of 
the audience had any idea what was being read to them in this foreign language, and since 
they  were   often   shackled   first,   the   issue   of   “pledging   allegiance”  was   largely  moot),   the  
statement declared: 
I certify to you that, with the help of God, we shall powerfully enter into 
your country and shall make war against you in all ways and manners that 
we can, and shall subject you to the yoke and Obedience of the Church and 
of Their Highnesses. We shall take you and your wives and children, and 
makes slaves of them, and as such sell and dispose of them as their 
Highnesses may command. And we shall take your goods, and shall do you 
all the mischief and damage that we can, as to vassals who do not obey and 
refuse to receive their lord and resist and contradict him. (Quoted in 
Stannard 1992:65-66) 
 
This peculiar mix of brutality and legality highlights the Spanish requirement of going 
through the formal exercise of reading a declaration. In contrast, English law (alone among 
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European cultures) would not require a written contract or the reading of a declaration to 
claim land until the late seventeenth century (Seed 2001:13). 
Charles V declared that the Indians of North America should be allowed to preserve 
their traditional surface-land rights, on the condition that they abandon resistance. Spanish 
government and colonial officials actually worked to prevent their colonists from seizing 
indigenous land, and met with relatively little organized opposition. Such a royal decree 
had the effect of giving First Nations enough reason to moderate, at least somewhat, the 
intensity of their opposition to the Spanish presence, while also preventing Spanish 
Christians from assembling large holdings and thus becoming a threat to the King’s  
authority (Seed 2001:83-84). 
 
The Vitorian Tradition of International Law 
The violent Spanish conquests of Mexico and Peru in the sixteenth century 
generated an intense Spanish debate about the legality, under the emergent law of nations, 
of colonial settlement in the Americas (Keal 2003:84ff; also see Tuck 1999). International 
law emerged in the colonial period as the Law of Nations (jus gentium), a development that 
reflected the uneven but inexorable change in the centre of gravity of political power, from 
the supra-national church to state governments (cf. Green and Dickason, 1989:241-250). 
The Law of Nations, which was based upon the tenets of natural law, provided a framework 
to legitimize European political and economic intrusions overseas, and its history is usually 
written  by  IR  scholars  as  a  universal,  or  at  a  least  “European”  one (Bull and Watson 1984). 
English School writers typically locate the origins of international law in the work of the 
Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, who set out a framework for international law, including a 
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theory   of   just  war,   abstracted   from   natural   law.   Grotius’s notion of international society 
provided a foundation for modern theories of international society in IR. Hedley Bull 
described  Grotius’s work   as   “cardinal because it states one of the classic paradigms that 
have since determined both our understanding of the facts of life of inter-state relations”  
(Bull, Kingsbury, and Roberts, eds, 1990:71). For that reason the English School is 
occasionally referred to as   the   contemporary   iteration   of   “the   Grotian   tradition”   in   IR 
(Cutler, 1991). By starting their historical narrative of international law in the seventeenth 
century with the work of Grotius, the English School ignores the sixteenth century Iberian 
tradition of Francisco Vitoria (cf Seed, 2001:199). 
The Spanish Crown, which assumed it had sovereignty over any Indigenous peoples 
encountered   by   Spanish   settlers,   asserted   the   settlers’   (encomemderos’) right to extract 
labour   or   tribute   in   exchange   for   “protecting”   indigenous   people   and   converting   them   to  
Christianity. This issue generated real and consequential debate (Anaya 2004; Keal 2003). 
The  papal  bull  “Inter  Cetera  Divini”  of  1493,  the  year  after  Christopher  Columbus  landed  
in the Americas (a journey undertaken on the condition that he be entitled to ten percent of 
the   value   of   whatever   goods   and   treasures   he   found   there),   referred   to   “certain   remote  
islands   and   also   mainlands”   discovered   by   Columbus,   and   acknowledged   that   “these  
nations living in the said islands and lands believe that there is one God and one Creator in 
the heavens”   (Quoted   in   Stewart-Harawiwa 2005:58). In the eyes of the church, then, 
indigenous nations were sovereign nations, and so the genocidal colonialism underway in 
the Americas was in direct contravention of the papal bulls (Morris 1992). When Christian 
theology proved unsatisfactory to establish the humanity and by extension the legal rights 
of the Indigenous peoples in the New World, supporters of the encomemderos turned to 
Aristotle’s   category   of   the   natural   slave (cf. Heath 2008). According to Vitoria, an 
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influential idea comes from Aristotle: “there   are   those  who   are   by   nature   slaves,   that   is  
those for whom it is better to serve than to rule. They are those who do not possess 
sufficient reason to even rule themselves, but only to interpret the orders of their masters 
and whose strength lies in their bodies rather than in their minds”  (in Pagden and Lawrence 
1991:67). They argued that the natives were, in essence, less than human, and thus, 
following   Aristotle,   “natural   slaves”   who   certainly   had   no   rights   to   their   territory:   “by  
defining away the essential humanity of the inhabitants, and by denigrating their capacity 
for self-government, it becomes possible to convert inhabited  land….available  for  the  first  
taker”  (Hanke  1965:28).  
The Spanish emperor, a devout Catholic, appealed to the prominent theologian 
Francisco de Vitoria for advice, likely in the expectation that he would provide legal-
theological   support   for   Spain’s   right   to   claim   the  New  World (Cohen 1942:46). Vitoria, 
however, largely sided with opponents such as the former encomemdero Bartolome de Las 
Casas, who were asserting strong public opposition to colonization. Vitoria drew on 
theories of natural law to contest the justice of the encomienda system, and arguing 
specifically   that   natural   law   applies   equally   to   all   humans,   regardless   of   nationality:   “so  
long as the Indians respected the natural rights of the Spaniards, recognized by the law of 
nations, to travel in their lands and to sojourn, trade, and defend their rights therein, the 
Spaniards could not wage a just war against the Indians and therefore could not claim any 
rights by conquest”   (Cohen   1942:46-47). Vitoria   did   not   dispute   Spain’s   legal   right   to  
establish sovereignty over the New World, but he did not accept the argument that the 
Castilian  crown  could  claim  indigenous  land  because  it  was  occupied  by  “barbarians”  (Keal  
2003:89-92). This   was   Vitoria’s   greatest specific contribution: he demolished natural 
slavery as a justification for colonialism, pointing to the cities constructed by the Inca and 
62  
 
 
Mexica   as   proof   that   these   people   were   not   natural   slaves.   Vitoria’s   understanding of 
natural law was separate from Christianity; the Indians were still entitled to rights as 
humans, even if there were not Christians.   
Writings by critics of the Spanish colonial project in North America show how 
international law, if we acknowledge its Iberian tradition, was in its earliest iterations a 
debate over the treatment of Indigenous peoples in the Americas. This reality is lost when 
we follow the standard IR line that sees international law beginning with Grotius, which in 
turn is part of a larger English-language scholarly tradition that sees human rights as 
originating  in  the  emergence  of  individual  citizens’  rights  in  northern  Europe.  For  Grotius,  
natural   law   was   a   “dictate   of   high   reason.”   His   law   of   nations   depended   heavily   on   all  
nations recognizing their mutual self-interest by deferring to custom, rules, reason, and 
practising moderation (Roelofsen 1990). Property rights were of central concern. As 
Murphy  (1996)  argues,  Grotius’s use  of  “high  reason”  as  the  foundation  for  natural  law  was  
based upon ancient conceptions of private property, along with the theory of sovereignty 
developed contemporaneously by Jean Bodin. The individual political subject living in a 
national state (with all associated legal restrictions and entitlements) was understood to be 
the equivalent of a state operating in a global context, where there was no regulatory or 
legal framework. Writings by Vitoria (and other critics of colonialism such as de Las 
Casas) help us see the origins of international law in the New World. Instead of the 
individual citizen being the central figure, Spanish debates over colonialism and 
international law emphasized communities, or (non-state) nations, a reality that is lost when 
viewed retrospectively through the lens of the nation-state. In the early-modern period, the 
rights of Indigenous peoples were widely recognized (if not widely respected); many 
thinkers specifically named indigenous societies as distinct and sovereign political entities 
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enjoying territorial rights (Berman 1993; Tuck 1999). Support for such rights, along with 
any possibility of a debate on the issue, disappeared in the seventeenth and eighteen 
centuries. How and why did this occur? As the modern state form gradually emerged and 
became entrenched, beginning in England in the late seventeenth century, the 
understanding of natural law itself changed, from a universal human moral code to a 
reflection of a dichotomy of individuals and states. In other words, there came to be in 
effect two sets of natural rights: one for individuals and one for states. (Anaya 2004:19-26)  
  
English Property Rights in the New World 
“The  modern  liberal  idea  of  individual  property  rights,”  Buck,  McLaren, and Wright 
write,   “is   just   that  — modern. Preceding ideas associated with feudal property relations 
placed significant impediments on the treatment of property as a commodity. During the 
turmoil of the English civil war, however, an opportunity was created for discussion and 
debate about alternative concepts of property, political order and sovereignty”   (2001:3). 
Aoki   adds   specificity   to   this   claim   and  places   it   in   the   international   context:   “the   rise   of  
public and private spheres occupied by, on one hand, materialistically motivated individual 
rights-bearers and on the other by strictly constrained, but powerful state entities, was 
paralleled by the rise of the idea of the sovereign nation-state and growing articulation of 
political sovereignty along strict territorially justified lines”  (Aoki  1995:1312).  The  English  
colonial tradition, which would become dominant in North America, evolved through 
several modes. At the moment of contact, England was still essentially a feudal state, 
without the clear modern distinction between sovereignty and property in land — land was 
still held of the Crown rather than privately owned. Consequently the English Crown 
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assumed that when it claimed sovereignty (the power to govern) in North America it also 
claimed property (ownership of the land), which it could then grant to British individuals 
and companies who petitioned for this privilege. But the English understanding of landed 
property rights hinged on the application of labour, and at the time of contact, First Nations 
had developed a complex agriculture based on corn, beans, and squash, supplemented with 
other crops including cotton. Techniques such as soil rotation and cultivation through 
selective breeding in order to meet specific geographic requirements were common (Hurt 
1987; Nabhan 1989). When confronted with the reality of Aboriginal agriculture, it could 
no longer be assumed that property followed sovereignty directly. Moreover, the reality on 
the ground was not so simple. In real material terms, colonists had limited power relative to 
the Aboriginal people they encountered, and so many chose to purchase indigenous land 
rather than forcefully assert the purported property rights that had been granted to them by 
their King. (The important role of private colonists, who made up the leading edge of 
English colonialism, is explored in detail in the next chapter.) 
In terms of foreign policy, England was mercantilist.35 Mercantilism was centred in 
England and France at time when those countries were beginning to intensify the 
establishment of colonies across the Atlantic in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
Mercantilist states were feudal-military states whose foreign policy, including colonial 
policy, was dictated by the logic of territorial accumulation and controls on trade. Britain, 
for example, imposed regulations that allowed its colonies to trade only with Britain 
                                                 
35 Mercantilism is, at root, a form of economic nationalism: the belief that national power and economic 
growth should be mutually reinforcing. The mercantilist state could act as a shield to protect the interests of 
its own industries as necessary. Strict government regulation of a national economy, typically guided by 
protectionist strategies, would ensure a positive balance of trade and a national accumulation of gold and 
silver, and these measures would lead to a stronger nation with even more power to manage trade (cf. 
Heilbroner 1995:39-40). Notwithstanding regional variations and uneven timing in the implementation of 
mercantilism, in general it reflected a growing acceptance on all sides that the state should do much more to 
regulate economic life. 
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(Wilson 1958). The   effects   of   European   colonial   “discoveries”   in   the   Americas   were  
echoing back across the Atlantic. A wide variety of global luxury commodities entered the 
European markets, and American mines were able to out-produce European ones within a 
matter of decades. These factors combined with advances in shipping to propel levels of 
foreign trade to unprecedented heights (Landreth and Colander 2002:43). The increase in 
wealth coincided with a major inflationary cycle, and that increase in prices in turn fuelled 
the growth of trade, and by extension of the mercantilist class in Europe (Galbraith 
1987:33ff). The sovereign state, which had assumed the authority relinquished by the 
Catholic commonwealth, was the mechanism that allowed the ascending mercantilist class 
— by   now   “merchants   were   the   dynamic   element   in   society”   — to pursue its global 
ambitions (Wilson 1958:487). In foreign-policy terms, mercantilism entailed a range of 
measures to protect domestic markets and increase exports. Such theories did not emerge 
fully formed: its roots were in a loose mix of feudal leftovers. But, throughout the sixteenth 
century, the costs of maintaining imperial dynasties grew, and this new reality provided the 
pressure that forged a previously incoherent set of ideas and approaches into a recognizable 
shape.  England’s  colonial  policy  immediately  after  contact  was  shaded  but  not  determined  
by its feudal-mercantilist character.36  
When English colonists first arrived in North America, they had two main rivalries: 
with the Aboriginal people they encountered for the first time, and with the other imperial 
powers. These rivalries were not symmetrical. In the case of the Aboriginal people, the 
                                                 
36 The same cannot be said of France, whose colonial land policies displayed a distinctly feudal character long 
after contact. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, France established seigneurial estates in New 
France. This essentially feudal model reflected a French belief in the importance of land tenure in sustaining 
its   colonial   presence   in   the   “new   world,”   along   with   a   simultaneous   commitment   to   the   ancien régime. 
Seigneuries were long strips of land along the banks of the Saint Lawrence River. Each remained the property 
of the French Crown, and the seigneur acted essentially as a landlord, without the power to impose penalties 
or  fines  on  his  tenants  (unlike  feudal  lords  in  France).  After  the  British  victory  in  the  Seven  Years’  War,  the  
seigneurial system remained as a vestigial structure for nearly a century (Lanctot 1963). 
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competition was over land (property), whereas English conflict with European countries 
was over sovereignty. For the English, as it was for all European imperial powers, the 
conflict over sovereignty was relatively straightforward, entailing few intellectual, cultural 
or moral complications. They all took for granted their right to assert sovereignty over 
North America, with no legitimate legal objection from its current occupants. The only 
complication  took  the  form  of  geopolitical  competition  from  England’s  European  rivals.  So  
England’s  claims   to   sovereignty were made vis-à-vis its imperial rivals, with sovereignty 
typically flowing from discovery (Slattery 2005). But, alone among European imperial 
powers, England also claimed private property of land at the same time as it claimed 
sovereignty of territory; it acted on the view that North American land was un-owned and 
there for the taking (Banner 2007:14-15).37 The very first official act of English legal 
sovereignty in the New World, the letters patent granted to Sir Humphrey Gilbert and 
Walter Raleigh, entitled  them  to  “have,  hold,  and  occupy  and  enjoy…all  the  soyle of such 
lands, countries, and territories”  (quoted in Seed 2001:13). The Crown also granted charters 
of conquest to the Cabots (with the important geopolitical qualification that territories, such 
as those in Africa, that had already been granted by other imperial nations by the Pope, 
were off-limits) (Williams 1990:121). Why did England assume the right to claim both 
sovereignty and property simultaneously? In contrast with that of Spain, English colonial 
expansion was much more focused on owning land, and this was due in no small part to the 
English obsession with landed property, which was carried over to settler colonies. Land 
ownership was at the heart of English (and later American) culture. This preoccupation 
                                                 
37 Inter-imperial   rivalries   had   actually   provided  much   of   the   discursive   justification   for  England’s   colonial  
campaigns in the 1500s. Advocates of colonization portrayed it as a crusade to carry Protestantism to the 
Indians   and   counter   Spain’s   spreading   papist   empire   in the New World. These early campaigns foundered 
largely as a result of a lack of capital. When the Scottish king James I replaced Queen Elizabeth on the 
English   throne,   the   appetite   for   pursuing   Elizabeth’s   expensive   two-headed Protestant crusade in the New 
World against Spanish Catholicism and indigenous infidels disappeared (Williams 1990:193). 
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with land ownership was manifest in long-standing cultural and legal traditions, dating back 
to the Middle Ages, when for centuries the common law was dominated by land law. The 
English legal system itself was based on the ownership of land (Milsom 1969).  
 
Enclosures 
One of the most important and politically contested social changes occurring in 
England in that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England was the enclosure of the 
commons, in which commonly held land was privatized. By the beginning of the sixteenth 
century, English merchants began investing surplus profits in land. The order of a landed 
aristocracy who allowed farmers to cultivate a small portion of land, with the produce 
larger consumed by the producers, fell into decline, to be replaced by a system organized 
around profitable investments. The new system entailed the use of money instead of labour 
in exchange for the use of land. The widespread use of money facilitated the 
commodification of land, with land increasingly being viewed as a potentially profitable 
investment (Lyons 1992:24). 
One of the main ways to get poor tenant farmers off their (purportedly 
unproductive) land was through enclosure. Enclosure ended traditional rights such as the 
use of open meadows and fields for farming or to graze livestock — such land was fenced 
and deeded to a single owner. If we adopt a politically neutral definition of enclosure 
(“inclosure”  was  the  contemporaneous  term)  as  a  method  of  increasing  the  efficiency  (and  
thus profitability) of land through specialization, then this was a long, drawn-out process 
that had been occurring since the early thirteenth century, and would continue even into the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Thirsk 1984:66). But in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
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centuries, as the English government established land tenure in North America, enclosure 
was a high-profile and controversial issue, and one that dovetailed with colonial concerns 
— this connection is marked by the fact that the definition of the term changed in this 
period. Where it once referred to keeping semi-wild animals in, it now referred primarily to 
keeping people out: “to  erect  a  fence  that  would  prevent  farmers  and  herders  from  entering  
formerly cooperatively or communally held ground”  (Seed  2001:33). The evictions of poor 
tenant  farmers  was,  in  Karl  Polanyi’s  description: 
A revolution of the rich against the poor. The lords and nobles were 
upsetting the social order, breaking down ancient law and custom, 
sometimes by means of violence, often by pressure and intimidation. They 
were literally robbing the poor of their share in the common, tearing down 
the houses which, by the hitherto unbreakable force of custom, the poor had 
long   regarded   as   theirs   and   their   heirs’.   The   fabric   of society was being 
disrupted; desolate villages and the ruins of human dwellings testified to the 
fierceness with which the revolution raged, endangering the defenses of the 
country, wasting its towns, decimating its population, turning its 
overburdened soil into dust, harassing its people and turning them from 
decent husbandmen into a mob of beggars and thieves. Though this 
happened only in patches, the black spots threatened to melt into a uniform 
catastrophe. (1957:35) 
 
Land that was enclosed was owned exclusively, not communally or cooperatively. 
Enclosure marked a profound reorganization of land tenure, the transition from a 
functionally organized system of land tenure to a one organized along the lines of absolute 
space. After enclosure, land ownership rested on the exclusive control of a territory, not on 
the use of the land. The loss of the ancient system, in which individuals or communities 
exercised the right to use particular resources, rather than exert exclusive control over a 
piece of land, hurt the poor by removing their traditional means of subsistence. In these 
ways, the enclosures movement in England anticipated the struggle for the land in colonial 
North America. 
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E.P  Thompson’s  work  on  enclosures  in  Albion’s  Fatal  Tree (2011), a collection he 
co-edited with Hay et al, and a monograph, Whigs and Hunters (1975), explores the 
criminalization of common historical practices such as hunting for food, establishing 
gardens on private land, and wood-gathering. The Black Act of 1723 (so-called in reference 
to the common practice of blacking faces as a nighttime disguise) made activities such as 
hunting, fishing, or cutting down trees on private land punishable by death. The Act was 
enacted in direct response to the killing of a gamekeeper by the Waltham Blacks, a group 
that would blacken their faces before entering parks to poach. But Thompson connects 
these specific, localized events  —  the   “economic   and   social   tensions   aroused   in   the  
forests”  — with changes in the broader social context, such as the collapse of the South Sea 
Bubble, which exacerbated class divisions in England, and the rise of the Hanoverian kings 
(1975:195). He argues that the imposition of Act was driven in particular by Whigs who, in 
1715, had taken near-total control of the government, and had now expanded that to include 
the elite strata of society, including the army, the legal profession, and local officials. In 
this context, many Whigs were accumulating new landholdings in the form of estates, on 
which they were cutting down the old forests to be replaced by formal gardens and 
landscaping. This consolidation of landed property generated resistance not only from the 
poorest of the poor, but even larger farmers. Thus, in addition to poaching, the Black Act 
also outlawed entering private lands with weapons and committing acts of vandalism such 
as arson, and it was later expanded to cover anyone wearing a disguise while committing a 
crime (Thompson 1975). 
Thompson’s  work   casts   light   on   the   cultural   importance of land. By using crude 
laws to restrict the community use of land, the Black Act had the effect of undermining 
lower-class community and solidarity — in effect, it criminalized a way of life. Thompson 
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contrasts this traditional worldview with the  “Whig  state  of  mind,”  a  view  of  the  world  that  
had private ownership of land at its core (1975:207). Respect for land rights as a core value 
was among the growing distinctions between British liberalism and other European 
ideologies of Empire. For the British, the ideological distinctions between their societies in 
the Americas, and those established by the Catholic monarchs of Spain and France, were 
central to their cultural and political self-understanding. (As we will see below, this was 
also true of its successor states — the claim that British expansion was uniquely able to 
create free societies proved to be an enormously powerful idea, one that would form the 
basis for the concept of Manifest Destiny and other expressions of American 
exceptionalism (Pagden 1995:128).) An obsession with owning land was common among 
elites in early-modern England. Colonial estates conferred prestige and social power. Of 
course, they also meant wealth, and the timing of English colonial expansion was itself an 
important factor: in the sixteenth century, land rents increased sharply in England. Land, 
which had long been associated with order, was now also and more than ever before 
associated with profit (Brenner 2003).   
 
English Colonial Charters 
Under James I, the English Crown began granting rights to form colonies in North 
America   by   issuing   charters   to   private   companies.   As   Brenner   writes,   the   “material  
foundations  of   the  merchant  community’s  alliance  with   the  Crown  were   therefore  crystal 
clear: the Crown could, and did, create economic privileges for the merchants; the 
merchants offered loans and taxes, as well as political support, to the Crown”  (2003:  200). 
The first company charter was issued to the Virginia Company in 1606, entitling 
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“Adventurers”   to   establish   settlements   on   the   eastern   coast   of   present-day United States. 
The Virginia Company, established by a group of wealthy landowners and merchants to 
finance a colony and make profits, was  one  of  England’s  first  joint-stock companies.  
The emergence of joint-stock companies in the early 1600s (including the Dutch 
East India Company, which received its charter in 1600) marks the evolution beyond guilds 
and state-regulated companies. The great innovations of joint-stock companies were limited 
liability — shareholders  were   responsible   for   covering   a   company’s  debts  only  up   to   the  
face value of their shares — and transferability, which meant that shares could be sold to 
any willing buyer, thus making them highly liquid. Shares in the colonial joint-stock 
companies tended to earn positive returns on equity, and so this model quickly became an 
efficient way to capitalize colonial settlement projects (Hunt 1936).38 The joint-stock 
structure represented the evolving complexities of the relationship between the English 
state   and   private   ownership.   The   company   charters   demonstrated   colonization’s   highly  
commercial character. The Virginia charter, which was a typical example of the royal 
charters, granted the right to own a certain property exclusive of other private interests, and 
by   extension   declared   the  English  Crown’s   prerogative   to   grant   such   rights,   exclusive   of  
other imperial interests. In the language of the charter the territories in question are 
included in those categorized  as  “not  nowe  actuallie  possessed  by  anie  Christian  prince  or  
people”  (Quoted  in  Bemiss  1957).  
 While few of the English elites who stood a chance of receiving colonial charters or 
land grants from the Crown expressed any doubt about the legality of colonial policies, 
these people engaged in intense debates about the most appropriate form of land tenure. 
                                                 
38 The success of the joint-stock company in financing colonial endeavours was a general trend. The Virginia 
companies faced numerous problems, including staggering debts, which necessitated successive additional 
royal charters, among other measures. 
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Weaver (2003) shows how early-modern English colonial charters were shaped by this 
context — in other words, the form that colonial charters took reflected domestic social 
relations. The two possible forms of colonial tenure were in capite or ut de manore. The 
former signified an estate held directly from the Crown. This model required landholders to 
pay feudal fees to the Crown, but also gave them the right to create landed estates with 
tenant farmers, as well as some judicial entitlements. Ut de manore limited dues owed to 
the  Crown  but  also  limited  landholders’  judicial  prerogatives  and  freedom  to  extract  rents.  
The company charters granted by the Crown in the early seventeenth century were 
commercial — intended primarily to produce wealth through trade — and so they took the 
ut de manore form. The companies had little interest in collecting rents from tenant farmers 
— they granted land to colonists who produced supplies to be traded, rather than paying 
rent — and so for them there was no point in paying the feudal dues to the Crown that this 
privilege entailed.  
At   this   moment   in   the   early   1600s,   metropolitan   capital’s   main   strategy   for  
extracting wealth from the New World was overwhelmingly commercial: companies were 
expected to profit from their trade in goods such as furs. Yet this approach proved to be 
imperfect at best. The new-world   companies’   trading   strategy   generated   disappointing 
returns; it was becoming apparent that land rents were more efficient approach to extracting 
profits from the frontier. This new reality mandated a shift to in capite tenure, in which the 
king granted successful petitioners the right to operate feudal estates, with rent-paying 
tenants, and enjoying some powers of government, in exchange for dues paid directly to the 
Crown (Weaver 2006: 180-182). This shift marks an important transitional moment, in 
which land-based enterprise became the focus.   
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Whatever the particular form of land tenure granted to the charter companies, there 
was no acknowledgement that the territory in question may have had previous indigenous 
owners. The shift in emphasis from trading enterprises (and ut de manore land tenure) to 
those based on land-ownership (and in capite tenure) occurred before the English 
revolution and attendant legal reforms of the mid-seventeenth century. The brief period in 
which metropolitan capital relied on trading companies ended and the renewed emphasis on 
land ownership and extracting profits through rents all occurred while England was still 
feudal. The colonists simply used the legal and philosophical tools they had available to 
them to structure the framework for acquisition. 
This is why, when a number of thinkers and writers found it necessary to develop 
justifications for claiming indigenous lands (the English Crown acted as if there were 
absolutely  no  question  of  its  right  to  “grant”  indigenous  territory  through  colonial  charters,  
and no need to provide anything in the way of justification for doing so), they employed 
arguments that were essentially intellectual legacies of the medieval Church (Williams 
1990:308-317). The most common such arguments were: an argument from Christianity 
(Christians had an inherent right to take land from non-Christians); an argument from 
conquest (the English had conquered the natives and therefore were entitled to their land); 
and an argument that there was no preexisting system of property rights, meaning that 
Aboriginal people themselves did not actually recognize such rights (Banner 2007:16-20). 
In general, English legal thought and practice in the period after contact remained 
dominated   by   the   medieval   Catholic   Church’s   view   of   non-Christian peoples as being 
inherently legitimate targets for conquest.  
But  there  were  additional  and  more  acute  problems  “on  the  ground.”  In  particular:  
English colonists had already been purchasing indigenous land. In other words, while the 
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English Crown, alone among European powers, assumed its right simultaneously to assert 
sovereignty and property rights on indigenous land, at least some of the English colonists 
seemed not to accept the view of their country on the latter issue (Buck, McLaren and 
Wright 2001; Nammack 1969). As we will see in the next chapter, the explanation for this 
is largely a matter of direct material conditions: the colonists were outnumbered, out-
resourced, and would have had great difficulty enforcing their claim to ownership of 
indigenous land, even if the English Crown saw the matter as a simple one. The common 
law reflected the deep-rooted English notion that land is claimed and possessed through 
labour. And this powerful idea not only gave individual colonists pause when it came to 
taking indigenous land, it also generated domestic hesitation and criticism. 
It was not only individual colonists who purchased the very Aboriginal land they 
had been granted — the colonial companies themselves did so, too. Stuart Banner describes 
the experience of the Virginia Company: 
When the Virginia Company finally decided to go public with a statement of 
why  ‘it  is  not  unlawfull,  that  wee  possesse  part  of  their  land,’  the  Company  
combined variants of the argument from Christianity and the right of 
conquest….But  these were all subsidiary arguments, the Company admitted. 
The main reason the English could settle on Indian land had nothing to do 
with Christianity or conquest. In fact, these arguments did not make the 
slightest   bit   of   difference.   ‘But   chieflie   because   Paspehay, one of their 
Kings,   sold   unto   us   for   copper,   land   to   inherit   and   inhabite.’   For   all   the  
Company’s   theorizing   about   its   rights   to   take   the   land,   in   the   end   the  
Company purchased it from the Indians. (2007:20-21) 
 
 
Improvement and Waste Land  
English property rights, both formal and informal, on the frontier and in the 
metropolis, were underpinned by the doctrine of improvement. Improvement entailed a 
form of ownership and management that saw land as having the potential for profitable 
75  
 
 
investment through increased productivity and an assertion of humans’ dominion over 
nature (Brace 2001:5). Improving the land meant applying labour (and, later, capital) to it 
so as to improve its profitability and value. This notion is consistent with the classic 
Lockean formulation: property is derived from the addition of labour to natural resources 
(Arneil 1996). “Working  the  land”  converted  it  into  landed  property.   
Improvement displayed its own internal contradictions. For example, improvement 
drew heavily upon romanticized ideas of land husbandry, while also abstracting the land 
onto documents that allowed it easily to be owned by a company, or by an individual who 
need  never  set  foot  on  that  land:  “the  improvement  discourse  insisted  on  the  intimacy  of  the  
connection [between land and labour] at the same time as constructing a system of 
ownership which required its dissolution”  (Brace  2001:62). In the eighteenth century, when 
enclosure   intensified,   the  middle  class  “discovered”   the  countryside   in  nostalgic  aesthetic 
and  cultural  terms:  “the  social  reality  of  a  changing,  improved  countryside  and  an  idealized  
representation of a rustic past, though seemingly in contradiction, complemented a drive 
among British immigrants to acquire land in new worlds. English history set the stage for a 
momentous tension between, on the one hand, law and entitlements, and, on the other, 
appeals to improvement and access”  (Weaver  2006:23).  
Even more severe were the social contradictions associated with improvement. It 
generated intense debates, which centred on conflicting notions of property. Defenders of 
the commons portrayed enclosure and improvement as causing suffering among the poor, 
and they drew on ideas of stewardship and accountability, suggesting the privatization of 
land constituted an abuse of the common treasury provided by God. Humans were merely 
entrusted with natural riches by God, and they should not delude themselves into believing 
their property belonged to them unconditionally. Opponents of the improvement doctrine 
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also  refuted  proponents’  claims  that  commoners  could  benefit  from  enclosure  by  becoming  
freeholders,   arguing   instead   that   it   “turned   farmers   into   cottagers,   and   cottagers   into  
beggars”   (Brace   2001:13). These challenges did not hold when applied directly to the 
colonial context, but the social conflict over improvement complicated its use as a rationale 
for land appropriation in the new world.  
Improvement has a rarely observed spatial aspect. The term, which had once simply 
referred to investing to make a profit, in the late Middle Ages came to refer more 
specifically to profits made from agriculture, and then, as English landowners had began to 
claim   unoccupied   or   “waste”   land   through   the   enclosures   movement,   the   term   became  
associated specifically with fencing — that is, improvement came to connote profiting from 
land by asserting exclusive territorial control. This is an expression of what Harvey refers 
to as absolute space. But improvement is also fundamentally predicated on an idea of 
progress, which likewise depends upon an absolute conception of time.  
 
Land Occupation and the Idea of Waste Land 
As William Holdsworth outlines in a classic history of the land law, in the common 
law before the modern system of property rights was developed in the late 1600s, there was 
no need for a written procedure for claiming ownership: land could legitimately be acquired 
and owned through labour (1927:112). This helps us understand why English rituals of 
claiming land did not involve a contract or a declaration. The English obsession with land 
explains the ceremonial practices English colonists used to mark their claim. Unlike 
colonists from other European countries, the English did not claim the land by planting 
banners, reciting declarations, solemnly kneeling, or staging parades; they only  
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occasionally read sermons or planted crosses. Upon landing the first priority for the English 
was  building  houses.  In  the  colonial  records,  “no  English  expedition  ever  omitted mention 
of setting up a house”  (Seed  1995:17).  
House-building was one of the two most important ways English colonists marked 
their land claims. The second was construction of a hedge or fence. For our purposes this is 
especially significant because it signified enclosure — not just ownership, but exclusive 
private ownership. The privatization of land in England, in the form of the enclosure 
movement, was gaining momentum in the sixteenth century, and this provided a particular 
cultural basis for English   colonialism:   “Englishmen   shared   a   unique   understanding   that  
fencing legitimately created exclusive private property ownership in the New World”  (Seed  
1995:20).  
Of the various forms of labour that could mark land ownership, agriculture held a 
special prestige for the English. Farming denoted a society that had advanced beyond 
hunting and gathering and developed the social mechanisms that allowed for private 
ownership of land. So when they saw first peoples farming, as was quite common, colonists 
had little choice but to take this as proof of some sort of ownership. This in turn opened up 
a potentially serious problem, which hinged on the conceptual link between the use of land 
and the cultivation of land. If cultivating land denoted a society sufficiently advanced to 
own  property,   then:   “on   the  one  hand   to   recognize   Indian  property   rights   in  uncultivated  
land was nearly tantamount to recognizing the Indians as owners of the whole 
continent….On  the  other  hand,  cultivation  was  not  a  prerequisite  for  property ownership in 
England. Everyone knew that land could still be owned even if it was not being farmed, and 
indeed even if it was not being used or occupied at all. Why should land in North America 
be  any  different?”  (Banner  2007:33).  
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The  common  law’s  apparent recognition of indigenous property rights, derived from 
natural  law,  did  appear  to  constrain  private  settlers’  ability  to  claim  indigenous  land  legally  
through occupation. This is another reason why they would have chosen to buy land. But 
we must remember our distinction between sovereignty and property. Property was a 
complicated matter, as we have seen. But the question of sovereignty was more 
straightforward: it was monopolized by the state. One way for colonial state attempted to 
assert some control on freebooters was to concede property interests on the frontiers to 
Aboriginal peoples, but then assert its sovereignty by claiming the exclusive right to 
purchase indigenous land. This strategy would culminate in the Royal Proclamation of 
1763.  
When English colonizing activities began in the early 1600s to take on the form of 
broadly capitalized trading concerns, the discourse followed suit, away from religiously 
grounded and anti-Spanish images — which never really fit very well with the basically 
non-missionary English colonial presence — and towards efficiency (Williams 1990:193). 
Arguments from efficiency were a much better fit for the English.39 This was especially 
true because of the enclosures movement that was such an important part of the context. 
Conceptually,   land   that  was   not   improved  was   considered   “waste.”  The   idea   of   common  
land, a by-product of enclosures (non-enclosed land is held in common) became waste: the 
commons were waste land (Seed 2001, especially chapter 2). When the first English 
colonists arrived in the New World, they saw land that met most of the conditions for waste 
land: it was, by English standards, sparsely inhabited; not fenced in; and not routinely 
                                                 
39 England’s  colonial  expansion  was  never  driven  by   the  goal  of   religious  conversion.  But  as  Brace   (1998,  
especially chapter 3) shows, many English advocates of improvement drew upon religious imagery to portray 
it  as  the  path  to  regain  paradise  on  earth  by  restoring  “man’s”  pure  dominion  over  nature,  which  had  been  lost  
in the Fall. This form of discourse was especially common in the late 1600s, when millenarianism pervaded 
the culture.  
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cultivated by animals. And it was held according to a form of land tenure that closely 
resembled that of the English common fields. They could, and did, therefore, come to see 
North America as consisting entirely of waste land, waiting to be claimed and improved. 
The contrast between privately enclosed improved land and commonly held waste appears 
throughout the colonial literature (Tully 1993).  
Whether   land  was   “occupied”   or   not   rested   on   a   question   of  whether   it   had   been  
developed,   or   “improved,”  which   typically  meant being put to agricultural use. The first 
person to use or improve a section of land became its owner (Pagden 1995:76). The notion 
of  improvement  (or  betterment)  is  a  core  concept  in  Locke’s  theory  of  property  rights,  one  
that he considered especially germane to what he called in his Second Treatise the  “vacant  
places of America”  (1988:23). Locke falls into the seventeenth-century English natural law 
tradition: he intervened into debates around British settlements in Carolina, and 
distinguished his theories about landed property from Dutch and Spanish colonial thought. 
This  may  be  why  most  of  the  scholarship  has  treated  Locke’s  theories  of  land  and  property  
from the narrow point of view of English property, and ignored the many references, 
especially in the Second Treatise, to American Aboriginal people. Only recently have a few 
writers  demonstrated  the  significance  of  indigenous  nations  in  Locke’s  theory  of  property.  
The most notable of these are James Tully (1993, 1994) and Barbara Arneil (1996). 
 
Locke and Land in the New World 
 “In   the   beginning,”   Locke   wrote in his Second Treatise,   “all   the   World   was  
America”  (1988:29). This claim establishes the idea that all societies are the same before 
they have started to develop; different societies can then be ranked hierarchically based on 
how  “civilized”  they  are,  or  in  other  words,  how  much  they  have  developed.  The  European  
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societies are at the top of this order, as evidenced by their state formations and property 
rights regimes. The Indigenous peoples of North America are nomadic and undeveloped, 
legally entitled only to what they hunt or gather. Uncultivated land is essentially up for 
grabs, with anyone able to  claim  it.  Because  indigenous  people  do  not  “improve”  the  land,  
they  have  no   legal  entitlement   to   it.  As  Tully   (1993)  argues,  Locke’s   argument,  which   is  
woven  into  a  chapter  on  conquest,  is  Locke’s  justification  of  British  settler  colonialism,  and  
his refutation   of   the   British   government’s   implicit   acknowledgement   that   Indigenous  
nations are independent, self-governing nations possessing the right to own land. As Arneil 
(1996)   clarifies,   Locke’s   defence of the British colonial project does not necessarily 
prohibit Indigenous peoples from legally owning landed property. Land becomes property 
through the addition of labour; this is a specific form of labour, namely cultivation and 
enclosure. Therefore, land becomes the property of whoever cultivates it, as opposed to 
those who set foot on it, live on it, or hunt on it.  
Locke’s   theory   of   property   allows   him   to   defend   colonialism   without   having   to  
resort to an essentially tautological argument along the lines of, English colonists have the 
right to take indigenous land because the English king or English law grants them this right. 
Rather, natural law as Locke uses the concept means that individuals carry within 
themselves the latent entitlement to claim land — an entitlement that becomes real when 
they practise agrarian cultivation, engage in commerce, establish freedom under the law, 
and recognize the Christian God (Arneil, 1996:132-167). In this way, the core of his 
justification of the European colonization of North America was essentially a cultural one: 
the native peoples whose land was being appropriated were not sufficiently developed or 
civilized, and therefore were not entitled to legal rights of ownership. The land itself was 
similarly reclassified, largely through the notion of improvement. Native land was 
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considered   “waste   land’   in   need   of   improvement.   The   word   “culture” comes from the 
Italian cultura,   which   means   “to   cultivate”   and   from   which   sense   we   derive   the   term  
“agriculture”   (Williams   1988,   1989). It is no mere etymological coincidence that culture 
and civilization were so closely associated with improvement of the land. As a result of this 
equation (culture = cultivate the land), to develop the land, i.e. turn it into property, is to 
become civilized. 
The arguments for European possession made by Locke (and further developed by 
Emeric de Vattel in The Law of Nations)  cast  a  long  shadow:  they  were  used  “through  the  
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to legitimate settlement without consent, the removal of 
centuries-old aboriginal nations, and war if the native peoples defended their property”  
(Tully 1994:169). As we will see in more detail in the next chapter, stateless native peoples 
— “particularly   those   who   wore   few   or   no   clothes”  — were made colonial subjects or 
wards   “on   the   grounds   that   they   were   in   their   cultural   infancy,   and   thus   unqualified   to  
govern   themselves.”   However,   in   a   catch-22, those indigenous nations whose political 
structures approached European standards were then said to be legitimate targets in wars of 
conquest, in this case on the grounds that their customs and habits violated natural law 
(Dickason 1989:246).  
Vattel’s   contribution,   which   also   drew   upon   res nullius, made the agricultural 
development of land the deciding factor in the possession of land. He was clear that he a 
purely   “civilizing”   or   missionary   rationale   was   inadequate   for   claiming   sovereignty   or  
property rights:  
The cultivation of the soil not only deserves attention of a government because 
of its great utility, but in addition is an obligation imposed upon man by nature. 
Every nation is therefore bound by natural law to cultivate the land which has 
fallen   to   its   share….Thus  while   the   conquest   of   the   civilized  empires  of  Peru  
and Mexico was a notorious usurpation, the establishment of various colonies 
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upon the continent of North America might, if it be done within just limits, be 
entirely lawful. The people of these vast tracts of land rather roamed over them 
than  inhabited  them.”  (34) 
 
After a century of colonization, taking land by contract rather than conquest was the norm 
for the English. By this point, the facts tended to overrule the theory: purchasing 
indigenous land was so widespread and common, and advantageous to the English, that 
philosophical arguments in defence of colonialism were somewhat moot. Moreover, so 
many English colonists had come to own their land by virtue of deeds and purchase 
contracts that any meaningful realization of the theory that the English were entitled to 
indigenous land as a matter of conquest would have de-legitimized the primary method by 
which land was acquired, and actually dispossessed most English landholders of their 
colonial property.  
 The imposition of the state was a lengthy, politically contested, culturally complex 
and geographically uneven process without precise start or end dates. However, for our 
purposes The Royal Proclamation of 1763 provides a crucial turning point. At that moment, 
coming at the end of the so-called French and Indian Wars, the English Crown gave 
colonial governments the exclusive right to purchase indigenous land, and gave First 
Nations governments the exclusive right to sell their land, thus bringing to an end a several 
centuries in which land was bought and sold by private contracts between private parties. 
The 1763 moment marked a profound change in landed property tenure — one that came 
about after the military victory that established Britain as the dominant colonial power in 
North America — after which indigenous land could only be transferred through 
agreements between sovereigns (typically treaties). The modern Anglo-Saxon state had 
effectively claimed control over land transfers.  
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As Teschke writes, the decades after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 marked 
England’s  shift  from  dynastic  to  parliamentary sovereignty, and facilitated subsequent legal 
enhancements  of  Parliament’s  power.  These  developments  allowed  British  foreign  policy  to  
shift  such  that  it  came  to  reflect  “national  interests”  (determined  by  the  propertied  classes  
through Parliament) rather than dynastic interests. Specifically, this took the form of 
mercantilist   “blue   water”   policies,   which   combined   superior   naval   capabilities   with  
economic pressure. Both of these elements had been made possible by the creation of the 
first modern financial system, including a reliable credit system in which public debts were 
guaranteed by Parliament (Teschke, 2003:249-258). Britain was thus the first modern state, 
and   the   attendant   “first   mover”   advantages   facilitated   its   rise   throughout   the   1700s   to  
become  the  world’s  leading  power (cf. Van der Pijl 2006:8-12). While the modern British 
state had left behind both dynastic rule and a foreign policy driven by territorial 
accumulation, its European rivals, France and Spain, had not. This is why inter-imperial 
competition in the Americas continued to take the form of direct military conflict over 
territory.   Even   though   its   “blue   water”   foreign   policy   gave   Britain   overall   geopolitical  
competitive advantage, unless it was willing to relinquish its American territories it had to 
fight for them on the ground. Intensified direct British colonial settlement reflected the 
dynastic logic of territorial accumulation, and thus was a prima facie contradiction of the 
country’s  status  as  a  modern,  parliamentary state. This approach was partly dictated by the 
need to counter the strategic challenges posed by France and Spain. This geopolitical 
context contributed a situation in which the English state was modernizing and 
simultaneously relying on settler colonialism. But the declining influence of feudalism in 
Britain meant something different for land rights.  
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England acted on the assumption that it could declare sovereignty over the 
Indigenous peoples in encountered in the New World, the only issue was one of imperial 
rivalries. But property did not necessarily follow from sovereignty, and as the English state 
modernized, the difference between sovereignty and property came into sharper distinction.  
In fact, the property-sovereignty distinction actually was even sharper in English-colonial 
North America than it was in England, where residual feudalism lingered much longer, so 
change   in   the  colonial  context  “ran  ahead”  of   that   in  England.  Practice in North America 
had come to lead theory — colonists had for a long time been buying land directly from 
Indigenous peoples. And theory itself posed a problem, as irrefutable evidence of farming 
and other applications of labour to the land seemed to entitle Indigenous peoples to 
property rights under the common law. And so, after almost two centuries of debate about 
the question of whether or not indigenous people owned their land, in the late 1600s an 
important change took place: the English government finally acknowledged that first 
peoples did own their land, and if English settlers wanted this land, they would have to buy 
it. There was one significant loophole in this position: land that was unused (or under-used) 
could be classified as wasteland, and then claimed through a process that resembled 
enclosure. These two strategies for land acquisition are explored in the next chapter. 
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 4.   “The   Dissolving   Effects   of   Space”: Private Initiative and 
Aboriginal Land Tenure on the Frontier 
 
Indigenous-settler relations on the ground were not determined by formal sovereignty or 
nationality, but were also shaped fundamentally by the real material conditions of defining 
and   claiming   property   in   the  New  World.   Colonists’   attitudes   and   practices toward land 
claiming and ownership were in tension both with those of Indigenous peoples, as well as 
with the official positions of their home state.  
The British practised settler colonialism in North America. Settler colonialism — in 
which settlers claim and directly occupy land on the frontier — commonly is understood in 
distinction   with   indirect   “exploitation   colonialism,”   with   the   former   practised in North 
America in the early British Empire, and the latter practised in Africa and India in the late 
empire (Evans, Grimshaw et al, 2003; Rist 2002; Armitage 2000). But while the Spanish, 
French, and Portuguese empires also practised their own versions of settler colonialism, the 
British settler-colonial presence was unique among these on several grounds, including an 
established culture of land ownership and of legality. British elites valued estates for 
reasons that went beyond the (significant) economic benefits: estates also conveyed social 
status. British elites also revered the rule of law. These ideas combined with the importance 
of  “entrepreneurial”  settlers.  Unlike  other  empires,  England  put  relatively  little  emphasis  on  
conquering Indigenous peoples so as to impose language or religion. Instead, an English 
culture of landed property and a commitment to Lockean self-regulation informed 
independent colonists. Unlike the Spanish or the French, most British colonial settlers were 
“free  agents,”  representing  neither  the  state  nor  the  church.   
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This freedom meant that, while the ideas that English settlers carried with them — 
notably those reflecting an early-modern English obsession with land — remained 
influential, they often underwent stark mutations upon contact with Indigenous peoples in 
the colonial context. European settlers were not blank slates when they arrived in the new 
world, far from it; but neither were their attitudes toward land and their land-claiming 
practices  simple,  direct   reflections  of  an  “English”  or  “Spanish”  point  of  view.  As  Elliott 
writes,  
Spaniards and Englishmen…regarded the reconstitution of European civil 
society in an alien environment as the essential preliminary to their 
permanent occupation of the land. As participants in the same western 
tradition, both these colonizing peoples took it for granted that the 
patriarchal family, ownership of property, and a social ordering that as 
nearly as possible patterned the divine were the essential elements of any 
property constituted civil society. But both were to find that American 
conditions were not always conducive to their recreation on the farther 
shores of the Atlantic in the forms to which they were accustomed. The 
dissolving effects of space, at work from the outset, gave rise to responses 
which would eventually produce societies that, although still recognizably 
European, appeared sufficiently different to justify their being described as 
“American.”  (2006:36)     
 
As settlers were forced to reconcile their ideas with the challenges of the frontier, 
they increasingly came into tension with views expressed by their own state. They 
contradicted official policy, sometimes taking by force land that their government had 
acknowledged as belonging to first peoples; sometimes buying indigenous land that the 
Crown believed they already owned as a spoil of discovery.  
Along the frontier, land was often claimed by private occupation, with formal state 
approval provided only after the fact. The land policies of the colonial state often lagged 
behind the actions of private interests, and   often   the   state’s   presence   was   reactive,  
providing retrospective support by establishing laws, land surveys, and official records. 
87  
 
 
These  tensions  were  shaped  especially  by  the  colonists’  spatial  position  relative  to  England:  
the closer they were to the colonial  frontier  the  more  “independent”  they  tended  to  be.  And  
they were over-determined by relative power balance. Shortly after contact, when colonists 
were most vulnerable — isolated, small in numbers, and with few resources — they tended 
to combine dramatic declarations of imperial dominance with de facto recognitions of 
Aboriginal land ownership. As time went on, and Europeans became more powerful, they 
transformed power into right: their methods for taking Aboriginal land actually become 
both subtler and more brazen, but in all cases the methods of appropriation were protected 
by a shield of legality (Weaver 2006:13). 
In effect, private settlers were the leading edge of British colonial expansion. 
Tension  between  “a  conservative-inspired desire for stability and a liberal hankering after 
progress  and  development”  was  “a  constant  in  the  colonial  experience  everywhere”  (Buck,  
McLaren, and Wright 2005:13). In the British case, it was specifically the tension between 
the informal land-rush carried out through private initiative and government planning and 
authority — between the state and the market — that ultimately proved very fruitful for the 
empire, giving it a dynamism that other imperial presences lacked. A range of innovations 
followed private initiative on the frontier; these helped secure new investments of 
metropolitan capital. Such innovations typically were explained and justified with reference 
to the doctrine of improvement —  which provided a common language shared by settlers 
and the administrators charged with enforcing the rules — and also functioned to mobilize 
capital. The state provided land surveys, maps, written records, and a commitment (even if 
incompletely and unevenly carried out) to enforce the rule of law; this framework prompted 
further  rounds  of  investment  in  land  on  the  frontier.  In  other  words,  the  colonizers’  appeal  
to the idea of improvement generated real improvement.  
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English Settler Colonialism on the Frontier 
Before the modern state was established and began regulating land transactions in 
the New World, land was transferred in what I characterize as a frontier context. The most 
famous conception of the frontier between colonists and Aboriginal peoples remains 
Fredrick Jackson Turner’s   influential   argument   contained   in   “The   Significance   of   the  
Frontier in American History”   (1893,   republished   in   1920:  
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1893turner.asp). Turner’s   nationalist   triumphalism  
marked the historical moment when the US Bureau of the Census officially declared the US 
internal frontier closed. In the bloodless terminology of the census, this was a matter of 
determining, based on population density, that there was no longer a meaningful distinction 
between  “frontier”  and  “settlement.”  Turner  argues  that  the  relentless  westward  progress  of  
pioneers in the face of a hostile natural and social environment steadily produced a new and 
uniquely American way of life. This fundamentally shaped American social and political 
life, with the constant drive to expand and renew forming the taproot of American 
exceptionalism.   In   contrast  with   Turner’s   sanguine   view,   I   see   the   colonial   frontier   as   a  
space of violent political conflict and uncertainty, a zone defined by its lack of a dominant 
authority.  
Specifically   I  draw  upon  Weaver’s   (2003:18)  definition  of   the  frontier  as  “a  place  
where   a   state   had   not   yet   installed   its   apparatus   for   allocating   property   rights.”  This   is   a  
spatial, not a statist understanding of frontier, and it replaces the conventional IR notion of 
the frontier as the boundary line between two states. This approach allows us to see how the 
specific form of colonial expansion that became dominant in this instance was a form of 
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settler colonialism closely associated with the British. British settler colonialism depended 
in   part   upon  what  we  might   call   “entrepreneurial”   settlers   acting   as   the   agents   in   a   land  
rush. This was distinct from Spanish- or French-style colonialism, because the British 
colonial  settlers  were  “free  agents,”  i.e. not representing the state or the church. In general 
the British state would follow behind these settlers, retroactively providing formal 
legitimization of their land claims. Such a dynamic is absent from the IR literature on 
colonialism, where the dominant   narrative   is   the   expansion   of   the   “European   state,”   and  
private property is relegated to the domestic realm. 
There is an interesting puzzle about how Aboriginal land was acquired. As an 
illustration we can consider how scholars outside IR have theorized the relationship 
between the imposition of the modern state and the appropriation of indigenous land. 
(Given  IR’s  assumption  of  immaculate  sovereignty  — i.e., not complicated by property — 
it would be surprising to find this question addressed in the conventional IR literature.) The 
puzzle finds expression in the relationship between two major themes in the scholarly 
literature. The first theme is the taking of land by conquest, which is often addressed 
through an exploration of various mechanisms of conquest, whether military, legal, 
ideological, cultural, or biological (see, inter alia, Armitage 2000; Churchill 1997; Crosby 
1986; Diamond 1997; Seed 2001; Williams 1990).  Numerous scholars have argued that 
Europeans’   right   to  claim  indigenous   land  followed  from  long-standing legal and cultural 
traditions regarding discovery and occupation. Leslie Green (in Green and Dickason 
1989:1-123) summarizes a tradition of legal and state practices supporting European 
colonial claims. (Essentially the same argument can be found in Seed 2001 and Williams 
1990.) This international law tradition begins with Vitoria, who set out the conditions of 
just conquest and in so doing legitimized colonial plunder. It then runs through the work of 
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Grotius,  who  asserted  the  right  to  claim  “unused”  land’s  centrality  within  international  law,  
to Locke, who emphasized land rights accrued by working the land, developing a formula 
in which land plus labour equals property. Locke was an influential proponent of the claim 
that European settlement on Aboriginal lands was good for Aboriginal people, because it 
would have a civilizing effect on them through the introduction of private property and 
profit. Privatization of landed property would also increase the productivity of the land, 
thus benefiting natives and settlers alike. These precepts were reflected in decisions of the 
European judiciary, as well as those of US Chief Justice John Marshall, who understood 
land rights to be based on conquest rather than natural law, and thus recognized a limited 
Aboriginal sovereignty. Despite the conceptual modifications that occurred through the 
various iterations of this tradition, the overall effect was to provide forceful justification for 
the legal dispossession of indigenous land.   
The second theme in the literature concerns the transfer of land through contract 
rather than conquest, emphasizing the historical negotiation and (often implied) recognition 
of land rights embodied in the use of treaties and contracts to purchase land. The literature 
from this latter perspective has been expanding rapidly, reflecting the many recent efforts 
by First Nations, especially in former British colonies such as Canada and Australia, to 
achieve legal resolution of long-standing land claims (cf. Clarke 2002).40 Recently scholars 
have   focused   on   Britain’s   settler-colonialist history, an approach that emphasizes the 
differences between the British colonial presence in settler colonies in North America and 
Oceania with the indirect, exploitation form of colonialism practised in India and Africa 
(Evans, Grimshaw et al., 2003; Banner 2007). Writers from this perspective tend to see the 
                                                 
40 On the specific example of the Delgamuukw case in Canada, see Monet and Wilson (1992). On the 1992 
Mabo case, which finally overturned the doctrine of terra nullius in Australia, see Russell (2006). 
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history of the law of nations as being more complex, noting that from the sixteenth century 
and at least into the eighteenth, many European jurists recognized independent Aboriginal 
sovereignty (Clarke 2002; Keal 2003; Tuck 1999; Wilkins, 2006:45-66).   
Considering the relationship between these two perspectives — land appropriation 
by conquest and by contract — highlights the puzzle: why would European colonizers have 
bought land to which they believed they were entitled as the spoils of conquest? 
Conversely, why would they have treated with indigenous governments, which they 
considered to have an inferior sovereignty? How do we explain the persistence of treaties, 
deeds, and contracts — all of which would seem to acknowledge that Aboriginal peoples 
legitimately owned and governed their land — in a context of genocidal colonialism? This 
dissertation can be seen as one long answer to that question. But that answer can be 
condensed as follows: colonists bought land to which they believed they were entitled 
because they were guided as much by the real material conditions on the frontier as they 
were  by  their  formal  nationality.  Settlers  were  “entitled”  to  claim  indigenous  land  only  by  
virtue of their assumptions of a superior sovereignty. In reality, buying land was often 
cheaper and easier than taking it.  
At contact, England was still largely feudal: property and sovereignty were both 
held by the Crown. Consequently, after contact the Crown assumed and asserted its right to 
take ownership over any land over which it claimed sovereignty. This was consistent with 
the feudal tendency to collapse sovereignty and property together: England had asserted 
sovereignty, and thus it also assumed the right to claim the land in question as property. 
Such claims took the form of colonial charters.  
But what did individual colonists themselves think? When they arrived in the new 
world they found people living on the land. Did these people own the land, or was it, in 
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effect, there for the taking? How did the colonists themselves answer this question? The 
earliest English colonists followed the English state in assuming that claiming sovereignty 
meant claiming property. But England was modernizing, and as feudalism receded, the 
separation between sovereignty and property emerged. In a colonial context this distinction 
was even clearer, because the rivalry was different: the dispute over property was vis-à-vis 
the Indians, while the dispute over sovereignty was vis-à-vis European colonial rivals. In 
this sense, the dynamic on the frontier ran ahead of that in Europe. So then the question 
became: who owned the land? After a short period of controversy the English assumed the 
land was the legal property of indigenous people who lived on it (Banner 2007). (These 
legal interests were seen as something to be overcome rather than respected.)  
In  many   cases   land  was   “grabbed”   or   occupied   by   settlers   first,  with   justification  
provided   only   retroactively:   “the   frontiers   of   British   and   American   settlement   regularly  
witnessed a conquest of space by private enterprise defying government rules, followed by 
the phenomenon of private parties plunging into trouble and pleading for government 
succour in the name of civilization or improvement”   (Weaver  2006:24). The government 
typically respected its racial and cultural bonds with the settlers, and in the case of dispute 
was always inclined to support people who shared the same race and worldview. Yet while 
they rarely formally acknowledged indigenous land rights, the behaviour of English 
colonists — and even colonial authorities — was not nearly so straightforward, as they 
almost immediately began to purchase land (Weaver 2006, esp. chapter 4). Purchasing 
indigenous land was common from the earliest moments in the English colonial period. The 
early governor of Virginia, Thomas Dale, bought land, and throughout the early English 
colonies, purchasing soon became standard practice, so much so that more land was 
purchased than was taken by conquest. There is compelling evidence in support of this 
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claim: many deeds of land sales consummated between First Nations and English colonists 
survive; there were numerous laws requiring private purchasers to secure permission from 
the colonial government before buying indigenous land; and colonial court records contain 
many examples of property disputes in which colonial officials recognized and enforced 
indigenous property rights in land against the claims of English colonists (Banner 2007: 26-
28).  
We   can   better   understand   colonists’   purchase   of   indigenous   land   by   considering  
how their decisions were shaped by their locations relative to such things as flows of 
money and supplies, military power, and Aboriginal communities. Their decision to buy 
land that their state claimed already to have given them makes more sense when we view it 
in light of their spatial position relative to England, to indigenous people, and to their 
imperial rivals. In short, together these factors made buying land easier and cheaper than 
fighting for it. There was a range of material incentives for colonists to buy Aboriginal 
land. First was the issue of relative power: the first colonists were extraordinarily 
vulnerable. They were a small community living in an unfamiliar climate. Many depended 
upon support from Aboriginal people simply to survive (Miller 1991). As Axtell writes, 
identifying  land  as  “waste”  and  claiming  ownership  of  it  under  the  rubric  of  improvement  
was one thing, but actually cultivating it profitably was another — the first Europeans 
relied heavily on Aboriginal support and aid in farming (2001:39). This outnumbered and 
under-resourced group, far from home, was in no position to take land by force. Even as the 
settler population and military capacity grew and the relative balance in power tipped in 
their favour, for a long time taking land by direct conquest still would have been much 
more expensive — in terms of lives lost and other resources — than buying it. This was 
especially true because land was cheap. The English came from a context in which land 
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was scarce and expensive; suddenly, they found themselves in a world in which the reverse 
was true. The population density in the New World was much, much lower than in 
England, and so buying land rather than seizing and defending it was an eminently 
reasonable calculation to make. In addition, colonists had a strategic incentive to maintain 
good relationships with First Nations, as throughout the colonial period the English and 
French were in a constant rivalry to establish sovereignty over the New World. Aboriginal 
alliances were central to this struggle, and purchasing land rather than seizing it made such 
alliances easier.   
As JR Miller (1991) shows, from first contact and throughout the better parts of the 
sixteenth and into the seventeenth centuries, European-Aboriginal relations in what would 
become Canada and the USA were relatively cooperative and peaceful. Extensive trading 
relationships were established in this period, with furs (especially beaver pelts, in high 
demand by the European fashion industry) being exchanged for an ever-growing array of 
goods, and on the whole these were mutually beneficial, a reality that greatly discouraged 
large-scale conflict between European and indigenous nations (cf. Miller 1991, 2001). 
There were exceptions to this early European tendency to stay off indigenous land, such as 
British colonization of the east coast of what would become Canada; this began in the early 
1600s and would ultimately lead to the extermination of the local Beothuk peoples. In 
general, however — European imperial rhetoric notwithstanding — indigenous nations 
were treated by Europeans more or less as foreign nations. France and England told 
themselves and each other that it was their imperial prerogative to claim land overseas, but 
they actually dealt with indigenous nations as trading partners and military allies. Different 
Aboriginal nations found places for themselves in the context of this inter-imperialist 
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rivalry by forming military alliances with competing French and British forces (Fowler 
2005). 
It is important to emphasize that the decision to purchase indigenous land did not 
demonstrate benevolence on the part of the Europeans — they were buying land because 
doing so was advantageous to them, not the sellers. Indeed, in the matter of indigenous land 
sales to private   interests,   there   was   “no   shortage   of   deceit.”   Some   English   purchasers  
reached verbal agreements with Aboriginal sellers but in the written deeds that included 
descriptions that inflated the size the land in question much bigger than had originally been 
agreed. Some bribed or tricked colonial officials into granting land patents for more land 
than they had actually bought. Some forged documents or got the sellers drunk before a 
deed of sale was signed; others threatened sellers or witnesses (Banner 2007:63; 62-68). 
Some settlers combined tenacity and audacity to use even the flimsiest documentation to 
hold onto dubious claims for years, often then selling them in the knowledge that the 
purchaser would support the original claim. Other fraudulent practices were as simple as 
using   the   phrase   “more   or   less”   in   describing   the   piece   of   land   in   question,   so   the   deed  
holder could then claim a much bigger area than was intended by the seller (Nammack 
1969:99-101). And even if legal standards of enforcement had been much stricter, such 
agreements would still have been quite foreign to indigenous people who had a much 
different understanding of property rights and land ownership (Pagden 1995:83). But even 
though much Aboriginal land was simply taken through fraud or force — what we might 
consider the crudest forms of primitive accumulation — the fact is that most land 
appropriation involved some sort of legal process, and, rather than ignoring inconvenient 
laws, the English more typically attempted modifications to make them more convenient. 
Once again, this was not really an expression of English fairness or any commitment to 
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justice: capital investment on the frontier demanded the predictability and stability assured 
by the rule of law. Hence, the law quickly followed the practice: colonial authorities soon 
caught up with private colonial interests and began acquiring land through purchase as a 
standard procedure. Aside from purchasing Aboriginal land, the only other way to acquire 
it while maintaining more than a thin pretense of legality was to declare it waste land in 
need of improvement.  
 
Why Would Indigenous People Sell Their Land? Indigenous Concepts of 
Land and Property 
 
Property as a concept and institution reflects different historical, political, and 
cultural contexts. To the English, indigenous forms of land tenure might have seemed 
familiar, as they typically resembled those seen in the common fields of pre-enclosure 
England. An indigenous nation or village would control a large area of land, within which 
some land would be allocated to families for farming, while the rest of the land would be 
held in common, and could be used for gathering and hunting. There is strong evidence that 
the English recognized the similarities: John Locke,  for  example,  wrote  of  “the  wild  Indian,  
who knows no Inclosure, and is still a Tenant in common”  (1970:305). For most English 
colonists it was a matter of lived experience, or at least within living memory, that land 
rights could take the form of the use of land, rather than private ownership defined along 
the lines of absolute space. In the early colonial period land tenure in England was 
undergoing major changes; these changes in the metropole shaped those on the colonial 
periphery.  But aside from certain similarities with pre-enclosure land tenure in England, 
what was Aboriginal concept of land as property? Keeping in mind the important caveat 
that   there  was   no   universal   “Aboriginal”   form  of   land   tenure   any  more   than there was a 
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universal  “European”  one,  we  can  still   identify   the  major  differences  between  Aboriginal  
forms of land tenure before and after the imposition of the modern state. To refer to 
“Aboriginal  property,”   as  Bradley Bryan notes, is already a “conundrum   for   the  Western  
legal system because as soon as we frame our study in a truthful way, the terms revolt”  
(2000:27). 
One widely noted aspect of Aboriginal land tenure is that it entailed a spiritual 
relationship to land. But what exactly does a spiritual relationship to the land mean? We 
need to be precise. It does not mean that the relationship was entirely spiritual or religious, 
even though there has been a tendency in the recent scholarship to emphasize the spiritual 
or religious aspect exclusively (Buck 2001:45). The anthropologist Frederick Rose argues 
that, to say the Aboriginal peoples of Australia had a spiritual connection to the land does 
not mean that land was not owned — in fact an area of land was normally owned by a 
nation or family group — nor does it mean that they did not use it. (1987:47-48) In North 
America, Aboriginal people had sophisticated agricultural practices and similar ownership 
patterns. Therefore it is necessary but not on its own sufficient to note the spiritual aspect of 
Aboriginal  land  tenure.  Even  to  say  “spiritual”  should  not  be  conflated  with  “religious,”  in  
the sense that the land was not an Aboriginal equivalent of a religious icon or an object of 
prayer. Instead,  it  was  “derived  from  family relationships that extend not only over a wide 
net of people but also over relations with other living things and ultimately over relations 
with the land itself”  (Overstall 23). The consequence of this is, in the words of Deloria and 
Lytle,  “as  land  is  alienated,  all  other  forms  of  social  cohesion  begin  to  erode”  (1984:12).  
 The   term   “alienated”   is   significant,   as   can   be   illustrated  with   reference   to   Radin  
(1993:191-199), who draws upon the personality theory of property to distinguish between 
two different forms of property. The first is an attribute of a person. The second is a thing 
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that  a  person  controls.  The  first  form,  which  she  calls  “constitutive”  property,   is  what  we  
associate with personhood or human relationships. In contrast, the second form, which she 
refers   to   as   “fungible”   property,   is   the   type   of   property  we   treat   as   a   commodity   and   is  
exchanged through the market. In the legal terminology, alienation refers to the legal 
transferability of an object. It is an expression of two factors: private, exclusive property, 
and transferability. In other words, a piece of property is alienable when it can be owned 
and sold under law. This is the definition of a commodity. But Radin also notes that 
alienation has another meaning, borrowed from psychology and philosophy, which 
expresses a sense of estrangement. Alienation in the sense of commodification is associated 
with fungible property. Alienation in the sense of estrangement is associated with parts of 
our personhood being separated: we say, for example, that we have become alienated from 
ourselves.  These  “two  meanings  of  alienation  can  be  linked  in  an  ironic  pun  about  capitalist  
private property”   (Radin   1993:193). According to modern liberal property theory, all 
property, both constitutive and fungible, could (or should) be alienable in the sense of being 
a commodity. But: 
When property is a property of persons, my liberty is my property. Does this 
mean I abdicate personhood if my liberty is voluntarily relinquished? 
Apparently yes, if property means attribute-property. But if at the same time 
property also means object-property, the voluntarily relinquishing my liberty 
is also an instance of contract-alienation, and in the traditional liberal 
ideology this is an instance of self-expression and fulfillment of personhood 
rather than its negation. Abdication of liberty is both destructive of 
personhood and destructive of it. (Radin 1993:194) 
 
 Radin’s   “ironic   pun”   helps   illustrate   the   inherent   contradictions   between traditional 
Aboriginal understandings of the land and capitalist property relations. But it also shows 
the  inadequacy  of  referring  to  the  Aboriginal  connection  to  the  land  as  “spiritual,”  if  by  this  
we mean purely idealist or religious.  
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Some scholars argue that portraying the Aboriginal connection to the land in this 
relatively narrow idealist sense originated in the academic anthropology literature in the 
years just before and after the Second World War. A rising interest in indigenous 
anthropology occurred long after traditional Aboriginal society had largely disappeared. It 
was no longer possible to observe Aboriginal land ownership except in profoundly 
distorted contexts such as reserves. However, traditional rituals and spirituality had 
survived to a much greater extent, and this is what scholars were able to observe. The 
resulting conclusion that Aboriginal land tenure was essentially spiritual was at best a 
partial truth; it ignored how Aboriginal people had actually used the land before they lost it 
(Rose 1987). The English School and constructivist approaches in IR have perpetuated the 
same view by characterizing the expansion of the European state form as the triumph of the 
modern, secular state over a spiritual one. In other words, writers from these perspectives 
may locate indigenous people within the global expansion of the state form, but not within 
the context of the growth of global capitalism. Yet this is a logical problem, owing once 
again to the commitment in the literature to sovereignty at the expense of property.  
The Marxian concept of alienation offers one way to bridge this conceptual gap. 
Marx showed how workers in a capitalist political economy produce goods and profits, and 
at the same time they reproduce the very system that confronts and exploits them. This is 
the basic dynamic that results in alienated labour. Lefebvre drew heavily on the early Marx, 
arguing that alienation was a fundamental aspect of human practice. Like both Hegel and 
Marx, Lefebvre sees the split between state and civil society to be a crucial feature of 
modernity;;   however,   he   is   clear   that   he   shares   Marx’s   view   that   this   differentiation  
expresses an historically specific form of political alienation within capitalism. Every 
human activity went through a process of abstraction, in which initially spontaneous forms 
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of order were shaped into organizing structures, which in turn became a fetishized system 
of oppression. Marx wrote in the Grundrisse:  
Labour seems a quite simple category. The conception of labour in this 
general form — as labour as such — is also immeasurably old. 
Nevertheless,  when  it  is  economically  conceived  in  this  simplicity,  ‘labour’  
is as modern a category as are the relations which create this simple 
abstraction….It  was  an  immense  step  forward  for  Adam  Smith  to  throw  out  
every limiting specification of wealth-creating activity — not only 
manufacturing, or commercial or agricultural labour, but one as well as the 
others,   labour   in   general….Now, it might seem that all that had been 
achieved thereby was to discover the abstract expression for the simplest and 
most ancient relation in which human beings — in whatever form of society 
— play the role of producers. This is correct in one respect. Not in another. 
Indifference towards any specific kind of labour presupposes a very 
developed totality of real kinds of labour, of which no single one is any 
longer  predominant….Indifference  towards  specific  labours  corresponds  to  a  
form of society in which individuals can with ease transfer from one labour 
to another, and where the specific kind is a matter of chance for them, hence 
of indifference. (1993:103) 
 
This  is  one  of  Marx’s  great  insights:  that  the  apparently  simple  category  of  “work”  — just 
work, not weaving, tailoring, welding, teaching, cooking, driving, typing — is the product 
of a society that itself is able to see these indifferently, as versions of the same kind of 
activity, reducible to a multiplier — so many dollars and cents per hour. Under capitalism 
labour becomes an abstraction, and this conceptual abstraction allows for the division of 
labor, which eventually turns into the exploitation of workers.  
Dipesh Chakrabarty draws  upon  Marx’s  great   insight in two important books: his 
study of jute mill workers of Bengal, Rethinking Working Class History: Bengal 1890 – 
1940, and in Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. 
Chakrabarty  shows  how  abstract  categories  such  as  “labour”  are  ”deeply implicated in the 
production of universal sociologies. Labor is one of the key categories in the imagination of 
capitalism itself. In the same way that we think of capitalism as coming into being in all 
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sorts of contexts, we also imagine the modern category  of  ‘work’  or  ‘labour’  as  emerging  in  
all  kinds  of  histories….  Yet  the  fact  is  that  the  modern  word  ‘labor,’  as  every  historian  of  
labor in India would know, translates into a general category a whole host of words and 
practices with divergent and different associations”   (2000:76). He shows how employing 
the universal sociology of labour actually impeded his understanding of, for example, the 
hathiyar puja,  or  the  worship  of  tools,  a  festival  held  in  many  northern  Indian  factories.  “I  
interpreted worshipping machinery — an everyday fact of life in India, from taxis to 
scooter-rickshaws, minibuses, and lathe machines — as  ‘insurance  policy’  against  accidents  
and contingencies. That in the so-called religious imagination (as in language), redundancy 
— the huge and, from a strictly functionalist point of view, unnecessarily elaborate panoply 
of iconography and rituals — proved the poverty of a purely functionalist approach never 
deterred my secular narrative”  (Chakrabarty  2000:78). In this dissertation I make a parallel 
argument about the cultural disjuncture regarding assumptions made by English colonizers 
about land, property ownership, and contracts — assumptions that were often replicated in 
their own way by IR theorists. 
The parallels between indigenous forms of land tenure and those of the English 
common fields were not absolute. It is important not to see them as equivalent, at risk of 
committing  exactly   the  kind  of  analytical  error   this  project  critiques.   IR’s  granting  of   the  
state carries within it a number of more specific universal assumptions regarding the 
control and ownership of land, political authority, and national identity. Yet these 
universalizing notions are not universally true in fact. The purported parallels between pre-
enclosure English and Aboriginal forms of land tenure came to be used as a discursive tool 
by  the  English  to  justify  colonial  dispossession  of  Aboriginal  peoples’  land.  When  he  wrote 
“…in   the   beginning,   all   the  world   was   America,”   Locke  was   referring to an Aboriginal 
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system of communal land ownership which, by clear implication, belonged to the past, and 
which was being surpassed by historical progress, in the form of the privatization of land. 
In fact, as Patricia Seed notes, the enclosure of common fields was not a sign of universal 
progress — a  development  shared  by  “all  the  world”  — but merely what was happening in 
England at that moment. In other words, Locke projected the English present onto the entire 
world, allowing colonists to believe they   were   not   “the   wicked   dispossessors   of   Native  
American farmers; rather, they were the slightly apologetic bearers of unavoidable 
historical and economic progress”   (2001:41). Such misrepresentations of Aboriginal 
notions of land ownership concealed real differences. Of particular importance is that, as 
we have seen, England had a long-standing culture of land ownership, and part of this was 
the simple fact that English people had been buying and selling land for centuries before 
contact. In contrast, the Indigenous peoples of North America did not sell land — that is, 
did not exchange land for money — before the arrival of Europeans (Wallace 1972; and cf. 
Deloria and Lytle 1984:17ff).41  
Similarly, we even  need   to   be   qualify  what  we  mean  by   “money.”  For   numerous  
indigenous peoples in North America, the exchange of wampum (beads) was a traditional 
way of notarizing a contract. Yet this was as much spiritual as material in value. The 
English saw wampum as money, and instituted a system of exchange, in which wampum 
were traded for goods, and contracts were purely legal. This fundamental cultural 
misunderstanding   (the   term   “misunderstanding”   should   not   be   taken   to   imply   that   it  was  
innocent) would be replicated regarding treaties and other agreements. Accordingly, 
                                                 
41 But  note  Seed’s  qualification  on the  use  of  money:  “The  Englishmen  in   the  New  World  seemed  to   think  
that  money  was   a   source  of   their   superiority  over  Native  Americans….Locke…explicitly   characterized   the  
mere possession of (as opposed to the use of) money as a fundamental source of English supremacy over 
Indians.  Locke’s   allegation   that   the  natives   lacked  money,   in   the   sense  of   a   generally   accepted  medium  of  
exchange,  was  mistaken.  Regional  currency  systems  abounded  in  the  New  World….Furthermore  the  colonists  
themselves often adopted these Native American media of exchange”  (2001:18).  
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purchases of indigenous land colonists and colonial companies through the mid-eighteenth 
century should not be interpreted as a neutral market transaction, since these transactions 
actually introduced a market-based system of land ownership.  
Typically an area of land was controlled by one Aboriginal nation or community, 
whose leadership allocated the right to cultivate particular sections of land to families or 
individuals.42 However, the holder of this   right  did  not   “own”   the   land,   in   the   sense   that  
they could not sell it, and typically the right to cultivate expired when the owner stopped 
cultivating the land in question — in other words, indigenous land tenure was characterized 
by limited exclusive ownership, but this was based upon the use of the land, not its abstract 
status as exchangeable property. Among the peoples of the eastern woodlands, for example, 
land   was   better   described   as   “a   symbolic   manifestation   of   kinship”   (Seed   2001:19).  
Consequently,  “the  very  first  transactions  were  most  likely  understood  by  the  Indians  not  as  
real estate sales in the English sense but rather as devices for incorporating English settlers 
within traditional Indian social and political networks”  (Banner  2007:58). Richter clarifies 
that   it   was   not   the   ownership   of   land,   “but   rather   the   meaning   of   ownership   was   what  
set…Indians and Western Europeans apart. Native communities treated land as a 
‘resource,’   which   could   not   in   itself   be   owned   any   more   than   could   the air or the 
sea….what  people  owned  was   the  right   to  use   the  resource  for  a  particular  purpose  — to 
farm, hunt, fish, gather wild plants, procure firewood, build a village — and these rights 
were not necessarily exclusive or permanent; once a resource was no longer being used, 
ownership rights faded”  (2001:54).  
                                                 
42 For a careful description of the variety of forms of land tenure that existed among First Nations in North 
America,  with  special  emphasis  on  Hawaii,  see  Linda  Parker’s  Native American Estate. (1989) 
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In contrast, the English assumed that an exchange of land for money meant the land 
was   permanently   relinquished   by   the   “seller”;; from the indigenous perspective the 
exchange   entitled   the   “purchaser”   to   use the land, not to possess it exclusively and 
indefinitely.  This  is  why  many  indigenous  nations  sometimes  “sold”  the  same  piece  of  land  
to  multiple   “purchasers”   (Snyderman  1951). Yet these issues must have been cleared up 
relatively quickly: it is absurd to assume there were cultural misunderstandings about land 
sales that lasted for decades or even centuries. (Still, once it became clear what the 
colonists understood land sales to mean, within First Nations themselves there must have 
been uncertainty about who, if anyone, had the right to sell land to Europeans.) The salient 
point is the introduction of a market for land, with an attendant shift toward an 
understanding of land as abstract and exchangeable and the introduction of a legal system 
through which transactions were enforced and disputes resolved. Colonial agents did settle 
some disputes in favour of Aboriginal complainants, but this did nothing to alter the reality 
that the English had replaced indigenous legal and conceptual frameworks with their own. 
In the view of the English, conducting purchases on the open market was the fairest way for 
land transfers to occur. This provided an answer to domestic critics of colonialism, and 
allowed the English colonizers to think of themselves as something other than conquerors. 
These were elements of the modern state that appeared in the New World while the English 
state itself was modernizing. 
If we are able to get beyond the notion that indigenous land tenure was purely a 
spiritual phenomenon, then their decision to sell land to settlers makes perfect sense. They 
had a lot of land, and selling some of it allowed them to acquire useful goods, avoid having 
to fight wars to defend their land from conquest, and establish and firm up political 
connections with the English and French (Banner 2007, esp. chapter 2). The most important 
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difference between Aboriginal and modern European forms of land tenure was not that one 
featured land ownership and use and the other did not. This was not the case: within the 
area controlled exclusively by an indigenous nation, individuals and families had exclusive 
rights to use land for cultivation. The difference was that Aboriginal people did not sell 
their  land,  meaning  they  did  not  “own”  it  in  the  same  way.   
What is the link between commodification and abstraction? As we have seen, a 
given property right is modern if it can be alienated, or sold: that is, if it functions as a 
commodity. The modern state allows every property right to be commodified. To clarify 
this  further,  let  us  consider  abstract  space’s  parallels  with  abstract  labour.  Recall  Lefebvre’s  
concept   of   abstract   space:   capitalism’s   distinctive   spatiality   entails   the   production   of  
geographically uneven development by producing abstract space, which is driven by three 
simultaneous characteristics: it is homogenizing; it is fragmented; and it is hierarchical. 
Lefebvre writes: 
capitalistic   space   is   simultaneously   homogenous   and   fractured.   Isn’t   this  
absurd, impossible? No. On the one hand, this space is homogenous because 
within it, all is equivalent, exchangeable, interchangeable; because it is a 
space that is bought and sold, and exchange can only occur between units 
that are equivalent, interchangeable. On the other hand, this space is 
fractured because it is processed in the form of lots and parcels, and sold on 
this basis; it is thus fragmented. These aspects of capitalistic space are 
shaped both within the realm of the commodity, in which everything is 
equivalent, and within the realm of the State, in which everything is 
controlled. (2009:233) 
 
The state produces homogeneity, equivalence, while the market tends to fracture. Space is 
fractured through exchange. In other words, the state and the market perform contradictory 
functions, but ultimately work together to produce capitalistic space. 
Now   recall   that,   under   capitalism,   labour   shows,   to   quote   Marx   “indifference  
towards   specific”   forms.   At   the   spatial   level,   this   can   be   extended   to   an   indifference  
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towards specific forms of community. Just   as   abstract   labour   “corresponds   to   a   form   of  
society  in  which  individuals  can  with  ease  transfer  from  one  labour  to  another,”  the  states  
system  divides  humanity  into  exchangeable  “like  units.”  People  are  citizens  of  one  state  or  
another. (This is why Indigenous peoples are at best granted a status equivalent to states.) 
Such a theory of abstract space allows us to incorporate resistance to the imposition 
of  the  state  into  our  analysis.  Lefebvre  takes  Marx’s  notion  of  the  commodity  and  applies  it  
to space through the idea of abstraction. According to Marx, commodity exchange was a 
matter of exchanging things that have different material properties and use value. The 
commodity form overcomes difference so as to allow for exchange. As Chakrabarty writes:  
Marx’s  critique  of  capital  begins  at  the  same  point  where  capital  begins  its  own  life  
process: the abstraction of labor. Yet this labor, although abstract, is always living 
labor  to  begin  with.  The  ‘living’  quality  of  the  labor  ensures that the capitalist has not 
bought a fixed quantum of labor  but  rather  a  variable  ‘capacity  for  labor,’  and  being  
‘living’   is   what   makes   this   labor   a   source   of   resistance   to   capitalist   abstraction.  
(2000:61)  
 
Chakrabarty shows how the category of abstract labour has a dual function for 
Marx: it is both a description and a critique of capital. It is a description in that is describes 
how capitalism understands human activity — in  abstract  terms.  (Chakrabarty  writes,  “the  
idea of abstract labor reproduces the central feature of the hermeneutic of capital — how 
capital reads labor activity”  (2000:58).) But it is also a critique in that Marx makes it clear 
that the process of abstraction — the reduction of the wide variety of human activities to 
exchangeable units — is so unnatural that it profoundly contradicts human freedom: 
Discipline — regulation, legislation, supervisory jobs, and so on — are what make 
the labour of abstracting visible as a moment of capitalist production, but they are 
also what makes this moment possible.  Marx  refers  to  such  discipline  as  “despotism,”  
a choice of terminology that clarifies that what is at stake is much more than 
technocratic decisions to organize labour in the production process so as to realize 
maximum efficiency; instead the abstraction of human labour, as Marx writes in the 
“Grundrisse,” “confiscates every atom of freedom”   (1993:548).  Thus labour 
resistance to capitalist discipline is inherent, natural, and visceral — it is not the 
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product of historically specific conditions, such as workers achieving a certain level 
of class-consciousness. To read Marx through Chakrabarty, workers resist capitalist 
discipline not because they have come to the intellectual realization that they are 
exploited,   but   rather   because   humans   have   an   “innate   capacity   for  willing,”  which  
“refuses  to  bend  to  the  ‘technical  subordination’  under  which  capital  constantly  seeks  
to place the worker”  (2000:  61).  
 
This argument can be extended to theorize the imposition of the state form upon — and the 
attendant powerful resistance from — indigenous peoples. 
 
Surveying, Maps, Archives, and Other State Technologies  
I have argued, following Lefebvre, that land tenure on the colonial frontier can be 
understood as the imposition of the space of the market, in which everything is 
exchangeable. This entailed a shift from functionally organized forms of land tenure 
consistent with the “absolute” space of precapitalist social formations, to forms of tenure 
that involved the abstraction of territory onto documents, which in turn meant they could 
easily be traded from individual to firm, firm to firm, and so on. The state provided 
essential technological supports that allow land to be recast as exchangeable property in 
this way. Property law was necessary but on its own insufficient; its function was more to 
establish a consistent and predictable framework for the acquisition of land. Producing an 
exchangeable abstract version of landed property was achieved through a combination of 
land surveying and map-making.  
Cartography, like law, may appear to be an objective, technical enterprise, but it is 
profoundly political: in a classic essay, Harley writes that maps   “are   never   value-free 
images….Both   in   the   selectivity   of   their content and in their signs and styles of 
representation maps are ways of conceiving, articulating and structuring the human world”  
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(1988:278). Cartography played a central role in the reification of the modern territorial 
state: from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries the creation and institutionalization of 
agencies   and  archives  were   centrally   important   to   state   formation.  This   “cartographic  sea  
change” was partly a technical matter, but it was also closely related to developments in 
colonial exploration and changes in property rights, in addition to the evolution of the state 
(Blomley 1994:83). While the canonical sociological theory of the state sees it as, in the 
words  of  Michael  Mann,  “both  a  central  place and  a  unified  territorial  reach,”  Biggs  argues  
this demonstrates a persistent tendency to project our image of the territorial state back into 
the   past….Our   language   leads   us   to   conceive   of   change   as   additional   rather   than  
integral….It  is  easy  to  say  ‘the state  mapped  its  territory,’  implying  that  a  preexisting  entity  
increased the quantity of its knowledge”   (Biggs   1999:399). In fact the sociological 
definition does not apply to feudal states, in which the king was typically peripatetic.  
Rulers   “did not   see   the   ‘medieval   states’   delineated   so   clearly   in   our   historical  
atlases. How, then, did they know the ground over which they claimed dominion? In the 
virtual   absence   of   appropriate   maps…the   realm   ….   accord[ed]   with   lived   experience”  
(Biggs 1999:377). Medieval methods of measuring land were ad hoc and approximate, with 
measurement units often being specific to one particular area (Blomley 1994).  Beginning 
in the sixteenth century, it became common for rulers to use maps to rationalize and plan 
the activities  of  rule,  as  well  as  to  “represent  the  fact  of  their  dominion.”  But  it  also  “came  
to define the shape of power and to constitute the object of state formation. As lands were 
surveyed   and  mapped,   they   were   reshaped   into   a   territory….the   old   dynastic realm was 
transformed into a distinctively new shape, the territorial state. This spatial rationalization 
was  modeled   on   the  map.”   In   this  way,   the  modern   state   form  was   partially   constituted  
through cartographic knowledge (Biggs 1999 377;385;398).  
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Thus it was the state that provided the technologies that allowed the conversion of 
land into property (which was a tradable asset) on the colonial frontier, including territorial 
surveying, map-making and archives. Recall our earlier reading of Lefebvre, who argues 
that  the  distinctly  modern  form  of  space  that  he  calls  “abstract  space”  is  characterized  by  a  
reliance   upon   representation:   “lived   experience   is   crushed,   vanquished   by   what   is  
conceived  of.”  The  representation  of  land  through  measurement  and  recording as maps can 
be understood as a process of abstraction, of abstracting real geographical features onto 
paper. Biggs describes map-making  as  “a  store  of  knowledge  reflecting  surveys  that  rulers  
sponsored to penetrate the ground over which they ruled”  (Biggs 374).  
Mapping  was  “spurred  by  colonial  expansion”  (Biggs  398). The British empire was 
more dependent on map-making than any empire before or since; a steady expansion of 
map literacy in Europe, driven by a combination of factors including the rise of new print 
technologies,  coincided  with  the  “discovery”  and  colonization  of  North  America  from  the  
late sixteenth century on (Edney 1997). The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries also saw a 
shift in the social function of cadastral maps, from primarily inventories of private land to a 
much  more  public  role  in  the  service  of  the  state:  “in  the  early  modern  period  the  cadastral  
map was a highly contentious instrument for the extension and consolidation of power, not 
just of the propertied individual, but of the nation-state and the capitalist system which 
underlies it”  (Kain  and  Baigent  1991:8). 
Maps were used to establish title to land, and were central to the process of 
organizing,   controlling,   and   recording   the   settlement   of   “empty”   or   “waste”   lands,  
especially those that were occupied by people with very different concepts of land 
ownership. They helped governments promote orderly settlement on colonial lands, and the 
map proved a highly effective and flexible instrument for governments to promote 
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particular settlement ideals, from the establishment of large plantations in the southern 
United States to a strategy of strictly limiting land availability in South Australia so as to 
force the emergence of an economy with farmers and wage labourers (Kain and Baigent 
1991:336).  
A strong new demand for land surveying was a by-product of enclosures in 
England.  Cadastral maps were a formal requirement of enclosure legislation, but the actual 
production of maps was left up to the private sector. In this way surveyors   “were  
simultaneously  ‘the  great  panegyrists  of  enclosing,’  the  promoters  of  capitalist  farming,  and  
advocates of the cadastral map”   (Kain   and   Baigent   1991:334). At the beginning of the 
colonial period, surveying consisted of written descriptions based on visual inspection of an 
area. Landmarks and natural division points such as rivers were the basic markers, and 
these methods were often accompanied by some sort of measurement, to produce 
descriptions  like  the  following:  “From  the  large  standing  rock on the south bank of Rocky 
Creek near the junction of Muddy and Rocky Creeks, south for 600 yards, then southeast 
one mile to the large elm tree, then north to Muddy Creek, then down the west bank of the 
creek back to the starting point.”   In the sixteenth century, surveying evolved from a 
combination of visual and chain-based measuring, to more standardized techniques of 
measurement. Standardization addressed some of the more obvious problems with the old 
method (over time landmarks such as trees and streams die or alter course; large properties 
required absurdly complex descriptions; it was very hard to tell if dishonest surveyors had 
been bribed to craft descriptions that were larger than the intended allotment) but it was 
market forces that really drove the changes: large tracts of land in the west were being sold 
sight unseen to investors, and so a visual description was all but impossible. The new 
methods were highly mathematical and geometrical and drew on innovations such as 
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triangulation to mark “plots.” By the late 1600s, surveying included the mapping of larger 
political units such as towns. By the eighteenth century, surveying as a category of 
employment had changed: military leaders and colonial governors, as well as landed 
individuals, employed surveyors and cartographer. The market-driven revolution in 
surveying and map-making in the early modern period was driven by landowners and the 
state alike. The former group came to value carefully precise maps, as these could be used 
as evidence in court cases. State governors valued them for use in inventories and tax 
collecting. These were practical applications of the theory of absolute space, which, as 
Harvey   reminds   us,   “permits   the   clear   identification   of   landholdings   and   provides  
unambiguous locational addresses to which inhabitants can be assigned”  (2009:252).  
 
Investment Follows Improvement 
Early-modern England was undergoing a transition from a feudal to a market 
economy, but this transition was neither total nor immediate (Brace 1998; Halperin 2004). 
The result was a commercial society still governed by landed aristocracy. Merchants and 
the   aristocracy   formed   “matrimonial   and   business   alliances”;; mobility between these 
classes was high, represented by the sons of the gentry moving into the city and becoming 
businessmen. Ultimately, the perspective of the landed elite became sufficiently dominant 
to   subsume   its  potential   rivals   into  a  “united  propertied   interest”   (Grassby  1995:386-387; 
also see Dobb 1946). This amalgamation of merchants, financiers, and landed aristocrats 
developed an ideology in which an obsession with owning land was combined with new 
ideas for legal tools that allowed land owners to borrow against it, and reinvest this capital 
into cultivating that land to make it more profitable. This process can be expressed as 
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follows: legal interests in the land  credit  leverage for improvements (Weaver 2006). 
This was a powerful circular process: private settlers occupied indigenous land and then 
used some variant on the doctrine of improvement in appealing to the empire to 
retroactively authorize and support their claim. Government supports such as laws, land 
surveys, and official records abstracted the land onto documents, making it measurable and 
tradable.43 This, in turn, produced the conditions (stability and predictability) that 
encouraged new capital investments in the land, investments that made it more profitable 
and hence valuable — and the stability and predictability ensured by the state framework 
then allowed landowners  to  borrow  against  their  property’s  increased  value,  fuelling further 
acquisition and investment. As we have seen, legal dealings with first peoples over land 
sales were riddled with fraud and perfidy. But that does not mean the legal agreements 
reached with First Nations over land were not important. On the contrary, they were 
essential  for  confidence:  “when  security  was  presumed,  investments  could  render  tangible  
the doctrine of improvement”   (Weaver   2006:140,141). In   other   words,   the   colonizers’  
appeal to the idea of improvement generated real improvement.  
This phenomenon was underpinned by the theory of absolute space, which, as 
Harvey   explains,   “permits   the   clear   identification   of   landholdings   and   provides  
unambiguous locational addresses to which inhabitants can be assigned”   (2009:252). 
Relevant measures — land-mapping, the making of exclusive land claims, and the other 
mechanisms that allow the state to identify its own exclusive territorial boundaries, develop 
a full inventory of its citizens and their landholdings (for purposes such as taxation) — 
                                                 
43 For a   fascinating   account   of   abstraction   as   the   “discursive   equivalent   of   extraction…a   process   whereby  
traces  of  a  distant  place,  people  or  resource  are  gathered  up  and  consolidated  at  the  metropolitan  centre”  see  
Tobin. Tobin emphasizes an interpretation of colonialism  as  “a  process  of  extraction”  (1999:202). 
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establish continuity between state power and an understanding of the individual based upon 
absolute theory of space.  
 
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 
The   Royal   Proclamation   of   1763,   the   “Magna   Carta of English-Indigenous 
relations,”  set  out  the  boundaries  for  the  British  colonies,  leaving  the  remaining  territories  
in the control and possession of their Aboriginal inhabitants. In it, the Crown dictated that 
indigenous nations not be forced off their land that they had not given up by selling it to the 
Crown: 
Whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and the 
Security of our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with 
whom We are connected, and who live under our Protection, should not be 
molested or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and 
Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by Us, are reserved to 
them. or any of them, as their Hunting Grounds.—We do therefore, with the 
Advice of our Privy Council, declare it to be our Royal Will and Pleasure, 
that no Governor or Commander in Chief in any of our Colonies of Quebec, 
East Florida, or West Florida, do presume, upon any Pretence whatever, to 
grant Warrants of Survey, or pass any Patents for Lands beyond the Bounds 
of their respective Governments. as described in their Commissions: as also 
that no Governor or Commander in Chief in any of our other Colonies or 
Plantations in America do presume for the present, and until our further 
Pleasure be known, to grant Warrants of Survey, or pass Patents for any 
Lands beyond the Heads or Sources of any of the Rivers which fall into the 
Atlantic Ocean from the West and North West, or upon any Lands whatever, 
which, not having been ceded to or purchased by Us as aforesaid, are 
reserved to the said Indians, or any of them. 
And We do further declare it to be Our Royal Will and Pleasure, for the 
present as aforesaid, to reserve under our Sovereignty, Protection, and 
Dominion, for the use of the said Indians, all the Lands and Territories not 
included within the Limits of Our said Three new Governments, or within 
the Limits of the Territory granted to the Hudson’s  Bay Company, as also all 
the Lands and Territories lying to the Westward of the Sources of the Rivers 
which  fall  into  the  Sea  from  the  West  and  North  West  as  aforesaid…. 
And. We do further strictly enjoin and require all Persons whatever who 
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have either wilfully or inadvertently seated themselves upon any Lands 
within the Countries above described. or upon any other Lands which, not 
having been ceded to or purchased by Us, are still reserved to the said 
Indians as aforesaid, forthwith to remove themselves from such Settlements. 
(www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English/PreConfederation/rp_1763.ht
ml, accessed Aug 10, 2010) 
Further, only the Crown or its colonial government representatives could purchase 
indigenous land: 
We have also  thought  fit….to  give  unto  the  Governors  and  Councils  of  our  
said Three new Colonies, upon the Continent full Power and Authority to 
settle and agree with the Inhabitants of our said new Colonies or with any 
other Persons who shall resort thereto, for such Lands. Tenements and 
Hereditaments, as are now or hereafter shall be in our Power to dispose of; 
and them to grant to any such Person or Persons upon such Terms, and 
under such moderate Quit-Rents, Services and Acknowledgments, as have 
been appointed and settled in our other Colonies, and under such other 
Conditions as shall appear to us to be necessary and expedient for the 
Advantage of the Grantees, and the Improvement and settlement of our said 
Colonies…. 
And We do hereby strictly forbid, on Pain of our Displeasure, all our loving 
Subjects from making any Purchases or Settlements whatever, or taking 
Possession of any of the Lands above reserved. without our especial leave 
and Licence for that Purpose first obtained. 
(www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English/PreConfederation/rp_1763.ht
ml, accessed Aug 10, 2010) 
 The   Proclamation’s   grant   to   indigenous   nations   control   over   land   not   sold   or  
otherwise ceded for  use  as  “hunting  grounds”  was  poorly  defined (See Pagden 1995:85-86 
for discussion). Its spatial dimension, however, was quite stark: essentially, the 
proclamation drew a vertical line down the centre of North American and prohibited new 
land grants or settlements west of the line. Why would the British Crown do this well after 
the relative power balance between English colonists and First Nations had shifted in 
England’s  favour? For an accurate interpretation of this momentous change in policy, we 
must emphasize that the proclamation eliminated private land sales between individuals. 
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After 1763 land could only be purchased by colonial governments (acting in the name of 
the Crown) and could only be sold by Aboriginal tribal governments. Thus the rapidly 
modernizing  British  state  assumed  direct  control  over  the  sale  of  native  land;;  “Indian  land  
sales were transformed from contracts into treaties — from transactions between private 
parties into transactions between sovereigns”  (Banner  2007:85). 
The first consideration behind this shift was strategic. In 1754 war had resumed 
between France and England in the so-called French and Indian War, which was the 
prelude   to   the   Seven   Years’   War   of   1756-63.44 The Treaty of Paris of 1763 gave the 
remaining French territory to England, and what had been known as New France now 
became the British colony known as Quebec. The original French settlers, the Acadians, 
were deported and replaced by waves of English-speaking colonists from Britain and New 
England (Evans, Grimshaw et al., 2003:20-21). But even in the wake of this military 
victory, the British were forced to take a careful look at their relationship with indigenous 
nations. The First Nations of the upper Great Lakes, in an attempt to preserve their 
territories, had staged a forceful rebellion in May 1763, when Pontiac, a chief who was an 
ally of the French, attacked Detroit. This was bad enough, but when the uprising spread 
quickly to the Iroquois, who had traditionally supported the British against the French, the 
British became very worried (Clarke 2002:95). A formal alliance between the Iroquois 
Confederacy (Haudenosaunee) and British colonies, known as the Covenant Chain, had 
been of great importance to both sides between 1677 and 1753 (Taylor 2001). The 
Proclamation of 1763 was intended to reestablish the spirit of this alliance and meet the 
strategically significant goal of consolidating and strengthening bonds with indigenous 
                                                 
44 As Jennings (1990) notes, the French and Indian War is an Anglocentric misnomer that implies that 
indigenous alliances were only with the French. If this had been true, the French would almost certainly have 
won the war.  
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nations.45 As the Crown explained through the text of the proclamation itself,  it  is  “essential  
to our interest and the Security of our colonies that the several Nations or tribes of Indians 
with whom we are connected, and who live under our protection, should not be molested or 
disturbed in the possession of such parts of our Dominions and territories as, not having 
been ceded to, or purchased by us, are reserved to them or any of them as their hunting 
grounds.”   
The most direct way to improve relations with First Nations was to address the issue 
of fraudulent and corrupt land purchasing, which were major antagonisms for First Nations. 
“As   the   Board   of   Trade   explained   toward   the   end   of   the   French   and   Indian   War,   ‘the  
primary   cause’   of  many   tribes’   decision   to   switch   their   alliance from England to France 
‘was   the   Cruelty   and   Injustice   with   which   they   had   been   treated   with   respect   to   their  
Hunting Grounds, in open Violation of those solemn Compacts by which they had yielded 
to us the Dominion but not the Property of their Lands’”   (Banner 2007 39-41; quoted in 
ibid, 40). The  text  of  Proclamation  itself  acknowledges,  “great  frauds  and  abuses  have  been  
committed   in  purchasing   lands  of   the   Indians.”  But   experience  had  already  demonstrated  
that cleaning up indigenous land sales to remove fraud required structural changes — 
colonial governments already had laws at their disposal, but were unable and unwilling to 
enforce them. The proclamation adopted an idea already in circulation in the 1750s: set 
aside an area in which land purchasing was simply banned. All land sales, including 
fraudulent ones, would be prohibited. This is especially significant because the 
proclamation in effect created the first reservation (Banner 2007:89). The line described in 
the proclamation ran north and south along the mountains running through western New 
                                                 
45  Clark agrees that the proclamation was  implemented  because  the  British  were  “faced  with  numerous  and  
warlike  tribes,”  but  adds  that  they  “were  not  completely  impervious  to  sentiments  of  natural  justice”  (1990:3). 
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York, western Pennsylvania, south through Georgia. No more land grants or settlement was 
allowed to the west of the line. East of the line, land sales could only occur between 
indigenous governments and colonial governments.  
The effects were different on either side of the line, but in each case they were long-
lasting. To the west the effect was an intensification of land speculation. Any settlers 
already on that side of the line were ordered to leave and new settlements were outlawed. 
But buying land on the west of the dividing line was not criminalized — the consequence 
was simply that contracts, if challenged in court, would have no legal validity. This did not 
dissuade speculators, who gambled that the ever-increasing demand for land would soon 
force the end of the proclamation provisions, and so temporarily restricting the supply of 
land merely drove up its future value. Government officials quickly became caught up in 
land speculation, and, as we will see in the next chapter, land speculation would play a 
central role in American secession and the post-revolutionary period. For example, George 
Washington (assuming that, while new patents could not be issued west of the line, 
legitimate claims for land would be honoured when the line was rolled back) marked 
thousands  of  acres  “to  secure  some  of  the  most  valuable  Lands  in  the  King’s  part  which  I  
think may be accomplished after a while notwithstanding the proclamation that restrains it 
at present and prohibits the settling of Them at all for I can never look upon that 
Proclamation in any other light (but this I say between ourselves) than as a temporary 
expedient to quiet the Minds of the Indians and must fall of course in a few years”  (quoted 
in Weaver 2006:155). 
East  of   the   line,  speculators  “redirected   their  efforts   from  buying   land   to   lobbying  
the government to buy it. Once the land was purchased, the government could then grant it 
to   the  speculator.”  Formal   land   titles  obtained   in   this  way  were  more secure — and thus 
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more valuable — to speculators than titles lacking a government imprimatur (Banner 
2007:105).  
The elimination of private land sales east of the dividing line was the most 
significant and enduring effect of the proclamation: this fundamentally restructured the land 
market. Jones (1982) argues that it is best understood as a transition from land sales by 
contract to land sales by treaty. A relatively informal system of negotiation and agreement 
between private interests was replaced by a formal system of negotiations between 
governments. According to Jones, this was simply a continuation of colonialism by other 
means:   “one   of   the   marks   of   colonialism   is   that   it   bends…diplomatic   structures   to  
exploitative ends”  (xii). Unlike other agreements reached between governments — such as 
conventions governing trade or military relations — property rights flowed uni-
directionally. They were not negotiated in a spirit of mutual need or benefit. Rather they 
were  a  “technology  of  law”  which colonizers, having established sovereignty, were able to 
use  to  their  great  advantage;;  the  English  benefited  from  the  fact  that  property  rights  “arose  
solely from their history”  (Weaver  2006:133). Tully (2000:54) argues that the reliance on 
treaties — a leading-edge  strategy  of  “internal  colonization” — rose and fell in dialectical 
relationship with indigenous resistance to the encroachment of settler societies and a 
capitalist economy. At moments when resistance was most effective, treaties were the more 
likely strategy. This argument would seem to support that interpretation that, although it 
came in the wake of military victory, the proclamation was essentially a response to 
England’s   perceived   strategic   weaknesses,   intended   to   shore   up   key   alliances with First 
Nations by addressing their longstanding grievances about corrupt land purchasing 
practices. In these terms, the proclamation failed. The colonial governments proved unable 
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to meaningfully enforce the interdiction against settlement west of the boundary line, 
which, as Banner writes,  
proved extremely porous. It was already an old story by the middle of the 
eighteenth century: colonial governments simply could not prevent settlers 
from heading west. Motivated by a belief (at variance with the formal law) 
that land and other natural resources were free for the taking and belonged to 
the first taker, settlers swarmed into the west. So many Virginians crossed 
the boundary and occupied unpurchased Indian land, contrary to the 
repeated admonitions of Governor Francis Fauquier, that in 1766 Fauquier 
announced  that   transboundary  settlers  “must  expect  no  protection  or  mercy  
from the Government, and be exposed to the revenge of the exasperated 
Indians.”  There   could  hardly  have  been  any  greater  evidence  of  Virginia’s  
inability to restrain its own citizens than this admission that the 
Proclamation of 1763 would have to be enforced by the aggrieved tribes 
rather than by Virginia. (2007:98) 
 
Moreover, the proclamation would have legal validity for only about a decade before 
American secession ended British colonial authority and rendered royal proclamations such 
as this irrelevant in the newly independent states.46 The proclamation had also been 
intended to strengthen the legal connection between the colonies and the British Crown — 
a goal that reflected the mounting political challenge on the part of the British colonies in 
the US. After signing the 1783 Treaty of Versailles, in which the British surrendered all 
territory south of the new American border, the need to increase British population in the 
existing territories took on a new strategic urgency, and so the British Crown began 
negotiating with indigenous nations to acquire new lands (Evans, Grimshaw et al, 2003:20). 
The proclamation may have been a seed for these eventual negotiations, and in this way we 
might say it did serve some narrow strategic benefit. 
                                                 
46 In Canada the proclamation was incorporated into the Constitution Act of 1867, and continues to form the 
foundation for relationship between First Nations and the Canadian government, with particular relevance to 
the highly contested issue of land claims (cf. Clark 1990).  
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 A spatial-social relations analysis reveals 1763 to be a watershed in the progressive 
expansion of the modernizing English state. The boundary line set by the proclamation was 
a moment (although an ephemeral one) of clarity demonstrating how the expansion of the 
modern state form occurred geographically across the globe. As a theoretical contrast, let us 
return briefly to the canonical English School account of the expansion of the state form to 
the Americas. According to this view, the universalization of the European state begins 
where the present chapter ends: in the 1770s, with the process of secession, when the 
American colonies demanded independence based on the two principles the English School 
views as fundamentally constitutive of the state: absolute sovereignty and juridical 
equality.47 A state, thus defined, is compatible with an international society governed by the 
balance of power, international law regulating conflict, and international diplomacy 
(Watson in Bull and Watson 1984:127-141;13-32). From the point of view of the English 
School the events of 1492-1776 are irrelevant. My argument is that the establishment of the 
state in the New World would not have happened without the events of this period.  
To summarize, the process was governed by accumulation, mediated by the 
differences in culture, law, and economic ambitions between a modernizing England and its 
inter-imperial rivals, and, within the English presence itself, by the fruitful tensions 
between private initiative and government regulation. Like all colonizing powers, 
England’s   colonial   ambitions   were   centred around the accumulation of resources. In 
particular, as the consequence of cultural and economic reasons, the English focus was on 
land ownership in the new world. This distinguished its colonial presence from those of its 
                                                 
47 Watson  views  this  as  one  of  two  ways  in  which  “states  on  the  European  model”  became  established  in  the  
new  world:   the  US  model  of  “unilateral  declarations  of   independence  and  successful  armed  defiance  of   the  
forces of the imperial power,”   and   “gradual   independence   by   negotiation   and   mutual   consent,   with   the  
maintenance   of   some   symbolic   constitutional   link   after   the   end   of   all   imperial   authority,”   as   would   be  
practised by Canada and Brazil, for example (128). The assumption here is that people want to be part of a 
modern state.  
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imperial rivals such as Spain, which was relatively more interested in the metals and 
minerals under the ground. But the English pursuit of land was not simple or 
straightforward. It was complicated by resistance from indigenous peoples who already 
occupied the land, and by competition from other European empires. It was further 
complicated  by  the  need  to  address  the  common  law’s  apparent  support  for  indigenous  land  
rights. Domestic class conflict shaped events on the colonial frontier, with the enclosure of 
the commons being especially important. This privatization of land, and the related notion 
of improvement, were essential in the development of the modern state in England and the 
ownership of land in the colonies. But it, too, was highly contested. 
Finally, the proclamation issued by the modernizing British state in 1763 set the 
pattern for the future in a number of ways. It established a close – if inevitably fraught – 
relationship between indigenous nations and the British Crown.   It   “drew   a   line   around”  
some territory, an approach that anticipated the reservation system. And it marked a 
watershed in the role of the state in land transfers.  
In this chapter we have seen how, in the period after contact, the English Crown felt 
that its colonists were entitled to claim as property any land within a territory over which 
England had declared sovereignty. Yet when it came to claiming land, the behaviour of 
colonists was determined less by formal declarations of sovereignty than by material 
reality. It was often much easier and cheaper to buy land than to take it and then fight to 
defend that claim. So before 1763, settlers tended to buy indigenous land that their state 
told them they already owned. And land ownership typically was transferred through 
contract. By 1763 the situation would be reversed: by this time colonists felt much more 
secure and powerful, and were more interested in acquiring indigenous land through 
conquest rather than contract. The Proclamation of 1763 changed the legal method of 
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acquiring indigenous land, concentrating control of such purchases in the hands of the 
government. A grant from the government became the only way to acquire new land titles. 
And the form that land sales took was transformed from contract to treaty.   
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5. Post-Revolutionary Land Policies in the US 
 
 
The state that establishes sovereignty over a territory has the power to make and enforce 
property rights in that territory. The particular system of property rights a colonial state 
imposes is typically developed in the home country first, and then exported. But as we have 
seen, the relationship between sovereignty and property is complex and dynamic, and 
colonial property rights regimes are never a simple reflection of those in the metropolis. 
This chapter deals with the period after American secession — a process that began in 1775 
— brought the British colonial period to a close. Viewed entirely through a sovereignty 
lens, such a major rupture in formal sovereignty would be expected to trigger an equivalent 
change in property rights. Yet that did not occur in this case. The emergence of a distinctly 
American property-rights regime was uneven.  
Revolutionary American governments from 1775-1785 attempted to assert control 
over the allocation of land on the frontier by putting land allocation in government hands. 
But residual feudalism, in the form of pseudo-aristocratic practices, continued well past the 
English abolition of feudal tenure by 1660, and even well past the American Revolution. 
This chapter addresses the changes and continuities that occurred after the American state 
was   established   and   Aboriginal   nations   were   becoming   “internal”   rather   than   “external”  
nations. Just as before, land transfer was structured through a series of contracts; now, 
however, control over land transfers was centralized in the state. Land was transferred out 
of Aboriginal hands through contracts, but these no longer took the form of sales between 
individuals, and instead took the form of sales between sovereigns; that is, as treaties.  
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British Dominance After the French and Indian War: Continuities and 
Changes in Land Policy  
 
The Seven Years’ War (which Lawrence Gipson has called the Great War for the 
Empire) marked the consolidation of British dominance in North America.48 In Europe, 
even  after  France’s  defeat,  French  remained  the  language  of  diplomacy.  France’s  enduring  
diplomatic influence was reflected in the European treaty system. Of the 100 treaties 
between European powers signed in the decade after 1763, 69 were in French, and France 
signed 39, more than twice as many as the next most active participants. In North America, 
the scenario was very different. Beginning in 1763, after France and Spain had withdrawn 
from active competition with Britain for North America, the British and the indigenous 
nations of eastern North America drew upon their long history of contact with each other to 
develop  a   treaty  network,  which  reflected  Britain’s  dominance   in   the  new  world.  Each  of  
the treaties in this system dealt with its own different territories and subjects, but together 
they articulated the core idea set out in the Royal Proclamation of 1763: the delineation of a 
boundary between indigenous and British territories (Jones 1982:3-18).  
Along with the various territorial advantages accruing to England as a result of its 
victory also came a war debt, which it addressed by imposing taxes on the American 
colonies. This provoked resistance, especially from large landowners and the small but 
influential community of wealthy business owners who did not depend heavily upon British 
trade. This tension reached a turning point with the Declaration of Independence of 1776.  
Establishing independence militarily was expensive; after the Revolutionary War 
the states were essentially bankrupt. The only likely source of income, both immediately 
and as potential income for the longer term, was land. Indeed, during the war, many states 
                                                 
48 This conflict actually began in North America two years before it did in Europe and ended in 1765 with the 
treaty signed in Detroit two years after the 1763 Treaty of Paris (Jones 1982:15). 
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had   paid   soldiers   with   promises   of   land   in   the   form   of   “depreciation   certificates”  
theoretically redeemable for land, but after the war they did not have sufficient land 
holdings to discharge these debts. The Continental Congress, and many state governments, 
began receiving demands from demobilized soldiers to repay the debts (Richter 2001). As 
we  have  seen,  for  decades  the  English  Crown  had  recognized  First  Nations’  ownership  of  
their   land.  But   now   the   states’   need   for   land  was   acute,   and   the   only   land   available  was  
owned by Aboriginal people. Mounting political pressures mandated a move away from the 
long-standing recognition of indigenous land rights. 
Yet such a change was not easily realized. Even after independence was declared, 
many of the main reasons for respecting indigenous land rights did not disappear. 
Aboriginal people still farmed, for example, and given the special value the English placed 
on agricultural labour, this offered continued confirmation of their land rights. And while 
European settlers by this point had acquired much greater relative strength and numbers, it 
was still often cheaper for them to buy land than to seize and defend it. In addition to these 
continuities, the revolutionary context actually produced new dynamics in support of land 
rights. In the 1760s England had attempted to establish a coherent land policy. It created an 
Indian department, which took negotiations with First Nations out of the hands of colonial 
governments, and it passed the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which established an Indian 
Territory. The 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, signed by the British and representatives of the 
Six Nations (Iroquois), had adjusted the territorial line that delineated the boundary of 
Indian country in the hopes that a new, ostensibly permanent line would impose some order 
on an increasingly violent and anarchic frontier (Taylor 2006). Speculators created ad hoc 
new land companies as they rushed to claim the new land opened up by Stanwix. But the 
now-independent states were no longer bound by the Proclamation of 1763, and the 
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speculative demand for land far outstripped the supply; speculators who had been frozen 
out  by   the  proclamation’s  ban  on  private   sales,   and  unable   to  get   in  on   the  post-Stanwix 
rush, saw the revolution as a possible opportunity to open up new Aboriginal territory for 
purchase. While the Crown argued that it had the right to tax land because that land had 
been acquired by grants from the Crown, opponents argued that the Crown had no authority 
to legislate or tax land because it never granted that land — instead, the land was purchased 
from its indigenous owners (Banner 2007:115-116).  
Thomas Jefferson offers an embodiment of these developments. Jefferson grew up 
in an eighteenth-century Virginia in which land speculation raged. Many land companies 
were formed to attempt to acquire indigenous   land   along   Virginia’s   western   frontier.  
Jefferson inherited a share in one of these, the Loyal Land Company, and also invested on 
his own in frontier real estate. This history contributed to his lifelong sympathy for settler 
colonists (Wallace, 1999:21-49). Jefferson, along with such others as Washington, John 
Adams,   and   James  Madison,   together  made  up   an  American   “speculative-landed”   gentry  
that had huge claims on land located on the far side of the 1763 Proclamation Line — 
claims which could not be realized as long as the letter or the spirit of that agreement were 
honoured.49 As Williams (1990) shows, the justifications provided for the widespread and 
unregulated land speculation on the eve of the Revolution drew heavily upon a discourse 
based in   Jefferson’s  argument   in  defence of secession, expressed in his 1774 pamphlet A 
Summary View of the Rights of British America. Jefferson portrayed the American rebels as 
the political descendents of the ancient Saxons who had left northern Europe, settled there, 
and established a political system that would come to define Britain. For the Saxons, 
                                                 
49 A number of historians have argued that thwarted speculation was an important factor in triggering the 
revolution. See Abernathy (1959) and Holton (1999). 
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emigration to America was simply part of a centuries-long trajectory of relentlessly 
pursuing freedom, justice and the rule of law. Jefferson employed the  
radicals’  Lockean-inspired thematic wedge — a natural-law-based notion of 
a government formed by autonomous compact and the consent of the 
governed — to   legitimate   the   American   claim   for   independence….The  
Americans, inheritors of the Saxon mantle of liberty, had seen their natural-
law rights to freedom frustrated by the continual usurpations of the British 
Crown….[which  was]   a  wrongful   continuation   of   the   perversion   of   Saxon  
principles of right and justice, traceable to the first imposition of the Norman 
Yoke in 1066. (267) 
 
Jefferson draws on the myth of the Norman Yoke, a shorthand phrase that emerged in 
seventeenth-century English nationalist discourse to convey the idea that the English gentry 
were the descendents of foreign invaders who had destroyed the Saxon golden age (cf. Hill 
1997). In the service of their war on the noble Saxon race, the Normans had contaminated 
natural-law principles by imposing a foreign system of feudal land-laws that was little more 
than a fiction of conquest. When freedom-loving Englishmen fled British tyranny, they 
carried with them Saxon-inspired common-law principles of free tenure. Thus the Crown 
could not claim colonial rights in North America based on the Norman right of conquest of 
infidels, because the King had never formally conquered America. Nominally a defence of 
American   independence,   Jefferson’s   highly   influential   argument   also   had   profound  
implications for indigenous land rights. It suggested that for descendents of the Saxons to 
purchase land directly from its Aboriginal occupants, without granting sanctioning 
authority to the Crown or its colonial representatives, was a revolutionary act. Not only did 
free Americans exercise (and thus assert) their natural-law rights when they bought 
indigenous land   directly,   First   Nations   exercised   natural   rights   of   their   own   by   “freely  
alienating that which they occupied”;; this  willingness   to  participate   in   the  colonists’   land  
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market demonstrated their natural capacity for rational, self-interested actions (Williams 
1990:266-272; 272).50  
As we have seen, the Proclamation of 1763 was an attempt to control settlement, 
although it was never successful in thwarting speculation. When the proclamation took 
away first nations’   ability   to   sell   their   land   privately,   they   also   lost   the   ad-hoc political 
coalition backing them: landowners who had bought land directly (and whose title thus 
depended on indigenous land rights being recognized), and speculators who wanted to buy 
land. Without the restraining influence of the Crown, the now-independent American states 
were even less effective than the colonial governments they replaced had been at enforcing 
the rules surrounding land purchases. Essentially the same dynamic that had spawned the 
Royal Proclamation reappeared in the revolutionary context: the central government, 
wanting to avoid antagonizing First Nations, found itself in need of a legal mechanism to 
impose restraint on the states. After some debate, the Articles of Confederation of 1777 
were drafted to include a weak power, leaving the state governments in charge of land sales 
within their own boundaries. After another decade of chaos on the frontier, the Constitution 
adopted in 1787 finally gave the central government exclusive control over Indian relations.  
It is also important that this was all happening in a context of war. In this light, 
Jefferson’s   1774   use   of   the   Norman   yoke imagery takes on an ironic appearance: he 
                                                 
50 The ideas themselves drew deeply from a well of racial discourse and myth. In the Revolutionary period, 
many Americans, following Jefferson, came to see themselves as the standard bearers for freedoms that had 
first  been  enjoyed  in  England  centuries  earlier:  “Has  not  every  restitution  of  the  ancient  Saxon  laws  had  happy  
effects? Is it not better now that we return at once into that happy system of our ancestors, the wisest and most 
perfect ever yet devised by the wit of man, as it stood before the 8th century?”  (as in Horsman 1981:9). The 
current of publications flowing across the Atlantic was especially strong on the eve of American secession, 
and   a   large   number   of   these   portrayed   the   revolutionaries   “as   Englishmen   — Englishmen contending for 
principles of popular government, freedom, and liberty introduced into England more than a thousand years 
before by the high-minded, freedom-loving Anglo-Saxons from the woods of Germany”  (Horsman,  1981:18). 
It is important not to overlook the racial dimension to the imagery and mythology that Jefferson invoked; 
these ideas would be picked up and developed in the decades ahead, and folded into the idea of Manifest 
Destiny.  
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accused the Crown of employing a feudal argument of conquest to claim indigenous land, 
which in fact, as we have seen, the Crown did not do. This claim was a discursive straw 
target. Yet now, in the revolutionary period, it was the rebels themselves who embraced the 
doctrine of conquest. To understand this we must remember that secession was not 
peaceful.   “In  much   of  North  America,”   Banner  writes,   “the  Revolution  was  more   a  war  
against the Indians than a war against the British. Tribes found themselves drawn into the 
conflict, unable to stay neutral, because much of the fighting was taking place on their 
land”  (2007:121). The end of the American War of Independence in 1783 left First Nations 
in a disadvantageous position. Most indigenous nations had fought on the side of the 
British. By the time of the war, the British had disclaimed entirely the right to indigenous 
land as a matter of conquest and acquired land by purchase as a matter of course. Britain 
also endeavored to regulate land sales to eliminate abuses in land-purchasing practices 
employed by many private speculators — these attempts to regulate land sales were 
embodied in the Proclamation of 1763. After secession, the new American state was much 
more aggressive in its land policy. This represented continuity in the sense that land 
purchases were concentrated in the hands of the state, but also discontinuity without the 
restraint imposed by the colonial government. The new American government was made up 
of landowners. Land speculators and frontier settlers had greater political power.  
The colonial wars had not been wars of conquest designed to take indigenous land, 
but after winning, colonial governments often took the land as compensation, and this 
continued in the Revolution. Before long, however, the conquest of land became a main 
reason for fighting. This way of thinking meant that the 1783 Treaty of Paris, which 
formally ended the revolution, was understood by the American government to remove all 
indigenous property rights. The treaty recognized the borders of the new American state. 
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Before the war, it would have been assumed that this entitled the United States to exercise 
sovereignty over this area, but not claim it as property. But after the war, Americans saw 
the treaty as entitling them to all the land within the state boundaries. They considered the 
Indians the defeated (See Banner 2007:122-123). In the 1780s land was confiscated through 
the  imposition  of  treaties.  The  treaty  of  Fort  Stanwix  established  an  “example  of  a  mundane  
frontier practice — namely, a purchase from an indigenous people that lacked approval 
from  all  interested  parties”  (Weaver  159). 
In 1792 Jefferson, now secretary of state, outlined in a letter to a British government 
official   his   understanding   of   the   American   right   to   native   land:   “we   consider it as 
established by the usage of different nations into a kind of jus gentium for America, that a 
white nation settling down and declaring that such and such are their limits, makes an 
invasion of those limits by any other white nation an act of war, but gives no right of soil 
against the native possessors.” Jefferson, who had once used the argument against the 
feudal right of conquest so influentially vis-à-vis the English Crown, had now reversed his 
position. And Jefferson was clear: Aboriginal people who resisted this use of the law as a 
tool  of   acquisition  would  have   to  be   “exterminated.”   (in Lipscomb and Bergh, eds.1903-
04:467).  
The new American state adopted the British interpretation of empire as 
fundamentally territorial. Britain assumed that military victory over European rivals 
entitled it to territory previously occupied by those rivals. This logic of empire — the 
notion that the dominant power was entitled to the right of land transfer — caused a lot of 
tension with First Nations, who were already upset about shady land dealings. (As we have 
seen, these tensions were only partly and temporarily mitigated by the imposition of the 
dividing line set out in the Proclamation of 1763.) Moreover, Britain also assumed that the 
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Iroquois League was also a territorial empire. Understanding this issue requires us to revisit 
the Covenant Chain, the important confederation between English colonies and indigenous 
nations that held from 1677 until the French-English conflicts that broke out in the 1750s. 
The Chain, which organized trade and military alliances, was fluid in the sense that the 
specific indigenous nations participating, along with their internal power balance, shifted 
constantly. Throughout the life of the Chain, the Iroquois represented other nations to the 
British colonial governors (Jennings 1984; Taylor 2001). Their role as intermediaries gave 
the   Iroquois   a   powerful   position,   but   “Iroquois   hegemony   was   not   based on territorial 
domination”  (Jones  1982:19). However, by the mid-eighteenth century, the influence of the 
core territorial assumptions of the modern state form had come to encompass much of 
North America, including the Covenant Chain. The Iroquois adopted to some extent British 
assumptions about territorial control. The British held that any First Nations represented by 
the Iroquois consequently became their dependents, and thus, in keeping with the territorial 
logic of empire, that the Iroquois thus had the right to sell land that was occupied where 
these nations lived. In several cases, the Iroquois did just this, selling to the British land 
occupied by Shawnee and Delaware peoples (Jones 1982).  
This return to a feudal-imperial mode of thought partially and temporarily reversed 
the separation between property and sovereignty: the new American state claimed 
sovereignty over a territory and also assumed it could claim the land. This should not be too 
surprising, since at first the American government resembled a feudal state: it was a 
government made up of property owners. Many American officials were investors and 
speculators. In this period there were no business corporations to absorb investment. 
Frontier (indigenous) land was the logical place for speculative investments. And the 
landowners were running the show. This evidence complicates the claim that the US never 
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knew pre-liberal values or class structures and thus did not have to overcome them. 
Canonically, for example, Louis Hartz (1955) attributes the easy dominance of a classical 
liberal   ideology   in   the  US   to   the   country’s   lack   of   a   feudal   past.   So   it   is   not   accurate   to  
claim the US was exceptional because it was not immaculately conceived as a non-feudal 
state. A more convincing account can be found in Wood (1995). She argues that in the US, 
the link between property and social elites was broken early. While the federalists had 
wanted to create an American landed aristocracy, they were too late: property had already 
been   “disembedded,”   and   the   immediate-post-revolutionary context meant that the 
population was already politically active, so rejecting the notion of democracy was 
impossible.  Therefore,   they  designed  a  system  that  both  “embodied  and  curtailed  popular  
power”;;   a   representative   democracy in which an exclusive and active citizenry was 
replaced by an inclusive and passive one (Wood 1995: 215). 
 
The State Regains Control of Purchasing Land 
To  build  on  Wood’s  analysis,  it  was  specifically  the  dispute  over  control  of frontier 
land that was one of the most divisive issues facing the Founders as they constructed the 
political basis of the United States. This was in fact an inter-colony dispute, which pitted 
“landed”  against  “landless”  colonies.  (In  this  way  it  echoed  the debates about the morality 
of colonialism carried out between rival European powers in the so-called Age of 
Discovery.)   Virginia,   for   example,   was   a   “landed”   colony:   as   the   result   of   its   original  
colonial charter, it had (vague) rights to frontier land currently occupied by indigenous 
nations. This gave its speculators an apparent legal advantage in acquiring property on the 
colonial frontier (Williams, 1990). Having charter claims to western land also helped 
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loosen a financial bind: unable to issue its troops cash during the War of Independence, 
Virginia was one of the colonies that paid such debts with warrants for land in Indian 
country, redeemable if and when victory had been realized (Churchill, 1997:209, f.n.). 
In   contrast,   speculators   from   “landless”   colonies,  whose   colonial   charters   did   not  
grant them any claim on western land, fanned out aggressively along the frontier, 
purchasing land directly from its Aboriginal occupants without legal sanction provided by 
the  British  Crown  or  the  “landed”  colonies that held charter claims to the land. The dispute 
produced competing discourses that drew upon two different traditions of European 
political thought: the accumulative logic of the feudal state, and the Lockean-derived theory 
associated with the modern state as it emerged out of England. Representatives of the 
landless states, whose speculators stood to gain the most if the state granted indigenous 
rights to sell land directly, argued that First Nations did naturally have that right. Founders 
from the   landed   states,   in   contrast,   invoked   the   ancient   notion   that   the   “savages”   had   no  
claim to their land, and thus could not legally sell it (Williams, 1990:233-239). It is 
interesting  to  note  that  this  American  debate  undid  the  theoretical  “solution”  reached by the 
European powers on the problem of how to justify the dispossession of indigenous land 
under the law of nations. That solution had denied indigenous nations the prerogatives 
possessed by the European colonial powers, not on the grounds that they were  “savages,”  
but   rather   that   they   were   “uncivilized”   because   they   did   not   convert   land   to   property  
through the addition of labour. This, in other words, represented a combination of feudal 
and Lockean ideas, a combination that the inter-colony dispute over control of frontier land 
effectively disaggregated.  
The solution agreed to by the founders was a political one: the colonies all agreed 
that the federal government would have exclusive jurisdiction over indigenous land — 
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which it would claim by purchase or dispossession.51 This   “solution”  — federalism — 
contributed greatly to indigenous land rights. State governments did not have the right to 
purchase land — that was once again claimed by the federal government in 1787. And they 
could do little to influence the federal government to buy more land or buy it more quickly. 
But the states were feeling the pressure to give land to settlers (in part to pay soldiers). So 
they just gave away indigenous land to settlers without buying it first. Over time this 
became standard practice and the states came to believe it was a perfectly legitimate 
practice.   
The Revolutionary period had been a temporary exception (in some ways) from the 
trend of the state assuming direct control over land. But with the Trade and Intercourse 
Acts the federal government took for itself the same power the Crown had claimed with the 
Proclamation of 1763. The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, first passed by the US 
Congress in the 1790s, prohibited American citizens from trading with Aboriginal peoples 
without a licence from the federal government, and hunting and trapping on indigenous 
land (Wilmer 1993:74). The act was renewed every two years until 1802, when a 
permanent one was passed. As the legislation evolved through its biennial iterations, it 
steadily embodied the core tenets of what would become federal Indian policy (Prucha, 
1995:31).  
There was a particular spatial element to this. The Trade and Intercourse Acts 
                                                 
51 Holton (2007) argues that the US Constitution itself was an attempt by the framers to centralize power 
within the federal government at the expense of state governments, because the latter  were  “too  democratic”  
— i.e., responsive to citizens, and in particular to farmers. In the wake of the Revolutionary War, state 
governments had sided with farmers rather than their creditors, passing laws that allowed debts to be repaid 
with various  forms  of  property  rather  than  “hard  money”  (gold);;  state  governments  also  funded  the  war  partly  
by printing paper money, creating high inflation. Centralizing power in the federal government was a personal 
priority for the many framers who were private creditors and/or investors in government securities, and even 
those who were not personally affected believed that limiting the power of the relatively more democratic 
state governments was necessary to attract investment. 
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established, in parallel to trade regulations, a system of government-run trading posts 
(“factories”),  where  Indians  were  to  offer  their  goods,  most  importantly  furs,  for  sale.  The  
factories were closely associated with military outposts; more than 85% of them were built 
next to, or else prompted the construction of, a fort. This arrangement provided protection 
for the factories, as well as enhanced commercial credibility because the forts signalled the 
government imprimatur. They were also used as leverage: indigenous nations were often 
expected to cede territory in exchange for access to the factory (Prucha, 1995).  
Just   as  British  colonists  on   the   frontier   tended   to  “run  ahead”  of   the  British   state,  
claiming land first and then expecting the Crown to provide legal justification after the fact, 
Americans living along the frontier largely disregarded the Trade and Intercourse Act, 
along with most other legal regulations on trade. The permanent act of 1802 explicitly 
prohibited encroachment on indigenous lands, but white intrusions were common. Some of 
these were largely accidental, in areas where land surveys had not yet been carried out — 
the clearly mapped-out territorial boundaries required by nation-state form were at this 
point highly fictional, existing only in theory. But more commonly and more importantly, 
white intrusion into indigenous lands was a direct (and typically violent) challenge to 
indigenous land ownership. The federal government attempted to use the army to guarantee 
indigenous boundaries against intrusion, but such a widespread, persistent problem proved 
far  beyond   the  army’s   capacity   to   address   for   long.  The  only   alternative  possible  way  of  
policing the frontier was through the use of local militias, but these were made up of the 
very settlers who were breaking the law, and so by 1816 the federal government had 
essentially granted disputed territories to the white settlers that claimed them 
(Wallace:1999:211-218). As Prucha writes: 
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Why did the government not take more effective measures to prevent 
encroachment? The answer lies partly in the insufficiency of the forces available 
[for   enforcement]….but   behind   these   failures   was   a   larger   issue.   The   federal  
government was sincerely interested in preventing settlement on Indian lands only 
up to a point, and it readily acquiesced in illegal settlement that had gone so far as to 
be irredeemable. The policy of the United States was based on an assumption that 
white settlement should advance and the Indians withdraw. The federal 
government….meant  to….govern  the  advance  of  the  whites,  not prevent it forever. 
(47) 
 
By the 1790s the main elements of the system for acquiring indigenous land were in place. 
Over the next century or so the central government bought the US parcel by parcel (Banner 
146). (Speculators were not buying indigenous land, they were buying the right to buy it 
after the government had bought it.) This is the modern state writ large: the state establishes 
sovereignty;;   it   establishes   a   rule   of   law   for   private   property;;   the   land   within   the   state’s  
sovereign territory can now be purchased; it purchases it.  
 
Treaties 
From  the  sixteenth  century,  treaties  were  “the  basis  for  defining  both  the  legal  and  
political relationships between the Indians and the European colonists”   (Deloria,   Jr.   and  
Lytle, 1983:3). But they were not primarily about transferring land. After the American 
Revolution, this changed. Now land was transferred between sovereigns. In 1778, two years 
after secession, the US government entered into its first treaty with an indigenous nation on 
the same territory, in this case the Delaware. Over the next century, more than six hundred 
treaties and similar formal agreements were made with North American First Nations, of 
which approximately four hundred were made between the US government and the peoples 
indigenous to the area now known as the contiguous states (Charles J. Kappler, Indian 
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Affairs: Laws and Treaties, online at http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler/; Deloria Jr. 
and Lytle, 1983:4).52  
Treaties with First Nations pose a theoretical challenge for the IR scholar. They are 
by legal convention agreements between sovereign nations — and so they should be a 
matter of sovereignty. But in this case they were really about the transfer of property. (On 
treaties see Deloria and Lytle 1984 7ff.) In general, the purpose of the treaties was to secure 
an orderly legal transfer of land ownership from indigenous nations to the United States; in 
the act of which, the US acknowledged that those nations already owned it. For the 
Aboriginal nations, these treaties were entered into on the understanding that they would 
secure permanent borders to their national territories, and in turn guarantee the continuation 
of their self-governance, trade and military alliances, and other trappings of sovereign 
nations (Churchill, 1996: 516). In these ways, treaties were perhaps the most important 
signifiers  of  indigenous  nations’  de  facto  foreign-nation status. 
Once again, we must not view the issue at hand purely as a matter of formal 
sovereignty.  While   the   nascent  US   government’s   stance toward treating with indigenous 
nations met the formal requirements for relations between sovereign nations, it should be 
clarified that that was not the spirit with which it approached the treaty process. Treaties 
simply offered the most efficient way to gain control of indigenous land, especially since 
the US had just emerged from a war with Britain, and it likely did not have sufficient 
military or financial resources to win a large-scaled sustained fight against many 
indigenous nations. George Washington, according to a plan he wrote and submitted to 
Congress in 1782 that was intended to solve immediate problems and also provide future 
                                                 
52 These figures are by necessity imprecise in that the territorial borders of indigenous nations in some cases 
crossed and overlapped the borders with what would become Canada and Mexico. 
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direction  for  Indian  policy,  saw  treaties  with  indigenous  nations  as  the  best  way  to  “induce  
them to relinquish our   territories   and   remove   to   the   illimitable   regions   of   the  West,”   for  
“there  is  nothing  to  be  obtained  by  an  Indian  war  but  the  soil  they  live  on  and  this  can  be  
obtained by purchase at less expense”   (Quoted   in   Eckert,   1995:440-441). Washington’s  
plan was impressive in its strategic clarity and audacity (not to say legality): 
Since the expense of a major war could not be shouldered by the young and 
still newly shaping United States government, he recommended that all 
efforts be made to implant as many new settlers as possible on Indian lands. 
In order to do this, his plan went on, grants of land should be made to 
veterans of the Revolutionary War from such parcels in Indian territory as 
the  Virginia  Military  Lands  and  the  Western  Reserve  Lands….He  then  very 
meticulously laid out for Congress a blueprint of negotiations for such lands. 
First, government agents should point out to the Indians that as allies of the 
British, they had become conquered when the British surrendered and, as a 
conquered people, they had no land rights or rights of any kind and therefore 
could not make demands; yet that the United States, in its generosity, would, 
if the Indians gave up their alleged claims, pay them a certain amount and 
also provide them with new lands of their very own farther to the west. 
(Eckert, 1995:440) 
 
The international context provided another reason why the young United States felt 
substantial pressure to treat with indigenous nations. By staging a decolonization struggle 
against Britain, the US had by definition violated the central tenet of colonialism. It was 
thus an outlier, even a pariah, in the expanding system of inter-state relations. Wanting to 
establish   its   international   legitimacy,   the   US   government   “adopted   the   most   acceptable  
posture toward the Indians possible with the hope that by demonstrating their ability to act 
in traditional political terms they could allay the fears of other nations”  (Deloria  in  Wunder,  
1999:23).  
Prucha   (1996:21),   while   acknowledging   that   the   US   government’s   habit   of  
“treat[ing] with Indian tribes with legal procedures similar to those used with foreign 
nations   [was]   a   practice   that   acknowledged   some   kind   of   autonomous   nationhood,”  
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cautions against seeing these treaties as exactly equivalent to treaties reached with foreign 
nation-states. Still, the strategy of gaining land cessions from indigenous nations through 
treaties (and the attendant international diplomatic recognition) caused the significant legal 
problem that, as we have seen, treaties with indigenous nations seemed to be an 
acknowledgement that they were the rightful owners of most US territory. As Attorney 
General (from 1817-1829) William Wirt expressed the problem: 
So long as a tribe exists and remains in possession of its lands, its title and 
possession are sovereign and exclusive. We treat with them as separate 
sovereignties, and while an Indian nation continues to exist within its 
acknowledged limits, we have no more right to enter upon their territory than 
we have to enter upon the territory of a foreign prince. (Quoted in Churchill, 
2003:7) 
 
The de facto solution to this problem came from settlers and governments who chose to 
ignore inconvenient legal implications; by the 1790s US government was purchasing land 
again, but unscrupulously. The de jure solution would be reached in the 1820s and 1830s at 
the Supreme Court. 
 
The Marshall Doctrine: Johnson v. McIntosh 
In the 1790s it was assumed by everyone that any land that had not been bought 
from first nations belonged to them. By the 1820s that had changed completely: 
unpurchased indigenous land was thought to belong to the government. The legal and 
political changes that occurred over this three-decade  period  constituted  a  watershed:  “Like  
many transformations in legal thought, this one was so complete that contemporaries often 
failed to notice that it had occurred. They came to believe instead that they were simply 
following the rule laid down by their English colonial predecessors, and that the Indians 
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had never been accorded full ownership of their land”   (Banner   2007:150). How do we 
explain this change? 
Lefebvre (2009:275) observes that the modern state uses various methods for 
controlling   territory,  “the  best  known  of  which   is   ‘expropriation.’”  Such  methods  express  
the   state’s   “eminent”   right   to   a   space. The nation state manages the space to which it is 
attached,  dominating  and  profiting  from  this  space,  “almost  in  the  way  [the  term  eminent]  
meant under the ancien régime, whereby the written rights and powers of the nobles and the 
kings were superimposed   on   the   common   rights   of   the   peasants,   ‘commoners.’”   The  
American  government’s  “eminent”  sovereignty  over  the  land  was  formally  affirmed  in  the  
Johnson case. In 1823, in the case of Johnson v. McIntosh, the US Supreme Court was 
called upon to rule on the question of whether or not private American citizens could 
purchase indigenous land directly. Johnson in effect upheld in law the political compromise 
reached four decades earlier, in the revolutionary period (Williams, 1992:231). That 
compromise was to grant the federal government full authority over the allocation of 
indigenous territory. This arrangement was based on essentially the same medieval 
argument made by the Spanish encomenderos three centuries earlier — that indigenous 
people were less than human and thus not entitled to protection under natural law.  
Once Britain had recognized US independence, Virginia and the other formerly 
“landed”   colonies  — they were now states of the union — appealed to the Continental 
Congress  and,  in  a  legal  “shell  game,”  received  federal  grants  of  the  very  same  land  west of 
the 1763 Royal Proclamation line that they had claimed before the war. Those postwar 
grants, however, were based on the incorrect assumption that Britain had owned those 
western lands, which as a consequence made them now US territory. In fact, as we saw in 
the last chapter, the Royal Proclamation entitled the British Crown the exclusive right to 
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purchase those lands from their indigenous inhabitants. It did not grant the Crown 
ownership, which in turn meant that the US government did not own them and could not 
grant them to states (Horsman as in Churchill, 1997:209-210fn). This decision formally 
amended domestic law to resolve the contradiction created by the fact that the country had 
been founded on territory that the law of nations apparently recognized as the rightful 
property   of   the   indigenous   peoples  who   had   occupied   it.   It   was   based   on   a   “medievally  
grounded discourse”  (Williams,  1992:325).  
Simply put, the court acknowledged that the land was and had always been 
occupied by indigenous nations, but ruled that European discovery provided title for the 
land, and that this title was recognized by the other European countries. In other words, the 
court  “solved”   the  problem  of  how  to   justify the dispossession of sovereign nations from 
their land by denying that they were, in fact, sovereign nations. It returned to what we 
might  call  the  “original”  logic  of  European  colonialism  by  framing  the  question  in  terms  of  
an inter-imperial dispute over land. Since England had claimed territories that now made up 
the United States, and since that claim was recognized (or at least no longer actively 
disputed)  by  England’s  rivals,  it  was,  therefore,  an  English  possession.  (A  possession  that  
England lost in 1776.) Writing for the unanimous court, Chief Justice John Marshall — 
who had himself received 10,000 acres of indigenous land for his contribution to the 
revolution (Baker, 1976:80) — argued that Christian European nations had assumed 
“ultimate dominion” over the lands of America and that as a result of “discovery” 
Indigenous Peoples had lost “their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations,” 
and only retained a right of “occupancy“  in their lands. In other words, Indian nations were 
subject to the ultimate authority of the first nation of Christendom to claim possession of a 
given region of Indian lands (Johansen 1998:574). Indigenous rights, the court ruled, were 
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not  denied  but  merely  “impaired”  by  European  assertions;; indigenous nations were entitled 
to continue to occupy their land, but they did not own it as property. The ruling contradicted 
the recognition of indigenous national sovereignty implied by the many treaties that had 
been signed with them, first by the British Crown and then the US government. Moreover, 
it contradicted the United States’  own  constitution  (specifically  Article  1,  Section  8,  Clause  
3):   “The  Congress   shall   have   the  power…to   regulate  commerce  with   foreign  nations,   the  
several states, and with the Indian tribes”   (www.usconstitution.net). All of this was 
accomplished by legally reclassifying  indigenous  nations  as  “semi-sovereign”  (Deloria,  Jr.  
and Lytle, 1983:4). The Marshall court followed up the Johnson decision with other 
important rulings on indigenous rights the early 1830s, in the two Cherokee decisions and 
Worcester v. Georgia. These rulings developed the same logic that underpinned Johnson: 
what  Slattery   characterizes   as   the   “doctrine  of   legal   symbiosis,”  which can be contrasted 
with   the   “doctrine   of   a   legal   vacuum.”   The   latter   held   that   indigenous   people   were  
uncivilized and less than fully human, and consequently when Europeans arrived they were 
able   to   assert   rights   over   the   land  as   if   it  were   empty.  The   “doctrine  of   legal   symbiosis”  
developed by Marshall sets out four historical phases.  
In the first phase, the Indigenous peoples of what is now North America were 
independent nations holding sovereignty over an exclusive territory. In the second phase, 
the great powers of Europe established a mutually agreed-upon principle to regulate the 
right of acquisition of new territory. This principle was essentially the right of discovery: 
discovery of a country gave imperfect title against the other European states. Title could be 
consolidated,  or   “perfected”   in   the   legal   jargon,   by   actual  possession  of   the   territory   that  
had been discovered. Because this was an agreement between European states, it did not 
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mandate how relations with indigenous nations should take place.  Consequently, the form 
such relationships took often varied a good deal across European states.  
In the third phase, one of these variations in particular rose to prominence as the 
English Crown began issuing charters conferring title to land of which the English had not 
yet taken possession. The charters gave exclusive right of ownership to one British subject, 
a right that could be enforced in British courts against other British subjects. But, as 
Marshall writes: 
The extravagant and absurd idea that the feeble settlements made on the sea-
coast, or the companies under whom they were made, acquired legitimate 
power by them to govern the people, or occupy the lands from sea to sea, did 
not enter the mind of any man. They were well understood to convey the title 
which, according to the common law of European sovereigns respecting 
America, they might rightfully convey, and no more. This was the exclusive 
right of purchasing such lands as the Natives were willing to sell. (1832; for 
commentary see, inter alia, Slattery 2005:53) 
 
The third stage took place in a context of the most intense inter-imperial conflicts 
for territory and trading routes, and Aboriginal nations were drawn into these conflicts 
because they were viewed as potential powerful allies. Marshall characterized these 
relations as equivalent to those among sovereign powers under international law.  
In the fourth stage, as set out by Marshall, the Crown began to establish ever-
increasing control over First Nations, through treaties and other mechanisms. It was 
through  this  process  that  First  Nations  took  on  the  status  of  “dependent  domestic  nations,”  
that   is   to  say,  “distinct,   independent  political  communities,   retaining   their  original  natural  
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the   soil   from   time   immemorial….[Yet]   so  
completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that any attempt to 
acquire their lands, or to form a political connection with them, would be considered by all 
as an invasion of our territory, and  an  act  of  hostility.”  The   transition   to   this   fourth  stage  
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marked  the  “conversion  of  a  right  of  discovery  into  a  right  of  conquest,”  or  to  put  it  another  
way,  “the  transformation  of  a  merely  dormant  right  into  a  right  of  fact.”  In  this  final  stage,  
Aboriginal land rights were formally recognized; First Nations were understood to have the 
legal and just right to own their land and use it as they wished. However, the right to sell 
that  land  was  limited  to  a  “right  of  alienation  to  the  Crown”  (Slattery  2005:53). Slattery’s  
account  of  Marshall’s  doctrine  emphasizes   its  evolutionary   character,   revealing   it   to  be  a  
relatively complex version of the doctrine of a legal vacuum. If we replace the more 
unadorned  account  of  the  Marshall  doctrine  with  Slattery’s  version, that does not contradict 
the core claims of my argument.  
 
Culture and Civilization:  The  “Myth  of  America” 
Justifying the logic embodied in the Marshall decision entailed portraying Indians 
as nomadic, and this was a cultural phenomenon. In the early nineteenth century Americans 
came to think of Aboriginal people as nomadic hunters. The American policies that allowed 
the  state  to  claim  and  privatize  indigenous  peoples’  land  had  a  parallel  in  the  form  of  a  
policy  track  designed  to  “civilize”  or  “Americanize”  them,  a  policy  first  expressed  
legislatively  in  the  Civilization  Fund  Act  of  1819.  Assimilation  reveals  how  Lefebvre’s  
schema of homogenization, fragmentation, and hierarchization worked at the cultural level.  
Recall that the European colonial powers employed a cultural process to reclassify 
indigenous peoples as uncivilized, according to a Lockean formulation in which land 
becomes property through the addition of labour. Applying labour to the land — or in other 
words,  “improving”  it  — was the standard that a people had to meet if they were to be 
considered civilized, or cultured. The Jeffersonian position, which, by the time of the first 
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Federalist governments, had become dominant (Wallace, 1999) was that indigenous people, 
like all other human beings, carried within them the potential to become civilized, but 
realizing that status required them to give up a subsistence economy on communally held 
land for an agrarian system based on private property (Prucha, 1996). It might be possible 
to take from this the idea that Aboriginal societies in North America before European 
contact were made up of nomadic hunter-gatherers who had not yet evolved to the point of 
learning agriculture. As we have seen, this was not the case: archeological evidence shows 
they had been farming for over 7,000 years. At the time of contact, they had developed a 
complex agriculture based on corn, beans, and squash, supplemented with other crops 
including cotton. Techniques such as soil rotation and cultivation through selective 
breeding in order to meet specific geographic requirements were common (Hurt, 1987; 
Nabhan, 1989).  
It was not an agricultural question per se but rather a commitment to private 
property that explains how Jefferson was able to ignore already-extensive indigenous 
agricultural  practices,  as  when  he  told  a  delegation:  “Let  me  entreat  you   therefore,  on  the  
lands now given you to begin to give every man a farm, let him enclose it, cultivate it, build 
a warm house on it, and when he dies let it belong to his wife and children after him”  
(Quoted in Horsman, 1981:108). In other words, the real problem was not that Indians did 
not farm, it was that they held land communally, and so their labour did not qualify as 
“cultivation”   or   “improvement”   because   it   did   transform   land   into   “equivalent,  
exchangeable”  property.  Similarly,  there  was  no  contradiction  between  helping  indigenous  
people and steadily reducing their land holdings: these were two sides of the same policy 
coin, justified with reference to free enterprise and natural law. And the same policies of 
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land privatization allowed speculators to acquire great tracts of land, a coincidence that 
helps explain their strong stated interest in indigenous welfare.  
In general terms the European equation of culture and civilization, progress and 
improvement, were replicated in the American context, providing the cultural basis for the 
“myth  of  America.”  As  Slotkin   (2000)  shows,  however,   a   set  of   related   ideas  and  stories  
such as these does not make the transition from Enlightenment Europe to embryonic USA 
without undergoing some changes. What were those changes?  
The majority of the American population before 1800 were European by 
ancestry, by language, and by religious and literary heritage. The only non-
European   native   cultures   were   those   of   the   Indians….Since   the   Indian   is,  
from our point of view, the only one who can claim to be indigenously 
American, it seems important to question whether our national experience 
has   “Americanized”   or   “Indianized”   us,   or   whether   we   are   simply   an  
idiosyncratic offshoot of English civilization. (Slotkin, 2000:6) 
 
Slotkin describes how traditional, romantic European myths — drawn from classical, 
medieval and Renaissance romances, as well as political and religious ideas from the 
Reformation — were adapted to the new context, to reflect the anxieties of the colonists, 
whose social and psychological experiences were shaped by factors including the 
confrontation with a vast, rich, and yet untamed nature, and with profoundly foreign 
natives; emigrants wrote not for themselves, but also for a European audience, whom they 
had  to  try  to  sell  “either  actual  land  or  the  idea  of  a  colony”  (18;;  also  see  Drinnon,  1990  for  
additional examples and commentary). What Slotkin calls the American myth (articulated 
through a number of literary forms that came together to express a coherent story) 
fundamentally concerned an isolated settler attempting to claim the land by civilizing both 
the harsh wilderness and the hostile natives.  
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The most symbolically significant narrative in the colonial experience was the story 
of the Indian wars; the archetypal figures in these narratives included the Indian hunter and 
captive needing to be rescued. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, however, the main 
mythical figure had evolved. Instead of the heroic Indian destroyer (or converter), a figure 
that   reflected   the   colonists’   early   experiences,   these   subsequent   stories   featured  mythical  
heroes who tamed the land: the yeoman farmer, the surveyor, the naturalist. These figures 
mediated between the natural, or savage, world, and European civilization. In some ways 
they   had   “gone   Indian,”   or   become   a   part   of   the   now-beloved American wilderness, yet 
they were resolutely civilized. Thus the archetypal figure in the period leading up to 
secession  was   “the   lover   of   the   spirit   of   the  wilderness,   and   his   acts   of   love   and   sacred  
affirmation are acts of violence against that spirit and her avatars”   (Slotkin,   2000:22). 
These jobs were held in high regard at   the   time.  For  example,  “to   survey   land  was   to  do  
more than measure it, mark it, and describe it; it was also to read its potential”   (Weaver  
2006:100). George Washington, before becoming commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary 
Army and the first president of the US, was a surveyor, trained at the age of 16 on 
surveying missions on behalf of Lord Fairfax (Ferling 1989). Indeed, when Washington 
became president he   “had   been   feathering   his   own   personal   nest   with   Indian   lands ever 
since   his   family   first   became   involved   with   the   Ohio   Land   Company   in   1748,”   in   the  
process reputedly becoming the wealthiest man in America (Eckert 1995:440).  
In the eighteenth century white attitudes toward indigenous people underwent 
changes. These changes reflected general Enlightenment optimism about human nature, as 
well as the reality that the American frontier had moved westward, with the result that 
many Americans now had very little direct contact with indigenous people, and so began to 
appreciate them from a distance as an exotic curiosity (Horsman, 1981:104). The romantic 
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notion  of  the  “noble  savage,”  found  in  the  works  of  writers  such  as  James  Fenimore  Cooper  
and Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, raised further complications. As Drinnon (1990:123) 
notes,  for  “writers  dedicated  to  the  creation  of  a  national  literature,  the  critical  vehicle  for  a  
national  mythology,”  the  central  question  was  this:  “Did  real  people  lurk  in  the  woods  just  
beyond the line of white settlement? If the answer was yes, then how could one maintain 
the  dream  of  American  innocence  versus  European  evil?”  This  was  a  cultural  articulation  of  
the same problem we have seen addressed through political-theoretical debates: are 
stateless indigenous people really human, and therefore entitled to protection under the 
natural-law-derived  law  of  nations?  As  we  have  seen,  Jefferson  and  others  upheld  Locke’s  
notion of natural law, which holds that individuals carry within themselves at least the 
latent entitlement to claim land, an entitlement that is only actualized when they become 
“civilized”  by   farming,   embracing   commerce,   establishing   the   rule  of   law,   and  accepting  
Christianity. This was a core European argument made to justify the colonization of North 
America.  
In the American context, it was modified somewhat. From their perspective, 
colonists   began   to   see   the   Indian   as   “natural   man.”   Conceptually,   then,   the   distinction  
between the cultivation, or improvement, of the land, and the improvement of its 
indigenous inhabitants, was blurred. Indeed, Slotkin recounts an argument developed by 
Cadwallader Colden, a physician, farmer, and surveyor who was the first colonial 
representative to the Iroquois Confederacy. Colden portrayed the Iroquois Confederacy as 
follows:  “The  Five Nations are a poor Barbarous People, under the darkest Ignorance, and 
yet  a  bright  and  noble  Genius  shines  thro’  these  black  Clouds.  None  of  the  greatest  Roman  
Hero’s  have  discovered  a  greater  Love  to  their  Country….The  Five  Nations  (as  the  Name  
denotes) consist  of  so  many  Tribes  or  Nations  joyn’d  together  by  a  League  or  Confederacy,  
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like the United Provinces, without any Superiority of any one over the other”   (Quoted   in  
Slotkin, 2000:199-200, italics in original). Colden’s   missive   is   based   upon   the   Lockean 
notion that the individual in the state of nature was free from any political restrictions, and 
chose to enter into a social contract with others for their mutual protection. In other words, 
the decision to sacrifice some freedom is justified only by being a response to the hostile 
natural world (Pangle, 1990:244-260). If this argument is followed to its conclusion, 
indigenous government may actually be the best form of government, since it is the purest, 
arising as it does most directly from contact with nature. It is an example of nature 
genuinely   improved,   before   such   improvements   go   too   far.   Since   Locke’s   theory  
underpinned   that   era’s   most   significant   changes   in   English   politics,   Colden’s   favourable 
assessment of the Iroquois Confederacy measured against a Lockean index is very 
significant, not least because it anticipates the national consciousness that would soon 
emerge in the colonies (Slotkin, 1990:200). 
Arneil  (1996)  show  how  the  American  government’s  Aboriginal  policies  in  the  late  
eighteenth   and   early   nineteenth   centuries   were   heavily   influenced   by   Locke’s   theory   of  
property  as   regards   indigenous  people.  Locke’s  belief   in   the  natural   right   to  property  and  
the theory that agrarian labour is what transforms waste land into property were adopted by 
a number of prominent religious and political thinkers (in addition to Vattel) to justify the 
views on Aboriginal people. The Two Treatises were used to refute the notion that 
indigenous nations help the right to their land because they were self-governing nations; 
when the same ideas were incorporated directly into American government policy, 
indigenous nations were no longer treated as foreign nations, and instead became officially 
seen  as  primitive  communities  populated  by  “natural  man.”  The move from natural state to 
civil society in Europe marked the fundamental betterment of humanity, and the 
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replacement   of   stateless   indigenous   nations   and   their   “primitive”   traditional   way   of   life  
with a European-style market society would signify similar progress in America (Arneil, 
1996:168-200).  
The influence of Lockeanism on early-American political thought has been noted by 
a number of authors (See, inter alia, Pangle, 1990, Arneil, 1996). Thomas Jefferson was 
perhaps the most important and tenacious American advocate of the Lockean-civilization 
position, which he ultimately articulated through his Indian policy. Essentially, Jefferson 
wanted to allow indigenous people to remain on their land east of the Mississippi river, on 
the condition that they become   “civilized”   (cf. Wallace, 1999). This is the origin of the 
designation   “Five   Civilized   Tribes,”   which   refers   to   the   five   nations   indigenous   to   the  
southeastern United States who were seen to have adapted successfully to European 
cultural norms. US policies based on the idea that indigenous people themselves would be 
improved through an embrace of property rights rehearsed some of the key elements of 
modern liberal internationalism in the twentieth century (Weaver 2006: 28), as we will see 
in the next chapter. 
 
The  Transition  from  “Greek”  to  “Roman”  Colonialism 
For Europeans, the intellectual legacy of expansion to the Americas — the   “first  
European  empires”  — was ambivalent. By the turn of the nineteenth century, Britain had 
lost the east-coast colonies that made up the United States in the War of Independence. This 
setback did not fundamentally disrupt its imperial expansion. But it generated a 
contradictory  response.  On  the  one  hand  it  was  “entirely  in  the  Lockean  spirit  — resistance 
to state encroachment, self-regulation under the law, and bourgeois control of 
parliamentary institutions, private property, and free enterprise (van der Pijl 2006:10). But 
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it now appeared that any settler community, given enough time and resources, would 
eventually demand political autonomy. While India remained far and away the most 
valuable British possession, settler-occupied territories, such as the lands that would 
become Canada and Australia, were becoming more prosperous, and the example set by the 
restive settlers in the US in 1776 focused British attention on avoiding similar such losses 
in the future (Evans, Grimshaw et al, 2003:20).  
More generally, European political theorists were attempting to come to terms with 
the widely held sentiment that the approach to colonization in the Americas — large-scale, 
direct overseas settlement, heavily reliant upon forced native and slave labour, and which 
they attempted to control from the European imperial centre — was unsustainable. This 
does not in any way mean that the European powers had soured on colonial expansion — 
indeed, it was at this same historical moment that the scramble for Indian and Africa began. 
The difference now was that they would no longer approach colonialism as a process of 
settlement,  bur  rather  of  a  purer  but  less  direct  form  of  exploitation:  in  “Greek”  rather  than  
“Roman”   terms (Pagden, 1995:6;127). As   Charles   Maurice   de   Talleyrand,   Napoleon’s  
foreign minister, observed, informal empires established by an essentially commercial 
society such as Britain stood a greater chance of success by avoiding conquest and then 
sustained direct imperial rule. As the British experience in India seemed to suggest, a 
relationship in which the colonized peoples were wards rather than the subjects of direct 
rule was much cheaper to establish and maintain, and less likely to experience political 
unrest. For similar reasons, it was desirable to exploit a large, paid native labour force 
rather than an enslaved one (cited in Pagden 1995:6-7). 
By the eighteenth century, a particular understanding of the British Empire would 
become established and widely embraced: in sum, the British Empire distinguished itself 
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from its predecessors and its rivals by being Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free 
(Armitage 2000:8). Legal and political theorists had to attempt to craft justifications for and 
reconcile the inherently contradictory goals of liberty and empire. The early British Empire 
embodied   “Roman”-style imperialism, with its reliance upon territorial acquisition and 
direct control. Accordingly, early-modern British thought drew extensively upon classical 
(and in particular Roman) traditions, traditions that saw libertas and imperium as 
fundamentally incompatible values. Classical and contemporary British thought alike held 
that freedom produced republican forms of governance (Armitage 2000:11;125-126).  
British   “freedom”  was  understood  as  being  expressed   through   institutions   such  as  
Parliament and property rights; these were exported throughout the British world. How 
could freedom under the law be reconciled with imperial expansion? This would become 
the fundamental question at stake in debates around the American Revolutionary crisis 
(Taylor   1991).   The   crisis’s culmination in the American Declaration of Independence in 
1776, and the Peace of Paris, in which Britain formally acknowledged US independence, 
together marked the end of the First British Empire and the start of the Second.53 The 
contradiction between empire and liberty took on even greater social influence because 
British elites, from political theorists to colonial officers, received extensive training in 
classical history and the Roman moral tradition, in which this problem was central. The 
tension  between  liberty  and  empire  remained  “one  of  the great legacies of the First British 
Empire to the Second”  (Armitage,  2000:12). 
 
 
                                                 
53 Some historians have problematized   the   clear   historical   distinction   between   the   “First”   and   “Second”  
British Empires. See for example Marshall (1964). 
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6. Removals, Reservations and Allotments 
 
So far I have argued that if we define sovereignty as purely a matter of formal recognition, 
we necessarily exclude any real   consideration   of   property.   This   is   IR’s   version   of   the  
separation of the economic and the political. In the previous chapter, I addressed a puzzle: 
why would colonists have bought land to which they thought they were entitled as a spoil 
of conquest? In other words, was land taken by contract or by conquest? I showed that it is 
impossible to resolve this puzzle if the separation between property and sovereignty is 
maintained. In this chapter I develop a similar argument, applied not to private speculators 
but to the state. From 1828 to early 1840s, the US state forcibly removed most remaining 
indigenous people to land west of the Mississippi. At the same time, this was formally done 
through contracts (treaties). If we view sovereignty in formal terms, the preceding two 
sentences are contradictory, but as we have seen, US government acquisition of Aboriginal 
land was always structured as a series of voluntary transactions. The state normally did 
whatever it took to achieve formal Aboriginal consent, in the form of treaties and so on. But 
such consent soon became purely formal, not meaningful. The process for appropriating 
land continued always included both consent and coercion.  
 
Removals 
In the last chapter we saw how in the Revolutionary period and the first decades of 
the nineteenth century, the US government attempted to reconcile two sharply contrasting 
dynamics. First was the ever-growing white demand for land. In order to open up more 
Aboriginal land for purchase by settlers and speculators, the government first claimed the 
exclusive right to treat with First Nations, and then took whatever measures necessary — 
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including threats, bribery, force, and trickery — to convince First Nations to sign the 
treaties through which they gave up their land. Even  though  the  “underlying  assumption  of  
American Indian policy was that the eastern tribes would continue to relinquish their land at 
approximately   the   same   rate   that  whites   demanded   it,”   there  was   another,   countervailing  
pressure on the government. Many citizens wanted the government to find some sort of 
moral justification for Aboriginal dispossession; these took the form of various efforts to 
“civilize”  Aboriginal  people  so  as  to  assimilate  them  into  dominant  society (Satz 1975:2). 
Several southern First Nations, notably the Cherokees, had very high levels of contact with 
government agents, white missionaries, and private land traders. Ironically, this had the 
opposite effect from what the government had expected.  
By the early nineteenth century, Cherokee agriculture had become highly modern 
and developed. Their use of various forms of intensive agriculture — clearing land to 
produce cotton, owning slaves,54 and raising tens of thousands head of cattle — and their 
connections with the market for agricultural produce meant that their land was very 
productive and much more valuable than the undeveloped land in the west they were being 
offered in exchange (Wishart 1995). The Cherokees began to focus much of their political 
efforts on preserving their landholdings and resisting further encroachment by settlers. The 
political tools of which they could avail themselves were by white standards very advanced. 
By the 1820s the Cherokees had adopted a written language, the syllabary of which was 
introduced by their brilliant leader Sequoyah in 1821. A bilingual (English-Cherokee) 
newspaper, the Cherokee Phoenix, began publication in 1828, and lending libraries and 
schools flourished. Plans for a national academy and museum articulated the view that 
                                                 
54 A census taken in 1835 recorded that approximately 1,600 black slaves were owned in the Cherokee nation 
(Mayers 2007:95). 
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Cherokee culture was distinct and worth preserving as such, but also that the best way to do 
so was through European-style institutions. Traditional forms of spirituality were 
supplemented and even supplanted, to the point that, by 1835, ten percent of the Cherokee 
population professed Protestant versions of Christianity. Traditional, clan-based methods of 
justice and law-enforcement were gradually being replaced by written laws, to be enforced 
by a national police force. In short, the Cherokee elite was becoming culturally and 
economically intertwined with southern white society (Mayers 2007:94-105). Most 
significantly, in 1827, they adopted a written constitution modelled explicitly on the 
American Constitution, and featuring corresponding legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches, declaring the Cherokee nation to be an independent nation with complete 
sovereignty over its current territories (Malone 1956). The federal government had 
recognized Aboriginal sovereignty as part of the process of claiming complete control over 
land appropriation. Now, however, such recognition was having the opposite effect; the 
Cherokee nation announced it would use its sovereignty to end land transfers.  
In the state of Georgia, where much of the Cherokee territory was located, the 
demand for land was acute: the combined white and black population nearly doubled 
between 1790 and 1800, and then doubled again between 1800 and 1820 (Banner 
2007:195). And so, in response to the Cherokee declaration of independence, in 1828 the 
Georgia state legislature passed a law declaring that all Indian residents of Georgia — 
including most of the Cherokee — would come under state jurisdiction within six months 
(Satz 1975). It created a police force, the Georgia Guard, to enforce the new rules — and 
allowed the force to operate in effect as a paramilitary vigilante squad that harassed 
Cherokees and their white (mostly missionary) defenders. Aboriginal people were 
forbidden from testifying against whites in Georgia courts, employing any white man or 
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any slaves owned by whites, mining gold, or cultivating more than 160 acres of land. 
Members of the Cherokee nation who spoke out against removal or advised their 
neighbours not to sell their land could be arrested. It was, as Senator Theodore 
Frelinghuysen — one of the few government officials to oppose removals — wrote,   “a  
whole people outlawed — laws,  customs,  rules,  government,  all…abrogated,  and  declared  
to be void, as if they had never been”  (Quoted  in  Mayers  2007:96). 
The Adams administration  refused  to  comply  with  Georgia’s  legislated  demand  for  
removal, causing other southern states to worry that if the Federal government could 
recognize the sovereignty of indigenous nations within US states, it could also force states 
to abandon slavery and free the slaves. This precipitated a serious constitutional crisis; for 
the first time, Indian land policy took on the status of a national political issue. (Banner 
2007). The Johnson decision was one of a number of cases that hinged on the issue of 
federal sovereignty in the context of intensifying conflict between federal and state 
governments in the US. The forced removals of indigenous nations were expected to 
mitigate these conflicts (Wilmer 1993:75).  
The  federal  government’s  response  was  to revivify an idea that had been considered 
in one form or another by every American president to date: essentially, the plan was to 
trade uninhabited western land for eastern land currently occupied by First Nations.55 It was 
seen as an elegant solution, because western land could be traded for Aboriginal land, 
which would give the sellers a place to go after they had sold their home land. The plan was 
to make such exchanges voluntary. And so, from 1828 to early 1840s, the federal 
                                                 
55 This plan took on special urgency after the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. Before  that  point,  “removal  was  
more a by-product  of  Indian  land  purchases  than  an  articulated  government  policy.”  The  enormous  swath  of  
land acquired through the Louisiana Purchase very quickly came to be seen as valuable currency for 
Aboriginal land transactions.(Banner 2007:193). 
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government forcibly removed most remaining indigenous people to land west of the 
Mississippi. The federal Indian Removal Act of 1830 mandated that individual Indians had 
to respect the law of the state in which they resided. Thus, traditional governance structures 
were no longer granted the same status as they had had earlier, when the federal 
government negotiated directly with First Nations leadership. More significantly, the 
Removal Act allowed the US president to force First Nations to relocate from east of the 
Mississippi to the west. During the Jackson presidency of 1829-1837, the US government 
used the relocation process to exchange 100 million acres of Indian lands east of the 
Mississippi for 30 million acres in the area that in 1834 became formally known as  “Indian  
Country” (Mayers 2007:81).Title to the new territory was to be held by its new occupants 
in perpetuity unless, in the words of the Indian Removal Act, “the  Indians  became  extinct,  
or abandon the same”  (Prucha, ed. 1990:52).  
The laws passed in Georgia invalidating Cherokee law and threatening to seize their 
territory and redistribute it to whites were a prima facie rejection of the entire post-
revolutionary legal precedent. No state government had ever assumed or claimed the 
authority to assert its sovereignty over that of an indigenous nation; after all, the federal 
government had recognized Aboriginal sovereignty in order to take control over land 
appropriation. The new Georgia law ostensibly drew on the recent precedent set out in the 
Marshall decision of 1823 — that   the   “right   of   occupancy”  was   inferior   to   the   “right   of  
discovery”  (Deloria  and  Lytle,  1984:16). Yet  Marshall’s  decisions,  while  somewhat  unclear  
on whether the federal government could actually seize native land, was perfectly clear that 
a state government could not do so. In reality, the Georgia government had little interest in 
directly pursuing such ends. The new legislation was mostly intended to force the 
Cherokees to the bargaining table and hasten their exodus.  
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At its core, the removal of the Cherokees to territory west of the Mississippi 
represented continuity, not change, in Aboriginal policies. First, in employing aggressive 
methods that pushed the legal boundaries, Georgia was continuing a long-standing pattern 
in which local governments, particularly sensitive to the influence of settlers on the frontier, 
acted much more aggressively than did central governments. As we have seen, the 
metropolitan perspective was different from the colonial one: soon after contact the 
imperial government in London was attempting to convince British colonial governments 
to enforce laws respecting Aboriginal land rights (typically with very limited success). In 
the post-revolutionary United States an equivalent relationship existed between federal and 
state governments. The other very important parallel is that, as we have seen, US 
government acquisition of Aboriginal land had always been formally structured as a series 
of voluntary transactions. This explains why the state of Georgia would pass a law that 
unilaterally abrogated Cherokee land rights with the real intention of forcing the Cherokee 
nation to enter into negotiations to give up traditional land — and in the weakest possible 
position. The state normally did whatever it took to achieve Aboriginal consent, in the form 
of treaties. But such consent was purely formal. That there were negotiations should not be 
interpreted as evidence of an equal power relationship. 
 
Cherokee Resistance and the Trust Relationship 
The   federal   government’s   exclusive   right   to   purchase   land   from   and   treat   with  
indigenous nations, enshrined in the US Constitution and confirmed by the Supreme Court, 
also seemed to imply some sort of responsibility. Since the nineteenth century the US 
government considered itself to have a fiduciary or trust relationship with the indigenous 
nations within its territory. This doctrine was first formally addressed by the Marshall 
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Supreme Court in the 1831 case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. This case represented the 
Cherokees’   appeal   to  what  was   really   their   last   hope.  They  had   resisted   removal   using   a  
range of means, almost all of which were clearly aimed at a white audience: they expressed 
their position in the Cherokee Phoenix and wrote letters and opinion pieces for northern 
newspapers; they sent delegations to petition Congress and government officials; and they 
worked with sympathetic missionaries and abolitionists to make their case. 
Finally, they retained William Wirt, former Attorney General of the United States, 
to represent them before the Supreme Court in the case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. In 
it, the Cherokee nation attempted to have the aggressive Georgia laws of the 1820s struck 
down, on the grounds they contravened the Constitution, the treaties signed with First 
Nations, and the Intercourse Acts. The decision, once again written by John Marshall, was 
profoundly significant in that it offered the first extended discussion of the legality of 
Aboriginal sovereignty. In its decision, the court ruled against the Cherokees. Viewing 
indigenous nations as neither foreign states nor American states, the court held that their 
status   in   US   law   was   as   legal   “wards”   of   their   “guardian,”   the   federal   government 
(Johansen 1998:345). Marshall   found   that   “the   tribes…[constituted]   distinct   political  
[communities]….that  may,  more  correctly…be  denominated  domestic  dependent  nations”  
(1831).  
While  “trustee”  status  rests  upon  the  concept  of “trust,”  it  is  important  to  clarify  that  
the trust relationship established in such treaties was based not on the common-sense 
meaning of trust as a condition of honour and obligation, but rather on the legal usage of 
the term. Simply put, this usage refers to a situation in which an individual arranges for 
someone else to hold property on his behalf. The person who holds the property for 
another's benefit is the trustee. The trust relationship as it applies to the US government and 
160  
 
 
indigenous nations does not actually meet the normal legal standard of a fiduciary 
relationship:  
In   the  white  man’s   business   world,   a   “trust”   is   likely   to   be   a   property   of  
great value; the trustee is required to protect the trust property and to turn 
over all the profits of the enterprise to the beneficiaries of the trust. The 
trustee  has  no  control  over  the  beneficiaries’  person.   In  the  Indians’  world,  
he same principles should apply; there is no legal basis for the common view 
that the [US] Indian bureau may deal with Indian trust property as if it were 
the owner thereof, or use such power over lands to control Indian lives and 
thoughts. Unfortunately, administrators often find it convenient to forget 
their   duties,   which   are   lumped   under   the   legal   term   “trusteeship,”   and   to  
concentrate   on   their   powers,   which   go   by   the   name   of   “guardianship.”  
(Cohen 1960:333) 
 
In  other  words,  the  narrow  legal  meaning  of  “trust”  applies  to  the  relationship  between  the  
US government and First Nations only  in  the  abstract.  In  real  policy  terms,  “trusteeship”  is  
with  conflated  with  “guardianship,”  which  is  technically  a  different  condition,  one  in  which  
the state assumes control over the property of an invalid or incompetent person so as to 
protect that person’s  interests (Cohen 1942). It is this latter form of trust relationship that 
arose out of the European colonial project, was formalized in the US, and, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, extended to the international level, forming the basis for the Berlin, 
Brussels, and Algeciras treaties, which made Indigenous peoples the guardians, or wards, of 
the colonial state, an arrangement ostensibly required by their incompetence.  
Aborigines are the members of uncivilized tribes which inhabit a region at 
the time a civilized State extends its sovereignty over the 
region….Aborigines   are   distinguished   from   “colonists,” the latter term 
including   the   citizens   of   civilized   States   who   settle   in   the   region….The  
relations of the aborigines with each other, with the colonists, and with the 
colonizing State are necessarily subject to a special regime established by 
the colonizing State for the purpose of fitting the aborigines for civilization, 
and  opening   the   resources   of   the   land   for   the   civilized  world….Hence   the 
dealings of individual civilized States with aborigines under their respective 
sovereignties are matters of common interest to all nations, and the law and 
practice of nations properly concerns itself with the common and 
international aspects of such national  action…Taking  it  to  be  established  as  
a fundamental principle of the law of nations that aboriginal tribes are the 
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wards of the civilized State, the question of the validity of agreements made 
between civilized States and aboriginal tribes is to be determined by 
principles which would apply in the case of an agreement between guardian 
and ward. (Snow [1919] 1972, quoted in Wilmer 1993:119, 12) 
 
Snow summarizes the view contained in a report prepared for US President James Monroe 
by his special Indian Commissioner: 
The Government, according to the law of nations, having jurisdiction over 
the Indian territory, and the exclusive right to dispose of its soil, the whole 
Indian population is reduced, of necessary consequence, to a dependent 
situation. They are without the privileges of self-government, except in a 
limited   degree,   and  without   any   transferable   property….in   return   for  what  
they virtually yield, they are….entitled  as  “children”  of  the  Government,  for  
we so call them, peculiarly related to it, to  kind  paternal  treatment.”  (Snow  
[1919] 1972, quoted in Wilmer 1993:119-120.) 
 
The   status   of   “domestic   dependent   nation”   deserves   a   bit   more   attention,   in  
particular  the  word  “domestic.”  According  to  Marshall’s  ruling,  once  a  European  nation’s  
occupation of   territory   it   had   “discovered”   in   the   “New   World”   was   established,   the  
original inhabitants of that territory became an exclusively domestic concern, and any 
efforts   by   other   European   nations   to   “form   a   political   connection   with   them   would   be  
considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and as an act of hostility”  (1931). 
A year after the Cherokee Nation v. Georgia opinion, the Cherokees found a new 
case that allowed them to in essence appeal the core of the original ruling. They used the 
case of Samuel Worcester, a white missionary who opposed removals and who had been 
convicted of violating state law by living on Cherokee territory. The decision in this case 
represented a victory for the Cherokee nation. With Marshall again writing for the majority, 
the court rejected the way Georgia had dealt with the Cherokees in their long dispute. In 
this ruling Marshall left no room for doubt: colonial settlement only entitled the English to 
buy  “such  lands  as  the  natives  were  willing  to  sell.”  When  it  came  to  Aboriginal  territory  
that had not been purchased, English and American rights were limited only to the right to 
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keep other imperial powers away. English and US sovereignty over Aboriginal land, 
Marshall ruled, existed only vis-à-vis other non-Aboriginal sovereigns. Citing the many 
treaties with First Nations signed by the federal government as evidence, Marshall 
concluded,   “the   Cherokee   nation….is   a   distinct   community   occupying   its   own   territory,  
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and 
which  the  citizens  of  Georgia  have  no  right  to  enter.”   
How   to   explain   Marshall’s   change   in   opinion   regarding   Aboriginal   sovereignty  
between the 1923 ruling in Johnson v. MacIntosh and Worcester v. Georgia less than a 
decade later? The latter ruling actually contradicts some of the key assumptions of the 
earlier ones. The most likely explanation is that in the earlier ruling, Marshall had been 
primarily concerned with white settlers who had received grants of Aboriginal land from 
state governments. In the Worcester case, the context had changed: the removals issue was 
a national controversy, and it was clear that the fate of the Cherokee nation depended upon 
Marshall’s   decision (Banner 2007). This is an argument against a formal reading of 
sovereignty and the laws that uphold it. Neither indigenous sovereignty nor the Supreme 
Court rulings that affected it existed in a vacuum: historical and political context were 
essential to understanding them.  
That the formal victory of Worcester v. Georgia was politically inconsequential is 
evidenced by the end result. In late 1835 the treaty of New Echota was signed; by its 
provision, the Cherokees gave up all of their land — totaling 8 million acres — in exchange 
for $5 million and land west of the Mississippi. Yet despite this agreement, most members 
of the Cherokee nation still opposed relocation. The Cherokee nation consisted of enough 
people that its removal was intended to occur through several stages, of which the treaty 
signers were in the first, small, stage. Their voyage was relatively swift and healthy, and 
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they arrived in Oklahoma in 1837. But the discovery of gold within Cherokee territory 
combined with the general demand for land to produce sufficient pressure for the 
immediate removal of the rest of the population.56 In 1838 soldiers led by General Winfield 
Scott rounded them up and organized them into prison camps. From there they embarked 
on  a  long  winter  march  west,  the  infamous  “trail  of  tears”; during which one of every four 
Cherokees died en route (Brown 1970). 
The context was also essential to understanding how a major vindication of the 
Cherokees’ rights as was contained in the Worcester case ultimately failed to have any real 
effect.57 The state of Georgia carried out the narrow mandate resulting from the decision: it 
pardoned Worcester. If other cases had made it before the Supreme Court it likely would 
have ruled on similar grounds, overturning a particular conviction or restoring one 
particular  plaintiff’s  property.  But  the  court  could  not  require  the  state  government  to  stop  
trying to intimidate and harass the Cherokees into signing away their land, nor could it 
mandate the federal government intervene to that effect. This helps explain American 
governments’   consistent   reliance   upon   treaties   and   contracts   as   the   main   tools   of  
dispossession. True, the use of such tools provided a thin veneer of legality on a process 
that amounted to organized theft on a grand scale. But that does not mean the legality was 
purely superficial. By respecting the laws, a government could support and justify its own 
actions regarding Aboriginal land. At the same time, respecting the letter — if not the spirit 
— of the law validated the entire legal system. And that system was set up so that it could 
                                                 
56 In 1830 state legislators held a land lottery to distribute Cherokee land to white prospectors. 
57 In 1834, Congress passed the final Indian Intercourse Act. It identified an area known as “Indian territory,” 
specifically “all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi and not within the states of Missouri and 
Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas” (Trade and Intercourse Act, June 30, 1834, quoted in Prucha 
1990:63). The Indian Territory echoed the British Royal Proclamation of 1763, which set aside Crown lands 
east of the Appalachian Mountains for white settlement. The final Intercourse act combined with the Indian 
Removal Act to forcefully abrogate whatever meaningful recognition of national sovereignty for First Nations 
still remained at this point.  
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not challenge the most fundamental power relations. And those power relations were how 
First Nations lost their land.  
The presence of a legal system and a modern state did not make the process fair, 
except in the most superficial ways; to the contrary, the state supported and facilitated the 
massive transfer of indigenous land into non-native hands. In the next section I use a case 
study to show exactly how a legal system and modern state could be imposed upon one 
particular First Nation, with the effect that that First Nation lost its property and 
sovereignty. As much as any Aboriginal nation, the Cherokees embraced the trappings of 
formal sovereignty. It did not help them. Moreover, it demonstrated that the primary goals 
of removal policies were the acquisition of desirable land and the generalized extermination 
of   indigenous   people:   “Indian   Removal…was a rejection of all Indians as Indians, not 
simply a rejection of unassimilated Indians who would not accept the American life-style”  
(Horsman, 1981:192). Other First Nations attempted more direct, violent forms of 
resistance to removals. The Black Hawk War in Illinois and Wisconsin lasted fifteen weeks 
in 1832. The Second Seminole War of 1835–1842 involved eleven thousand federal troops 
(Mayers 2007:80-105). The Muskogee also resisted in their own ways. As we shall see in 
the next section, their fate was no better than that of the Cherokee. 
 
Governance: The Case of the Muskogee 
The effects of European contact on indigenous governance structures and practices 
are illustrated with dramatic clarity by the changes experienced by the so-called Five 
Civilized Tribes of the South (made up of the Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and 
Seminole). As one illustrative example let us consider the experience of the Muskogee, or 
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Creek. (This section is based on Braund 2008:3-24, 139-162; Deloria and Lytle 1984:20-
27; and Green 1982:69-141.) The Muskogee confederacy was made up of a number of 
towns, which were communities that controlled a certain territory. By the time of European 
contact, the confederacy was made up of fifty to eighty towns whose members spoke at 
least six different languages. The population of the towns typically ranged from 200 to 600. 
When the population of a town reached 600, it would often split into two separate towns on 
nearby sites. Although these towns shared common culture, history, and some family roots, 
their union was primarily a political one. The Muskogee kinship structure was based on 
matrilineal clans, who shared a common ancestor. Members of every clan lived in each 
town in the confederacy, with large extended families — all members of the same clan — 
living together in a cluster of houses.   
At the moment of European contact, the Muskogee were a nation. The confederacy 
was divided into two groups, called the Upper and Lower towns by Europeans. Although 
this  division  existed  before  trading  relationships  had  been  firmly  established  with  Britain’s  
Atlantic colonies, it designated the relative proximity to the two main trade paths linking 
the confederacy with South Carolina. The Upper and Lower nations held separate councils 
and often pursued different foreign policies. The towns in the confederacy were further 
divided   into  one  of   two   classifications:   “red,”  or  war   towns,  or   “white,”   or  peace   towns.  
Red towns were responsible for military and foreign relations — with other confederacies 
and also with European colonial officials. White towns held all councils, developed laws 
and treaties, and oversaw all internal affairs, including adoption. The distinction between 
red and white towns bears rough similarity to what a government in the European tradition 
might have classified as the division between foreign and domestic affairs, but in fact the 
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designations carried historic and ceremonial significance as well administrative and 
governmental.  
Each town was led by a micco (typically referred to as the headman by Europeans, 
although the term was sometimes translated   as   “king”),   a   political   figure   who   was  
appointed   for   life   unless   “recalled”   for   bad   behaviour, and who was advised by two 
councils, including one made up of respected elders known as the Beloved Men. Each town 
also had a structure of war officials and leaders organized along roughly parallel lines. This 
basic structure, allowing for some variations reflecting different cultural histories, was 
common across all Muskogee towns. Although they were influential figures, the headmen 
and councils did not enjoy any material advantage as a result of their position, and all were 
expected to contribute their share of work and hunting. Moreover, they did not possess 
coercive power, they did not have the political authority to impose decisions, an authority 
that the British considered essential to good government. This traditional governance 
structure reflected a culture that valued democracy more than efficiency.  
The towns had always valued autonomy and independence, but increased contact 
with Europeans in the form of trading and diplomatic relations forced them more frequently 
into collective actions. Yet, in a political culture that placed such high value on debate and 
democracy, the new pressures to work together had an unexpected result: the basic 
equivalent of a party system, in which popular headmen built support among like-minded 
people in their regions. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these influential leaders 
were courted by Europeans, which had the circular effect of reinforcing their authority. 
During the American Revolutionary War, the status of the war chiefs was elevated above 
those of the peace chiefs. The Muskogee were allied with the British, and sustained conflict 
with the Americans, lingering territorial disputes with the Spanish, and diplomatic 
167  
 
 
complexities with the British dramatically intensified the demands placed upon the war 
chiefs. The number of war chiefs was steadily increased in an attempt to address the 
numerous threats and complications that these three state governments posed to the 
Muskogee. These pressures produced a new form of government, led by two principal 
chiefs, one from each of the upper and lower towns. A new confederate council structure 
also evolved out of the old confederate structure; unlike the former structure, which 
performed ceremonial and judicial functions, the new one was essentially legislative. After 
American secession, the requirements of dealing with the US government continued to 
reshape the Muskogee governing structure. It moved away from the more democratic pre-
contact form, and toward what was now recognizable as a federal structure.   
In the 1820s the Muskogee entered into a series of superficially voluntary 
transactions with the federal government. In 1821, they sold almost half of their land in 
what was then Georgia, and soon after this deal had closed they found themselves under 
intense pressure from federal commissioners to sell the rest. This took the form of an 
“offer”  to  purchase  that  barely  hid  a  threat: 
If you wish to quit the chase, to free yourself from barbarism, and settle 
down in the calm pursuits of civilization, and good morals, and to raise up a 
generation of Christians, you had better go. The aid and protection of the 
government   will   go   with   you….You   must   be sensible that it will be 
impossible for you to remain for any length of time in your present situation 
as a distinct Society or Nations, within the limits of Georgia. Such a 
community is incompatible with our System and must yield to it. (Quoted in 
Banner 2007:197) 
  
The Muskogee leadership resisted such threats, but in 1825, a dissident group 
signed the Treaty of Indian Springs, which exchanged all remaining Muskogee land for 
new land in Arkansas and cash. Even though the leader of this group was executed for 
treason and the treaty abrogated, the pressures to sell continued to mount, and by 1827 they 
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had sold their land and moved to Alabama. Even this provided only temporary respite, and 
in the 1830s the Muskogee people were forcibly relocated by the US government to what is 
now Oklahoma.  
At   that   time,   the   confederacy’s   government   had   taken   the   form   of   a   two-house 
legislature with appointed executive officials. In the 1860s, further major reforms were 
effected. The former distinction between upper and lower towns was eliminated. A 
principle chief and a second chief together became a permanent executive branch of the 
government, which now included a council made up of influential men from each town. 
The nation was divided into four judicial districts, with a judge in each district; above this 
level five judges were appointed to the supreme court of the Muskogee nation. And a 
national police force was created, made up of former second-ranking warriors. In 1867, 
following the US Civil War, the US government demanded that the Muskogee legislature 
become a two-house body made up of the House of Kings and the House of Warriors — 
finally eliminating the former distinction between the white towns and red towns, and 
merging   “foreign”   and   “domestic”   functions   into   one.   The   evolution   of   the   Muskogee 
governance structure from a traditional indigenous, democratic form to a European-style 
government with an executive branch, courts, and police was a lengthy iterative process. 
However, the prevailing pressures that shaped the changes came from European contact in 
the form of trade, incursion into traditional Muskogee territories, diplomacy and military 
alliances, and then the direct demands of the US state. 
Also in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, the federal government initiated a 
process of making the Five Civilized Tribes (of which the Muskogee were a member) 
territory an independent Indian state within the United States. While the prospect of 
achieving statehood did not please many members of the Five Civilized Tribes, the 
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possibility did seem to offer protection from further forced relocation. The US Congress 
saw this as test case, and funded a series of annual meetings in which the tribal leadership 
submitted a series of proposed constitutions, which were intended to preserve as much as 
possible cultural traditions while moving the territory toward statehood. Congress and 
presidents and secretaries of the interior rejected these proposals, with the major problem 
being that none of the proposals included any formula or mechanism for allotting tribal 
lands — in other words, the indigenous nations were determined to maintain the communal 
holding of land. For the federal government the notion that a state could exist without a 
regime of personal land tenure was completely unacceptable (and likely absurd). 
Commerce would be impossible without the private ownership of land. Thus, the US 
government’s  attempt  to  force  these  indigenous  nations into adopting the nation-state form 
foundered on the issue of property rights. The idea of statehood was abandoned, and in 
1898  the  federal  government’s  Curtis  Act  gave  indigenous  nations  a  date  by  which  they  had  
to have negotiated allotment of their communally held lands; if this deadline was not met, 
the government had the authority to unilaterally dissolve tribal governments and allot land 
into private hands. In the terms of our Lefebvrian analysis, we might say that 
homogenization could not happen without fragmentation. 
 
Reservations  
The  strategy  of  “removing”   indigenous  people,  pushing   them  ever  westward,  only  
partially and temporary satisfied the insatiable settler demand for land. Shortly after the 
removals of the 1830s, white settlers were moving across the Mississippi in gigantic 
numbers, and they were quickly claiming land all the way to the Pacific Ocean. The 
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construction of the Pacific railroad, as much as any other development, fuelled westward 
expansion (Wilmer 1993:99). By 1840, with very few small exceptions, the eastern third of 
what would become the contiguous United States had been cleared of all indigenous 
people. But white settlements were also already reaching the Pacific coast: Oregon was 
purchased from Britain in 1846, and in 1848 the vast northern half of Mexico — land that 
would become California, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, and southern Colorado — 
was taken by force. For example, in 1848 the non-native population of California was 
estimated to be approximately 15,000. By 1854 over 300,000 settlers had arrived.58 
Meanwhile, the Aboriginal population, which stood at an estimated 150,000 in 1848, began 
a steady decline, to below 30,000 in 1870. The presidents, such as Jefferson and Jackson, 
who only recently had advanced policies intended to push the indigenous population ever-
westward, could surely not have foreseen how quickly events would overtake those plans. 
“Native   North   Americans   were   now   caught   in   a   vise”   — surrounded on all sides by 
burgeoning white settlement — “from   which   there   was   truly   no   escape”59 (Churchill 
1997:218-219).  
There was no more western land on which to relocate Aboriginal people, so 
westward removals could not continue. The government solution to this problem was the 
introduction of the reservation system. Reservations were not a new idea in the United 
States. Some of the earliest treaties between the US government and First Nations signed in 
the late eighteenth century included zones of Aboriginal territory surrounded by white 
settlement. These were referred to as reservations or reserve land in keeping with the 
                                                 
58 US Census Bureau, accessed online Sept 1, 2010. 
59 Local exterminationist sentiments fuelled an astonishing wave of several hundred brutal attacks on 
indigenous settlements carried out by gangs of vigilantes or paramilitaries. This form   of   “free-enterprise”  
racial lynching was effectively condoned by governments, who offered a bounty on the scalps of victims 
(Carranco and Beard 1981; Churchill 1997; Eckert 1995). 
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meaning of the term as it was used in early property law.60 If the seller of a piece of land 
maintained some rights to the land — either a portion of it, or the right to use it for certain 
purposes, such as grazing — this was referred to as a reserve. The difference in this case 
was that people were being relocated to land the government owned and chose to reserve 
for this purpose. Relocation happened almost entirely on land that the government had 
recently purchased from western First Nations, and that would have been sold to white 
settlers if not used for reserves (Banner 2007). It is significant that this terminology has its 
roots in the private sale of land. Even though the idea of reserves had been around for 
decades, in the decades in which the system itself was established, between the 1850s and 
the 1880s, the velocity of land appropriation accelerated intensely. It had taken 250 years 
for whites to acquire the eastern half of the United States; it took only three decades to 
acquire the western half.  
Reservations were fundamentally a matter of land-taking, and the primary goal was 
to prevent Aboriginal interference in white migration and settlement in the West. Still, 
many proponents argued that the reservations system would protect Aboriginal welfare. 
There were several variations on this theme, some of them based more than others on 
genuine humanitarianism. Perhaps the most honest such argument was that the reserve 
system would protect Aboriginal people from settler violence on the frontier. Given the 
brutal violence being levelled against Aboriginal people on the frontier, many proponents 
portrayed reservations as basically benevolent because they move Aboriginal people out of 
the line of fire. This notion of reservations-as-sanctuary was frequently accompanied by 
another set of arguments in favour of the new policy, a series of interrelated ideas centred 
                                                 
60 The   “praying   towns”   of   seventeenth-century  New   England   and   the   “demonstration   farms”   proposed   by  
Thomas Jefferson a century and a half later stand as other examples. See Wilson (1998). 
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around the assumption that indigenous people were in transition from barbarism to 
civilization. Reserves offered a permanent settlement, and the promise of an end once and 
for  all  to  a  “nomadic”  lifestyle.  In  this  way,  reserves  represented  the  logical  culmination  of  
English ideas of land rights following from improvement in the form of agriculture.  
A closely related argument for reservations was that they offered the cultural 
benefits   of   “civilization”: in addition to agriculture, these included Christianity, literacy, 
and the discipline of work. In 1849, the federal  government’s  Committee  on  Indian  Affairs  
proposed   that   the   “only   alternative   to   extinction”  was   to   settle   “our   colonized   tribes”   on  
reservations,   where   they   would   be   sheltered   until   they   were   “sufficiently   advanced   in  
civilization…to  be  able  to  maintain themselves in close proximity with, or in the midst of, a 
white   population.”  This   view  was   summarized  was   brutal   clarity   by   the  Secretary   of   the  
Interior:  “the  policy  of  removal…must  necessarily  be  abandoned;;  and  the  only  alternatives  
left are, to civilize or exterminate them”  (quoted in Wilson 1998:289). 
The logical accompaniment of such ideas was a federally mandated education 
system, of which several hundred Indian Industrial Schools were the signal institutional 
form. This was intended to retrain indigenous people out of their traditional culture. As the 
motto of one school declared, the goal was the total destruction of indigenous culture: 
“From  Savagery  to  Civilization.”  During  vacations,  students  were  not  allowed  to  return  to  
their families but instead were placed in white homes. After all traces of indigenous 
language, spirituality, dress, kinship and political structures had been eradicated, the 
reservation system could be dissolved, and indigenous people released from their cultural 
quarantine, now able to blend into American society without difficulty (Otis 1973, as in 
Mayers 2007:176-177). Nonetheless, the strategy of pursuing cultural homogenization by 
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“civilizing”  Aboriginal  societies  always  dovetailed  with  the  imperative  of  transferring  their 
land into private (white) hands (Wilmer 1993:174). 
 
Race and Manifest Destiny 
Those who supported reservations on the grounds that they would civilize the 
Indians drew on an emerging racial discourse. In the nineteenth century, the powerful 
mythology of the freedom-loving Saxons that had animated American revolutionaries 
underwent   a   change.   English   writers   began   using   the   term   “Anglo-Saxon”   as   a   broader  
racial designation, which referred to Englishmen as well as a poorly defined but powerful 
notion of a fraternity of white English-speaking people in Britain and beyond. In the 1840s, 
in  the  US,  the  term  “Anglo-Saxon”  became  more  common  and  less  precise,  now  referring  
to white Americans, although always vaguely informed by an awareness of backward 
linkages with the Saxon myth. The racially informed belief in the inherent superiority of 
Anglo-Saxon political institutions now took on an even stronger cultural aspect. It was 
informed by a rising European Romanticism (Horsman 1981).  
Romantics argued for the restoration of their national cultures. One of 
Romanticism’s themes along these lines was the assertion of nationalism through a focus 
on national languages, folklore, customs, and   traditions.   Now,   “as   German   philologists  
linked   language   to   race,”   Horsman   (1981:5)   writes,   “Americans   were   able   to   see   new  
meaning  in  their  drive  to  the  Pacific  and  Asia….Americans  had  long  believed  they  were  a  
chosen people, but by the mid-nineteenth century they also believed that they were a 
chosen people with an impeccable ancestry.”   
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Yet there was a necessary divergence between American and European forms of 
Romanticism. In Europe at the turn of the nineteenth century, in the wake of the French 
Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and the coming of the Industrial Revolution combined to 
produced a prevailing consciousness that the old order had passed and a new one begun. In 
this philosophical context, writers drew upon conventional mythological figures, whether 
they were attempting to return to the old order (by, for example, portraying a victory of 
reason and order over radical passion) or celebrate its destruction (by inverting the 
mythology’s   conventional   morality).   In   contrast,   Americans   were   constantly   confronted  
with the conflicts arising from an ever-shifting frontier. Consequently, while European and 
American writers alike drew upon a vocabulary of frontier character types to embody social 
and philosophical values and ideas, American sources of frontier material were ever-
changing;;   it   was   “therefore   inevitable   that   the  movement of the American literary mind 
during the Romantic era should be, figuratively and to a degree literally, a movement 
toward the Indian”  (Slotkin  2000:  371). 
 
Treaties and Allotment 
By the 1850s, almost all Aboriginal land cessions included two components: the 
federal government purchase of the land in question, and the designation of a specific area 
of land on which the selling First Nation would set up its new home. In some cases the 
reserve was located on a portion of the land that had been sold; in other words, the sellers 
retained a small portion of their territory. This was done through the treaty mechanism. In 
other cases, the federal government allocated some of its own holdings — land that would 
otherwise have been put up for sale to white settlers. But no matter which option was 
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chosen, as had always been the case, reservations required the formal consent of the First 
Nations involved. Throughout the nineteenth century, the courts continued to uphold 
Aboriginal land title as a consequence of the right of occupancy. The federal government 
had the exclusive right to purchase the right of occupancy, but it could not legally force a 
sale.  
Recall that the Supreme Court ruling in the 1823 case of Johnson v. MacIntosh, in 
which the court first discussed Aboriginal property rights to their unsold land, seemed to 
leave open some possibility that the government could appropriate such land. But 
subsequent rulings, as well as the general rule in federal government policies, made it clear: 
Aboriginal land rights, based in their right of occupancy, were as meaningful and 
consequential as white fee simple. In other words, as a matter of law, the only way to 
acquire land from First Nations was to purchase it. (And as a matter of policy only the 
federal government could do the direct purchasing.) In the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the tension between the formal law requiring land to be acquired by purchase and 
the real practices of land acquisition became especially acute. Sometimes the necessary 
signatures were obtained by threat, bribery, or forgery. Reservation s were a form of 
cultural segregation, played out in the clearest imaginable form of dislocation across space; 
they  were  met  with   resistance  from  indigenous   leaders  who  “disapproved  of  a   future that 
tolerated their physical existence but scheduled their cultural disappearance”   (Mayers  
2007:161). Sometimes efforts to force an intransigent First Nation onto a reserve were 
brutal.  
Among the many documented examples of frontier violence, the massacre that 
occurred in 1864 at a small, unarmed Cheyenne and Arapaho village in eastern Colorado 
called Sand Creek stands out. At the time, Colorado was the western frontier of white 
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settlement. Settlers were pouring into the state, with many squatting on Cheyenne and 
Arapaho territory. Some of the Cheyenne chiefs had agreed to give up land in exchange for 
reserve land, but others had not, a situation that frustrated settlers to no end. An angry, 
violent rhetoric featuring genocidal threats was encouraged by the local newspaper, the 
Rocky Mountain News,  which  started  a  campaign  in  support  of  Indian  extermination:  “They  
are a disolute, vagabondish, brutal, and ungrateful race, and ought to be wiped from the 
face  of  the  earth,”  the  News’ editorial wrote in 1863. Moreover, an upcoming vote on the 
question of whether Colorado should move toward statehood contributed to the problems, 
as proponents claimed having the status of a state would allow the government to assemble 
more troops to police the Aboriginal population.  
In 1864, a family of settlers was killed by Indian raiders. No one knew who had 
carried out the killings, nor which nation they were from. The governor issued an 
emergency proclamation, authorizing civilian soldiers to kill any Indians they could find. In 
exchange they would be entitled to whatever property they were able to loot, and the 
governor also promised to petition the federal government for additional payment. The 
News urged   “extermination   against   the   red   devils.”   Out   of   this   political context rode a 
group of about 700 heavily armed soldiers, led by the former Methodist missionary, 
Colonel John Chivington. Chivington also happened to be a candidate in the upcoming 
Congressional   elections.  His   stated   policy  was   “kill   and   scalp   all,   little   and   big,”   on   the  
logic  that  “nits  make  lice.”  In  other  words,  Aboriginal  children  were  nits,  and  the  only  way  
to get rid of the annoyance of lice was to kill all the children.  
On   the  morning   that   Chivington’s   troops   attacked   the   village   of   Sand  Creek, the 
population was an estimated 600 people. Almost all the young men in the village were 
away on a buffalo hunt. As well, the villagers had voluntarily disarmed themselves a few 
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days earlier. They had turned in all but their essential hunting weapons at Fort Lyon, in 
order to demonstrate they were not hostile. Chivington was told the governor of Colorado 
technically considered the residents of Sand Creek to be harmless and disarmed prisoners 
of   war.   Even   still,   Chivington’s   troops   moved   in   with   military-level aggression. The 
Cheyenne chief flew a white flag and an American flag in an effort to show this was not a 
hostile camp. But the massacre would not be stopped. Cannons were fired into groups of 
Indians and as they scattered they were chased down on horseback. As one of the Colonel’s 
guides later testified: 
After the firing the warriors put the squaws and children together, and 
surrounded them to protect them. I saw five squaws under a bank for shelter. 
When the troops came up to them they ran out and showed their persons, to 
let the soldiers know they were squaws and begged for mercy, but the 
soldiers  shot  them  all….they sent out a little girl about six years old with a 
white flag on a stick; she had not proceeded but a few steps when she was 
shot and  killed….I   saw  quite  a  number  of   infants   in  arms  killed  with   their  
mothers. (As quoted in Stannard 1992:132)  
 
Another   participant   later   admitted,   “it  was   hard   to   see   little   children   on   their   knees   have  
their brains beat out by men professing to be civilized”   (as quoted in Mayers 2007:164). 
Once   the  massacre  was  over,  Colonel  Chivington  described   it   to   the  press  as  “one  of   the  
most  bloody  Indian  battles  ever  fought”  against  “one  of   the  most  powerful  villages  in   the  
Cheyenne nation”   (quoted in Stannard 1992:133). Although the Rocky Mountain News 
joked  about   the  victims’  body  parts   taken  as   trophies  by   the  soldiers  — “Cheynne  scalps  
are getting as thick here now as toads in Egypt. Everybody has got one and is anxious to get 
another to send east”  — the killings at Sand Creek shocked eastern liberal society. Even 
though the survivors gave in and moved to the reservation, this was far from the process 
that proponents of reserves had envisaged. Sand Creek became an important symbol of the 
failures of the reservation system.  
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 When the reservations system was set up, it was rationalized through two basically 
contradictory arguments: it would help confine and contain Aboriginal people, keeping 
them out of the way of white settlers; and it would protect them. By the 1870s it was clear 
that the first of these was the real goal. In some cases the government forced First Nations 
onto reserve land they did not want, or forced dissenting members onto land they did not 
wish to inhabit. Perhaps the most striking illustration of the true function of reserves was 
the increasingly common practice of the government sending the army to track down 
people who had escaped from reservations and returning them there. In the 1870s, a group 
from the Nez Percé nation escaped their reservation and attempted to flee to Canada. 
Several hundred Cheyennes escaped their reservation in Oklahoma; they were violently 
captured after six months and the survivors forced to return to the reservation. In 1879 
Chief Standing Bear led most of his Poncas nation in an escape which attracted national 
attention and the support of white reformers. By now it was clear: reserves were more 
prison than sanctuary.   
 The gap between formal, legal sovereignty and sometimes brutally violent real 
practices was always a function of the relative power balance between whites and First 
Nations.  As   the   nineteenth   century   progressed,   the  white   population’s   relative   power,   in  
terms of wealth, technology, and sheer numbers, was greater than ever. Yet,  
as a matter of Supreme Court doctrine, the Indians continued to enjoy the right 
to live on their own land as long as they wanted to. They had the power, in 
theory, to refuse to convey their land to the government, to refuse to move to a 
reservation, and to leave a reservation so long as they were not trespassing on 
someone  else’s  land.  As  accounts  of  forced  relocations  and  foiled  escapes  filled  
the newspapers, and as Congress held hearings into atrocities committed by the 
United States soldiers in the course of herding the Indians into reservations, 
Supreme Court justices could hardly have avoided learning the reality of life in 
the West. Yet the Court continued to adhere to the fiction that Indian land 
transactions were void unless voluntarily entered into by the Indians. (Banner 
2007:244) 
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 The courts treated treaties with First Nations as the equivalent of international 
treaties, at least in one important respect: they could be repealed. This was a complicated 
issue. On the one hand, First Nations were treated as wards of the state. They were 
dependent in many ways upon the state for protection, etc. They were not equals. Yet, 
formally speaking, treaties with First Nations were just like treaties with foreign countries, 
in that they were agreements between sovereigns. This is an example of how the separation 
between the political and the economic — of the gap between formal sovereignty and real 
power — was used as a tool of dispossession.  
 This basic truth remained largely unchanged. Thus, in the final decades of the 
nineteenth century, some of the main ideas that had animated policies and debates in the 
years after contact reappeared. There was extensive and growing dissatisfaction with the 
reservation system, not only from liberal white reformers (who typically lived in the north 
and east of the country), but also from westerners. As the white population continued to 
swell, and demand for land grew commensurately, reserves that previously had seemed 
reasonably sized now seemed — in the eyes of settlers — far too big. The discourse of 
improvement was once again mobilized to portray reserve land as being so unproductively 
used that it was essentially wasteland.  
One idea that gained a good deal of prominence was the notion that First Nations on 
reservations were fundamentally hampered by the absence of a private-property system. 
Land within a reservation was granted to the First Nation as a collective entity, not to 
individual members. Even though most of these communities did have systems of land 
tenure that incorporated some individual property rights, a lack of government-defined 
individual property rights was widely identified as an impediment to investment. (In reality, 
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if anything made land tenure on reserves too insecure to encourage investment it was the 
government’s   practice   of   moving   reservations   around,   moving   and   combining   different  
Aboriginal nations onto different territories, and shifting the borders of reserves.)  
 In 1881, there were 156 million acres of Indian land under the protection of the US 
government, almost all of it west of the Mississippi river. This included the self-governing 
Indian Territory (which is now Oklahoma) in addition to numerous reservations. Without 
titles, Indians could not sell land or lease it (to grazers, for example). The idea of breaking 
up reservation land gained currency, supported by an awkward political coalition of white 
reformers who saw it as the key to assimilation, and western landowners and speculators. 
The General Allotment Act (the Dawes Act), which was passed by Congress in 1887, was 
the  legislative  foundation  of  assimilation;;  in  Theodore  Roosevelt’s  words,  it  was  “a  mighty  
pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass”   (Quoted   in   Wilson   1998:303). It was 
intended carve up Indian land into fee-simple plots to be held by individuals or families. 
The legislation gave the President the power to compel allotment of a reservation (with 
some exceptions). This was to occur when the president was satisfied that the First Nation 
in question had  achieved  a  sufficient   level  of  civilization,  although  “it  soon  became  clear  
that   tribes  were   as   likely   to   be   selected   for   the   quality   of   their   ‘surplus’   land   as   for   the  
degree  of  ‘civilization’  they  had  attained”  (Wilson  1998:304). Land was assigned roughly 
on the basis of household size. At first, these allotments were held in trust for 25 years, to 
encourage landholders to work the land rather than sell it immediately, but this restriction 
was soon relaxed. In a parallel development, unallotted land was deemed surplus, and open 
for settlement. This was not the case for land on the self-governing Indian Territory. Those 
nations legally owned all the land, and so there was so surplus to revert to the federal 
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government. However, the people who received land through allotments often sold it (in 
many cases keeping a small portion as a homestead) to whites.  
The aggregate effect was to open up nearly all Indian land for private acquisition by 
speculators and settlers: they could lease allotted land, purchase it after the trusteeship had 
been lifted, or purchase the surplus. By the late 1880s the white settler demand for western 
land was intense, and with the allotment system now exposing most Indian land to the 
market,  the  land  in  “Indian  country”  was  quickly  becoming predominantly the property of 
non-Indians (Weaver 2006:332-333). In  fact,  allotment’s  two  ostensible  goals  — to protect 
Indian land and encourage Indian farming — both failed. During the 47 years in which the 
Dawes Act was in effect, Aboriginal landholdings in the US dropped from 138 million to 
86 million acres, and during the same period the extent of Aboriginal farming fell, both in 
absolute terms and relative to whites (Banner 2007:257).  
This takes us back to the beginning of our narrative — to the enclosures movement 
in England. Allotment featured almost exactly the same process of breaking up 
communally held land into small, privately held parcels. The shift from a functionally 
organized system of land tenure to a spatially organized one characterized not only the 
enclosure of common lands, but also the shift from traditional Aboriginal forms of land 
tenure to European models in which land was help privately and subject to sale. Many 
Aboriginal leaders based their argument against allotment on these very grounds. For 
example, the Cherokees already had a system of private property, but it was in the use of 
land. As Cherokee chief Dennis Bushyhead argued: 
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A Cherokee is entitled to all the land he can cultivate and the exclusive use of 
land a quarter of a mile outside his fence. These rights descend to children and 
heirs, or can be sold and are sold continually, but the right is in the use; the 
property is in the improvements, and the land is not itself a chattel that can be 
speculated on whether cultivated or not. If it is abandoned for two years it 
reverts to the public domain, and any Cherokee can take unoccupied portions. 
This, like the air and waters, is the heritage of the people; if it were otherwise, 
our domain would soon drift into the hands of a few, and our poor people, in a 
few years, would become like your poor people, most of whom, if they died 
tomorrow,   do   not   own   a   foot   of   the   earth’s   surface   in   which   they   could   be 
buried. If this is the phase of your civilization, to which you are at present so 
nervously inviting us, can you wonder if we pause to study the present 
tendencies and probable future of this fearfully anti-republic system? Our 
people have been taught from remote ages to believe that the surface of the 
earth, apart from its use, is not a chattel. We are neither socialists nor 
communists, but we have a land system which we believe to be better than any 
you can devise for us. Individual rights are fully respected, but the rights of the 
whole people are not destroyed. (Quoted in Banner 2007: 265) 
  
The response to this was summarized by Senator Henry Dawes, who, after a visit to the 
Cherokee nation in 1885, wrote:  
The head chief told us that there was not a family in that whole nation that had 
not a home of its own. There was not a pauper in that nation, and the nation did 
not owe a dollar. It built its own capitol, in which we had this examination, and 
it built its schools and its hospitals. Yet the defect of the system was apparent. 
They have got as far as they can go, because they own their land in 
common….there   is   no   enterprise   to  make   your   home   any   better   than   that   of  
your neighbours’. There is no selfishness, which is at the bottom of civilization. 
(Quoted in Wilson 1998:300) 
 
Allotment was formally ended with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act in 
1934. Under this legislation, the Bureau of Indian Affairs was authorized to return to 
reservations land that had been removed but not yet sold to white settlers. In other words, 
the government was committing itself to a package of policies that were exactly the 
opposite of those that had underpinned allotment: the new goal was to preserve and protect 
traditional forms of land ownership. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
Conventionally there have been two main ways of dealing with the presence of non-state 
forms of sovereignty, such as those embodied by indigenous nations, in the international 
states-system. The first is, in effect, to define them away — as out of bounds for 
consideration — on the tautological ground that Indigenous peoples have not adopted the 
territorial nation-state form of sovereignty required to enter the international sphere. The 
other main approach, commonly associated with a liberal discourse of recognition, is to 
argue that First Nations are equivalent to states. The second approach, no less than the first, 
reproduces the Eurocentric norm of sovereignty by confirming the nation-state form as the 
benchmark for legitimacy. How to bring Aboriginal peoples into IR without granting the 
modern European state as the only legitimate form of sovereignty is the problem this 
dissertation addresses. My account of the historical confrontation between European 
colonists and First Nations in North America from first contact until the end of the 
nineteenth century takes issue  with  the  assumption  of  formal  sovereignty   in  IR’s  attempts  
to account for Indigenous peoples. I have argued that an assumption of formal sovereignty 
is built into the traditional IR account of colonialism, and shared by liberal and 
constructivist critics   alike.   By   “formal”   I   mean   the   conventional   understanding   of  
sovereignty based on recognition, and with insufficient regard for cultural, political or 
historical context. I argue that the establishment of sovereignty is not a story of recognition, 
but of social relations. More specifically, it is the story of social relations that are played 
out in geographical space — and at the same time concealed by assumptions of empty 
space. I refer to this framework as spatial social relations.  
 
My first two historical chapters call into question some core IR assumptions 
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about  state  sovereignty.  First,  there  was  no  such  thing  as  a  “European”  state:  different  
European powers interacted with the peoples they encountered in the New World in 
different ways. There were different forms of modern state in Europe, and the specific 
moments of state formation were unevenly timed, with economic ambitions, culture, 
and domestic social relations accounting for most of the variations between different 
imperial systems. An assumption of formal sovereignty, such as characterizes most 
IR accounts of colonialism, obscures these dynamics. In chapter 3, my first historical 
chapter, I contrast the English and Spanish colonial presences, emphasizing the 
importance of the modern English state, which emerged out of sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century England, with its separation between sovereignty and property.  
Chapter 4 takes this line of thinking further: even though the modern state 
form that emerged out of England would come to define the state in the new world, 
“England”  was  not  simply  reproduced  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic.  The  dominant  
trends that first emerged and flourished in England were refined by the tensions 
between metropolitan government officials, colonial administrators, and land-hunters 
on settlement frontiers. The modern state form, which emerged out of England, 
spread out over the surface of the globe, but this process was not frictionless. As the 
colonial frontier moved geographically further away from the metropolitan centre, the 
friction increased. This is why geography matters, and illustrates why a spatially 
informed theory is important to an analysis of colonialism.  
The next two historical chapters highlight the real historical influence of the state. 
Where (neo)realists in IR take the state form for granted, constructivists have 
attempted to address the absence of indigenous experience from the discipline — on 
the grounds that stateless indigenous nations are not sovereign international actors — 
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by challenging the conceptual authority of the sovereign state. The latter approach 
amounts   to   an   attempt   to   wish   away   the   state’s   real   political   authority.   And   it  
overlooks the agency of Indigenous peoples, who had a major influence in shaping 
modern sovereignty. Rather than an all-or-nothing approach to the state form, I show 
how the English and then US governments took over control of land acquisition, and 
then, in the US case, used tools such as reservations and allotment to directly move 
Aboriginal communities around — all in the interest of freeing up land for white 
acquisition. 
The emergence of separate public and private spheres distinguished the modern 
state from the feudal state, in which land ownership and sovereignty had been largely 
conterminous (with both being held by the Crown). Pre-modern European states were 
characterized by exclusive territorial sovereignty, but non-exclusive property: while the 
state exercised exclusive territorial jurisdiction, within the state itself land might be subject 
to multiple, non-exclusive forms of ownership. Nor was the property-sovereignty 
distinction characteristic of traditional indigenous governance structures, where land was 
not privately owned, nor subject to purchase. Whereas feudal property relations and 
indigenous property relations both placed significant restrictions on the treatment of land as 
a commodity, under the modern state, private property in land is held exclusively. From the 
seventeenth century onward, as the modern state form spread across the globe, stateless 
indigenous nations were subsumed under nation-states and traditional indigenous 
governance structures were reshaped steadily away from democratic pre-contact forms by 
the requirements of dealing with nation-state governments (Warren 2005). In effect, the 
modern state was imposed upon Aboriginal people as a central part of a process of 
accumulation and exploitation. Conventional IR makes this point precisely by missing it.  
186  
 
 
In my telling, the rise of the sovereign, territorial nation-state in sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century Europe triggered a double movement. With the emergence of the 
modern, geographically bounded nation-state and attendant theories of sovereignty, the 
notion of a public realm first appeared. This called forth a reaction by private landowners, 
who pushed for the creation of a distinctly private sphere to restrain the law-making power 
of the Crown (and later Parliament) (Horwitz 1982:1423). The resulting separation between 
public and private mitigated the tension   between   “external”   sovereignty   (vis-a-vis other 
states)   and   “internal”   sovereignty   (vis-à-vis private property owners): while only one 
sovereign exercised exclusive authority over the state, internally this sovereignty was not 
absolute but rather socially and politically contested. The reason this bifurcated conceptual 
framework   resonates   at   the   deepest   levels   of   IR   is   the   discipline’s   commitment   to   the  
sovereign, territorial European state as the basic unit of analysis: sovereignty and property 
emerged as separate spheres coincidentally and relatively organically in early-modern 
Europe. In other words, grant the modern state, grant the separation between sovereignty 
and property. 
 
The Relationship Between Sovereignty and Property 
My narrative allows me to develop a richer account of sovereignty, one that is 
literally grounded in property. Indigenous communities organized themselves into political 
structures that controlled territories, practised self-government, and conducted foreign 
relations with each other using various forms of trade and diplomacy. By these formal 
criteria, they were very similar to European states, and logically might well have been 
recognized as sovereign international actors, every bit as much as states were. For our 
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purposes, the substantial differences between European and indigenous forms of political 
organization had to do with property rights. Most Aboriginal systems of land tenure did 
include private property — in the use of land. But in these systems land was inalienable. It 
was not subject to individual, exclusive ownership nor could it be sold. In these ways, 
Aboriginal modes of property ownership were similar to feudal regimes, and fundamentally 
opposed to the capitalist logic of landed property rights. But as markets emerged, land was 
re-imagined as marketable, alienable property. In the modern state, land was considered a 
commodity, which, like any other commodity, could be a source of profit. This helps 
explain why the establishment of a modern system of landed property rights was integrated 
with advances in the market economy, such as the formulation of capital-raising 
instruments such as stocks and bonds. Colonial land-taking also shared with the emerging 
market economy  and  classical  economics  “a  disregard   for  moral,   customary,  or   judicious  
restraints on dreams of unlimited material possibilities”  (Weaver  2006:348). 
The core characteristics of the process I describe in this dissertation are: 
 
1) The privatization and commodification of land. Aboriginal systems of landed 
property rights, in which land could be subject to multiple and overlapping 
ownerships, were replaced with one in which land was subject to exclusive ownership 
and could be privately transferred at law. 
2) A specifically spatial character to the new form of land tenure, which was based on 
territorial exclusivity. Simply put, a functionally organized system of land rights was 
replaced by a spatially organized one. This was accompanied by the refinement of 
abstracted representations of territory on documents. 
3)  A  “culture  of   legality”  (Weaver  2006:323),  originating   in  early-modern England, 
that ensured most land transactions were formally legal and recognized through 
treaties, even while many were voluntary agreements by First Nations in name only, 
or even outright fraudulent. 
4) The idea of improvement as a main justification for land appropriation. As the 
formation of landed property rights evolved in the New World, a parallel idea arose: 
that Indigenous peoples themselves would benefit from a process in which their land 
was taken from them. 
The cumulative effect of these elements was a near-total transfer of indigenous land 
into white hands. This occurred despite indigenous resistance, and the many 
difficulties associated with exporting social forms from the metropolitan centre where 
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they had developed, and imposing them on a colonial society that was not ordered for 
them. It was the modern state that made this possible, despite the contradictions. It is 
impossible to understand this fact — apparent contradictions and reversals in state 
policies and priorities cannot be explained — if we rely upon the conventional IR 
view of law and sovereignty in formal terms.  
Formal sovereignty — which entails the authority to set the law — was always 
present in every land transfer. For example, after an initial period of uncertainty, the 
English Crown acknowledged Aboriginal property rights, and held that Aboriginal 
land could only be obtained by contract, a position that was maintained by the US 
government. But real practices often diverged from formal law in significant ways. 
Thus, the same states that formally recognized Aboriginal land rights and insisted 
upon using treaties to acquire Aboriginal land also failed (often spectacularly) to 
enforce these policies on the colonial frontier, and in many cases treaties with First 
Nations were voluntary agreements in name only. Legal agreements and contracts 
outlining the sale of land to European settlers were often intentionally misleading or 
even fraudulent; some settlers combined tenacity and audacity to use even the 
flimsiest documentation to hold onto dubious claims for years, often then selling 
them in the knowledge that the purchaser would support the original claim. And in 
any case, if the colonizers could not achieve the property rights regime they desired 
through private law, they could always resort to the big stick of public law — that is, 
by holding sovereignty they held the power to make indigenous people suffer for 
their intransigence. 
This dissertation has highlighted a number of closely related oppositions: sovereignty 
and property; the state and the market; the political and the economic; contract and 
conquest; law and power. A formal IR theory would emphasize the first part of each 
pair: sovereignty to the exclusion of property, law over power, and so on. Yet the 
transfer of Aboriginal lands into white hands always involved both sides of these 
pairs. Law was always involved in land transfers. But so was power. The law is set by 
the state that enjoys sovereignty over a territory. English colonists, and then 
American settlers, acquired Aboriginal land within a legal and political framework set 
and enforced by their own state, and over which First Nations had no formal 
influence.  
The capacity to set the laws governing landed property — to turn power into right — 
was a huge advantage for non-Indians. Yet this does not mean Indians simply were 
victims. In fact, precisely because property rights are a form of social relations, the 
lack of formal influence over the law did not prevent First Nations from having real 
power. Military and other forms of resistance — both direct and through strategic 
alliances — trade, and other factors acted as vehicles for indigenous resistance. The 
laws and policies governing land transfers were always shaped by the relative power 
balance between whites and First Nations. In the period shortly after contact, when 
Indians were relatively powerful, laws and treaties were much more meaningful than 
they would be in later years, when the relative power balance had shifted dramatically 
away from the Indians.  
The persistence of treaties demonstrates that security of property under law was of 
central concern. Of course, this legal process was in some ways just for the sake of 
appearance. If legal standards had been much stricter, such agreements would still 
have been quite foreign to indigenous people who had a much different understanding 
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of property rights and land ownership. But being for the sake of appearance does not 
mean that the legal agreements reached with First Nations over land were not 
important. They were important for confidence: when security was established, real 
investments followed the doctrine of improvement. 
In short, the several-centuries-long acquisition of Aboriginal land was a story of 
power, but, as legal historian Stuart Banner (2007:6)  writes,  it  was  “a  more  subtle  and  
complex kind of power than we conventionally realize. It was the power to establish 
the   legal   institutions   and   the   rules   by  which   land   transactions  would   be   enforced.”  
Direct, physical violence, both private and military, was ever-present and devastating 
in its effects. But on the colonial frontier power did not only come from the barrel of 
a gun: land was also acquired by contract. Still, one fact is fundamental: whether land 
was taken more by contract or more by conquest, it was taken. The presence of a 
legal system and a modern state did not make the process fair, except in the most 
superficial ways; to the contrary, the state supported and facilitated the massive 
transfer of indigenous land into non-native hands. Consistently, the state acted to 
make Aboriginal land a commodity, after which it could be acquired by whites.  
The legacy of this process is still felt today, in ways that may not be obvious. For 
example, since 1990, property rights have been established and/or expanded in the 
former Soviet Union, following on similar processes in numerous countries from the 
so-called Third World. But even though the expansion of property rights is now 
reaching the most distant corners of the globe, this expansion is not merely 
geographical. Where the colonial version of property rights centred on landed 
property, in the contemporary world, the frontiers of property rights are not 
geographical but abstract and intellectual. These range from traditional Aboriginal 
knowledge, popular music and movies, genetic materials, licences to broadcast 
television, to carbon-tax credits, which are essentially licences to pollute. The 
complications around the establishment of landed property rights along the colonial 
frontier have found parallels in the contemporary world. Just as squatters and 
freebooters subverted colonial laws, contemporary intellectual property rights are 
undermined by including illegal copying   and   downloading,   “creative   sampling”   of  
music, and so on. In response, rights-holders and potential rights-holders have moved 
to define, clarify, and assert their claims to the valuable and ever-emerging new forms 
of property. And they have gone to the state for support — in the form of court 
rulings or government policies.  
When a vast new quantity of property — especially when it is new in kind, not just in 
degree — suddenly comes up for grabs, potential investors invariably turn to the 
state. Only governments can create and enforce the attendant system of rights for the 
new property. The connections and tensions between the state and the market — 
between sovereignty and property — to those that characterized the colonization of 
North America now animate the creation of new property rights. The new 
developments confirm one of the main insights from this dissertation: property rights 
are always political. They are contested. Neither the state nor the market is a neutral 
arbiter.  
This project demonstrates the profound and lasting legacies of the colonial 
confrontation between European states system and indigenous nations in modern 
international relations. The colonial imposition of the state form through British 
settler colonialism in North America rehearsed and anticipated some of the key 
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features of contemporary international politics.  
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